Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
Volume 22
Issue 1 Fall 1990

Article 3

1990

Confrontation at Capital Sentencing Hearings:
Illinois Violates the Federal Constitution by
Permitting Juries to Sentence Defendants to Death
on the Basis of Ordinarily Inadmissible Hearsay
Mark Silverstein
Clerk, Hon. Harry Pregerson, 9th Circuit Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, and the State and Local
Government Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Mark Silverstein, Confrontation at Capital Sentencing Hearings: Illinois Violates the Federal Constitution by Permitting Juries to Sentence
Defendants to Death on the Basis of Ordinarily Inadmissible Hearsay, 22 Loy. U. Chi. L. J. 65 (1990).
Available at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj/vol22/iss1/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola University Chicago Law
Journal by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.

Confrontation at Capital Sentencing Hearings:
Illinois Violates the Federal Constitution by
Permitting Juries to Sentence Defendants
to Death on the Basis of Ordinarily
Inadmissible Hearsay
Mark Silverstein *
TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.
II.

INTRODUCTION .....................................
INDIVIDUALIZED SENTENCING DOES NOT REQUIRE
ADMITTING HEARSAY ..............................

A.
B.
III.

Individualized Sentencing .......................
Eroding the Williams Decision ..................

66
74
74
77

CONFRONTATION AT ILLINOIS CAPITAL SENTENCING

H EARINGS ..........................................

A.
B.

The Illinois Capital Punishment Statute .........
The Illinois Supreme Court's Treatment of the
Statute ..........................................
1. Early Cases: A Tough Standard ............
2. No Difference Between Judge and Jury .....
3. The Standard of Relevance and Reliability ..
a. Evidence When Trial Judges Sentence ....
b. Reliable Because Defendant Fails to
Challenge ...............................
c. Corroboration............................
d. Double Hearsay and Corroboration ......
e. Obtained During Official Police
Investigation .............................
f Not Inherently Unreliable ................
g. Hearsay Reports of PsychiatricExperts ...
h. Accusations of Former Accomplices .......

80
80
81
82
84
88
92
97
105
109
113
114
115
116

• Clerk, Honorable Harry Pregerson, 9th Circuit Court of Appeals; J.D., 1989, University of Illinois. The author wishes to thank Professor Donald Dripps, who encouraged
and supervised the student research project that developed into this article, and Vera
Herst, Charles Hoffman, and Andrea Lyon, who helpfully critiqued earlier versions. The
author is especially grateful to Professor Kit Kinports. She patiently pored over two
drafts and filled the margins with thoughtful criticism and persuasive suggestions for
revision.

Loyola University Law Journal

IV.

[Vol. 22

4. Confrontation Revisited .....................
THE RATIONALE OF Williams DOES NOT JUSTIFY

118

SUBMITTING HEARSAY TESTIMONY TO A JURY IN

AN ADVERSARY PROCEEDING .......................

A. Two Explanationsfor the Rule Against Hearsay .
B. JuriesAre Different from Judges ................
C. Williams Does Not Apply to an Adversary
Proceeding ......................................
V.

DUE PROCESS REQUIRES A RIGHT OF
CONFRONTATION THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE
CAPITAL SENTENCING HEARING ....................

A.
B.

VI.

VII.

The Relevance of Specht v. Patterson ...........
The Eldridge Balancing Test ....................
1. The Defendant's Stake ......................
2. The Risk of an Erroneous Deprivation ......
a. Historical Fact...........................
b. PredictiveJudgments ....................
c. DiscretionaryMoral Judgment ...........
3. The Government's Interest ..................
4. The Final Balance ..........................

THE RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION IS ESSENTIAL TO
THE SUPREME COURT'S VIEW OF A FAIR TRIAL ON
THE ISSUE OF LIFE OR DEATH ......................
CONCLUSION ........................................

I.

121
121
122
126

129
133
136
136
138
140
143
143
149
153

155

159

INTRODUCTION

In the 1949 case of Williams v. New York, 1 the Supreme Court
held that a judge imposing a sentence on a convicted criminal may
rely on information contained in written presentence reports without granting the defendant an opportunity to confront and crossexamine the out-of-court sources of information. The Court extolled what it regarded as modern theories of penology that urge
judges to consider first each defendant's background, record, and
character, and then fit a punishment to the criminal as well as to
the crime. In the Court's view, individualized sentencing marked a
progressive advance from the days when judges pronounced a sentence based solely on the crime and the limited information about
the defendant's background that came to light at trial. To gather
and apply the wide variety of information relevant to enlightened
sentencing, the Court wrote, judges cannot be constrained by the
1.

337 U.S. 241 (1949).
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strict procedures and rules of evidence that filter the flow of information in criminal trials.2 Under the modem practices approved
in Williams, an officer of the court investigates the convicted defendant's entire record and background. Judges may rely on the
subsequent presentence report without violating the due process
clause.
The Williams decision authorized two departures from the exclusionary rules of evidence that govern criminal trials. First, it
recognized that an expanded range of information about the defendant's background is relevant to sentencing and not unfairly
prejudicial.3 Second, it freed judges from the constraints of the
hearsay rule and the Constitution's closely-related guarantee that
defendants may confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.4
Williams did not require that states individualize sentencing and
required no changes in existing sentencing practices. Likewise,
Williams did not consider state procedures that left the sentencing
determination to the jury. In more than a dozen states, juries determined the sentence for at least some noncapital crimes.5 Moreover, in almost every state that permitted capital punishment, the
jury, not the judge, fixed the sentence in capital cases.6
When the Court decided Williams, juries set the sentence at the
same time they determined the defendant's guilt. The rules of evi2. Id. at 247.
3. Id. at 246-47. As the court observed:
Rules of evidence have been fashioned for criminal trials which narrowly confine the trial contest to evidence that is strictly relevant to the particular offense
charged. These rules rest in part on a necessity to prevent a time-consuming
and confusing trial of collateral issues. They were also designed to prevent
tribunals concerned solely with the issue of guilt of a particular offense from
being influenced to convict for that offense by evidence that the defendant had
habitually engaged in other misconduct. A sentencing judge, however, is not
confined to the narrow issue of guilt.
Id. Regardless of whether information about the defendant's background is irrelevant or
prejudicial in proving guilt, Williams ruled that such ordinarily inadmissible evidence
may help the sentencer determine the appropriate punishment. See also MODEL PENAL
CODE § 210.6 comment 8 (1980).
4. Williams, 337 U.S. at 249-51. The Court had earlier held that the due process
clause did not permit criminal defendants to be convicted without an opportunity to
question adverse witnesses. Id. at 245 (citing In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948)).
Despite this holding, the Supreme Court did not squarely hold that the sixth amendment
right of confrontation fully applied to the states until 1965. See Pointer v. Texas, 380
U.S. 400 (1965).
5. See Note, Jury Sentencing in Virginia, 53 VA. L. REV. 968, 968-69 (1967) (thirteen
states in the mid-1960s let the jury determine the sentence for some noncapital crimes).
6. See Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 759, 767 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (appendix describes procedures for capital sentencing in every state); Knowlton,
Problems of Jury Discretion in Capital Cases, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 1099, 1100-01 (1953).
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dence that govern criminal trials limited the information upon
which juries could base their sentencing decision. The rules generally prevented the prosecutor from presenting evidence of the defendant's criminal record.7 They also barred the defendant from
offering mitigating evidence that was not relevant to whether he
had committed the crime. In capital trials, juries chose between
life and death without full information on the defendant's prior
criminal record, character and propensities.' Jury sentencing thus
prevented the individualized punishment that the Supreme Court
extolled in Williams.
Beginning in the 1950s, some states reformed their sentencing
procedures by splitting capital trials in two. After finding a defendant guilty, the jury heard evidence relevant to the sentencing
decision in a separate phase of the trial.' In 1959, the American
Law Institute's Model Penal Code endorsed split trials and further
proposed that legislatures specify aggravating and mitigating factors to guide the jury. 1 Although by 1971 six states provided separate sentencing hearings in capital cases, none provided any
standards or otherwise instructed the jury how to decide which
defendants should live and which should die.12
A revolution in capital sentencing procedures ensued after 1972,
when the Supreme Court held in Furman v. Georgia13 that every
state's capital punishment scheme violated the eighth amendment's
ban on cruel and unusual punishment. 4 Each justice wrote a separate opinion in the five-to-four decision, and none joined any of the
others. In the aftermath, Furman-parsing became sport for commentators and a chore for state 5legislators who rushed to enact
new capital punishment statutes.'
7. Knowlton, supra note 6, at 1111-12.
8. Id. at 1113.
9. See Note, supra note 5, at 979; see also Knowlton, supra note 6, at 1108-11 (noting
that at trial some state courts admitted evidence relevant solely to the issue of
punishment).
10. See Note, supra note 5, at 997. California introduced its two-trial system in 1957.
Note, The California Penalty Trial, 52 CALIF. L. REv. 386, 386-387 (1964). Pennsylvania followed in 1959, see Note, Criminal Procedure, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 1036, 103738 (1962), and New York in 1963, Note, The Two-Trial System in Capital Cases, 39
N.Y.U. L. REV. 50, 51 (1964).
11. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 202 (1971) (citing MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 201.6 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959)).
12. See id. at 208.
13. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
14. Id. at 240; see also Kaplan, Evidence in Capital Cases, 11 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 369,
370 (1983).
15. Within four years after the Furman decision, 35 states enacted new laws providing for capital punishment. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-80 (1976).
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In reviewing five of the new statutes in 1976, the Court ended
four years of doubt about the constitutionality of capital punishment and set the course of its modem capital sentencing decisions.1 6 It rejected statutes that imposed mandatory death
sentences, but, influenced by the Model Penal Code, upheld statutes that combined separate penalty hearings with "guided discretion." 1 7 The Court's modem capital cases recognize that because
death differs from all other punishments in its severity and finality,
capital sentencing procedures must conform to heightened standards of fairness and reliability.'" To satisfy the eighth amendment, statutes must specify objective criteria that narrow the class
of murderers who are eligible for capital punishment and must also
preserve the sentencer's discretion to consider every defendant as
an individual.' 9 As a corollary, defendants must have the opportunity to offer any mitigating evidence relevant to their background,
character, or the circumstances of the crime. 20 Thus, the individualized sentencing praised in the Williams opinion became
mandatory in capital cases.2
16. See Gregg, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (upholding statute); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S.
242 (1976) (same); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (same); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (rejecting statute); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976)
(same). In each case, Justices Powell, Stewart and Stevens announced the judgment of
the Court in a joint opinion. Justices Brennan and Marshall voted to reject each statute,
while Justices White, Burger, Rehnquist, and Blackmun voted to approve each statute.
The Court thus voted 7-2 to uphold three statutes and rejected the two others by a 5-4
vote. Later opinions regarded the joint opinion of Justices Powell, Stewart, and Stevens
as binding precedent. See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 601-02 (1978) (Burger,
C.J.); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 364 (1977) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
17. Kaplan, supra note 14, at 370 (discussing "guided discretion"). See McClesky v.
Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 302 n.24 (1987) (Georgia statute approved in Gregg generally followed Model Penal Code); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 272-73 (1976) (definition of
capital murder produces same result as Model Penal Code's aggravating factors and statute also allows sentencer to consider mitigating evidence); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S.
242, 247-48 (1976) (Florida statute patterned after Model Penal Code).
18. See, e.g., Clemons v. Mississippi, 110 S. Ct. 1441, 1448 (1990) ("twin objectives"
of "measured consistent application and fairness to the accused"); Murray v. Giarrantano, 109 S. Ct. 2765, 2769-70 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (finality of death penalty requires greater reliability when it is imposed); Johnson v. Mississippi, 108 S. Ct. 1981,
1986 (1988) (unanimous opinion) (eighth amendment gives rise to special need for reliability in determination that death is the appropriate punishment).
19. See Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244-46 (1988).
20. See California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 541 (1987); see also Eddings v. Oklahoma,
455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982) (" 'sentencer [may] not be precluded from considering, as a
mitigatingfactor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than
death' ") (emphasis in original) (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978)).
21. For several years, the Court left open the possibility that the Constitution might
permit mandatory sentences of death for some crimes. That possibility closed in 1987,
when the Court held that states cannot require automatic sentences of death when life-
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The Supreme Court is clearly convinced that capital punishment
serves legitimate state interests and can be imposed without violating the eighth amendment. This Article declines to challenge the
Court's basic premise. Instead, focusing on the practice in Illinois,
it argues that states violate the Court's standards for procedurally
fair sentencing hearings when they permit juries to impose death
sentences on the basis of ordinarily inadmissible hearsay.22
Illinois legislators looked at the Model Penal Code and the statterm prisoners are convicted of killing guards. Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 78
(1987).
22. Every state that imposes capital punishment provides for a separate hearing in
which the sentencer may consider a wider range of information than would be relevant in
a criminal trial. But many statutes do not clearly reveal whether the rules against hearsay remain in force. See Special Project, Capital Punishment in 1984: Abandoning the
Pursuitof Fairnessand Consistency, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 1129, 1225-27 (1984). Of the
37 states that authorize capital punishment, 30 entrust the final authority over the life-ordeath decision to the jury, unless the defendant chooses to be sentenced by a judge. See
Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 463 n.9 (1984) (29 excluding Oregon); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 163.150(l)(a) (Supp. 1990) (effective Dec. 1984). Eighteen of these 30 states enforce
criminal trial rules of evidence either throughout the entire sentencing proceeding or at
least as the prosecutor presents aggravating evidence.
In seven states that provide for jury sentencing, the statutes clearly forbid hearsay in
the prosecution's presentation of aggravating evidence. In Louisiana, Missouri, and Virginia, criminal trial rules of evidence prevail throughout the entire sentencing proceeding.
See LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.2 (West 1984); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.030.4
(Vernon Supp. 1990); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(B) (1983). In Arkansas, Connecticut, Massachusetts, and New Jersey, evidence relevant to aggravation must be presented
according to the rules of evidence. Evidence relevant to mitigation may be presented
without regard to the rules of evidence. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-4-602(4) (1987);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46a(c) (West 1985); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 279,
§ 68 (West Supp. 1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1 1-3(c)(2)(b) (West Supp. 1990).
In I1 additional states that provide for jury sentencing, court decisions reveal that the
sentencing hearing proceeds according to the rules of evidence. See People v. Bloom, 48
Cal. 3d 1194, 1228, 774 P.2d 698, 719, 259 Cal. Rptr. 669, 690 (1989), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 1503 (1990); Fair v. State, 245 Ga. 868, 871, 268 S.E.2d 316, 320, cert. denied, 449
U.S. 986 (1980); Lanier v. State, 533 So. 2d 473, 486-90 (Miss. 1988); State v. Guzman,
100 N.M. 756, 761-62, 676 P.2d 1321, 1326-27, cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1256 (1984); State
v. Barts, 321 N.C. 170, 178-82, 362 S.E.2d 235, 239-41 (1987); State v. Glenn, 28 Ohio St.
3d 451, 458-59, 504 N.E.2d 701, 709-10 (1986) (hearsay inadmissible at penalty hearing
except for reports of mental examination and presentence investigation, which defendant
may choose to forego), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 931 (1987); State v. Chatman, 671 P.2d 56,
57 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983); State v. Moen, 309 Or. 45, 82-86, 786 P.2d 111, 134-36
(1990); State v. Stewart, 288 S.C. 232, 236, 341 S.E.2d 789, 791 (1986); Rumbaugh v.
State, 589 S.W.2d 414, 417 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); State v. Bartholomew, 101 Wash. 2d
631, 639, 683 P.2d 1079, 1086 (1984) (holding statute, which permitted prosecution to
introduce hearsay, unconstitutional). Some of these decisions discuss only the defendant's evidence. This article assumes that the rules of evidence govern the entire proceeding whenever a court rules that defendants must follow those rules.
In six states, prosecutors are authorized to present aggravating information to the sentencing jury through ordinarily inadmissible hearsay. See People v. Salazar, 126 Ill. 2d
424, 467-70, 535 N.E.2d 766, 784-86 (1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3288 (1990); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(c)(iv) (1987) (jury may receive presentence report); NEV. REV.
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utes approved in the Supreme Court's 1976 capital cases when enacting a new capital punishment statute in 1977.23 The Illinois
statute provides for a separate sentencing hearing in which a convicted murderer becomes eligible for execution if the jury finds one
of several specified aggravating factors.24 In a second phase of the
sentencing hearing, the jury hears additional evidence relevant to
aggravation and mitigation and decides whether a death-eligible
175.552 (1985); 7 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(c) (1990); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-3-207(2) (1990); WYO. STAT. § 6-2-102(c) (Supp. 1989).
In the remaining six states in which juries may make the final choice between life and
death, the statutes and court decisions do not clearly reveal whether the prosecution may
rely on hearsay. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-103(1)(b) (Supp. 1989) (any relevant and
probative evidence; fair notice required); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(c) (1987) (evidence the court deems relevant and admissible; prior written notice required); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 532.025(1) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1988) (prior notice of aggravating evidence required); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630.5(11) (1986) (any matter court
deems relevant); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(a)(2) (Purdon 1982) (relevant and
admissible evidence); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-27A-2 (1988).
In Arizona, Montana, Nebraska, and Idaho, the trial judge determines the sentence
without a jury. Arizona prosecutors must follow criminal trial rules of evidence when
presenting their case-in-chief, see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(C) (1989), but may
rebut the defendant's evidence with hearsay, State v. Ortiz, 131 Ariz. 195, 208-09, 639
P.2d 1020, 1033-34 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 984 (1982). The remaining three states
permit the trial judge to consider hearsay. See Sivak v. State, 112 Idaho 197, 214-15, 731
P.2d 192, 209 (1986); State v. Smith, 217 Mont. 461, 474, 705 P.2d 1087, 1095 (1985),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1073 (1986); State v. Palmer, 224 Neb. 282, 303-04, 399 N.W.2d
706, 722-23 (1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 872 (1987).
In Alabama, Florida, and Indiana, where the trial judge may sentence a defendant to
death even after a jury has recommended life, the status of the right of confrontation is
uncertain. The statutes of both Alabama and Florida permit the prosecution to introduce
relevant hearsay at the sentencing hearing. See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-45(d) (1982); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 921.141(1) (West 1985). The opinions of the Florida Supreme Court are
confusing because they appear to require a full right of confrontation while simultaneously permitting the prosecution to introduce hearsay. Compare Walton v. State, 481 So.
2d 1197, 1200 (Fla. 1985) (sixth amendment right of confrontation applies throughout
the capital sentencing hearing), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 759 (1990) with Dragovich v.
State, 492 So. 2d 350, 355 (Fla. 1986) (statute permits hearsay as long as defendant has
fair opportunity to rebut). Both Florida and Alabama courts may be influenced by a
decision of the Eleventh Circuit that held that a defendant was deprived of his sixth
amendment right of confrontation when the sentencing judge relied in part on written
reports of a psychiatric examination. See Proffitt v. Wainwright, 685 F.2d 1227, 1255
(11 th Cir. 1982), modified, 706 F.2d 311 (1983). Some right of confrontation is provided
to Alabama defendants in capital sentencing, though its scope is not clear. See Ex parte
Clisby, 456 So. 2d 95 (Ala. 1983) (remanding for reconsideration of certain evidence in
light of Proffitt v. Wainwright). The issue is unresolved in Indiana, the third state that
permits the trial judge to overrule the jury's sentencing recommendation. See Moore v.
State, 479 N.E.2d 1264, 1279-80 (Ind. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1026 (1985).
23. See Note, The 1977 IllinoisDeath Penalty Statute: Does It Comply with Constitutional Standards?, 54 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 869, 885 n.136 (1978) (legislators considered
Model Penal Code, post-Furman statutes in other states, and proposed legislation in
Congress).
24. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1(b), (d) (1989).
STAT. §
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defendant shall live or die. 25 In this latter stage, the statute expressly discards the ordinary rules of evidence.26 Although the defendant may cross-examine the witnesses who appear in court, he
has no right to confront or cross-examine the out-of-court declarants whose statements are offered in evidence.27
The Illinois Supreme Court has relied on Williams v. New
York 28 to uphold the statute and deny defendants the right to confront adverse witnesses at capital sentencing hearings. This Article
argues that the Illinois court has erroneously regarded Williams as
authority for submitting hearsay evidence to a jury in a modem
capital sentencing hearing. 29 After Furman, the Supreme Court
has characterized the sentencing phases of capital trials as full adversary proceedings 30 that must incorporate many of the procedural protections that apply in all criminal trials.3 ' Although the
25. Id. para. 9-1(e).
26. The statute provides that information may be presented "regardless of its admissibility under the rules governing the admission of evidence at criminal trials." Id.
27. In 1965, shortly after the New York legislature provided for split capital trials
with evidentiary rules similar to those prevailing now in Illinois, one commentator offered this criticism:
A detailed statutory procedure is established which creates the aura of rationality around a proceeding which can never be rational because no institution devised by man can ever possess the facts or the wisdom upon which to base the
irreversible judgment of death. But then, as if to flaunt its irrational foundation
in our faces, the two-trial system in New York provides that at the hearing to
determine life or death none of the existing rules of evidence are applicable, so
that all types of hearsay, unproved allegations and even unconstitutionally obtained evidence may be introduced. Presumably the legislators believed that the
rules which are designed to assure a fair trial are irrelevant to the determination
of life or death.
Redlich, Edmond Cahn: A Philosopherfor the DemocraticMan, 40 N.Y.U. L. REv. 259,
269-70 (1965).
28. 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
29. The Supreme Court has never held that prosecutors may introduce ordinarily
inadmissible hearsay before a sentencing jury. Conversely, however, the Court has held
that a state violated due process by enforcing its hearsay rule in a manner that prevented
the defendant from introducing relevant mitigating evidence in a capital sentencing hearing. Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 97 (1979).
30. In an adversary system, the contending parties investigate, present, and control
the evidence that they submit to a relatively passive decision maker who generally has no
advance knowledge of the case. See Sward, Values, Ideology, and the Evolution of the
Adversary System, 64 IND. L.J. 301, 302, 312 (1989). By contrast, in the inquisitorial
system that developed in Europe, the decision maker actively develops the case, considers
almost any logically probative evidence, including hearsay, and often functions without
oral testimony or cross-examination by the parties. See Goldstein, Reflections on Two
Models: InquisitorialThemes in American CriminalProcedure, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1009,
1018-19 (1974).
31. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686-87 (1984); Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 438 (1981).
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Supreme Court has never held that the confrontation clause applies
in capital sentencing proceedings, this Article relies on the
Supreme Court's capital cases and procedural due process opinions
to conclude that Illinois violates the United States Constitution
when it fails to provide a right of confrontation throughout the
entire capital sentencing hearing.32
Part II of this Article explains that the Supreme Court's decisions that first required individualized sentencing in capital cases
provide no support for submitting hearsay evidence to a sentencing
jury. This Article further demonstrates that by the time Illinois
enacted its new capital punishment statute in 1977, the Supreme
Court had already undermined the value of Williams v. New York
as a controlling precedent in capital sentencing.33 Part III analyzes
the uneven reasoning that pervades many of the Illinois Supreme
Court's rulings on the evidence that is admissible at capital sentencing hearings. It criticizes the lax standards that permit prosecutors to employ unreliable and ordinarily inadmissible hearsay in
their efforts to persuade sentencers to impose death. 34 Part IV explains two rationales that justify the rule against hearsay. It argues
that because neither rationale applied in Williams, but both apply
to modern capital sentencing hearings, the Illinois Supreme Court
improperly extended Williams to cases in which juries make the
life-or-death decision. 5 Part V argues that the Supreme Court's
procedural due process decisions require that states permit defendants to cross-examine their accusers in capital sentencing hearings. 36 The Article concludes that the Court's capital cases suggest
that a right of confrontation is essential to the procedural fairness
that must govern every stage of the decision to end a defendant's
32. In general, this Article regards the right of confrontation as the defendant's right
to insist that the prosecution make its case through witnesses who present sworn testimony about their firsthand observations in open court and subject to cross-examination,
unless the prosecution's evidence falls within a recognized exception to the hearsay rule.
Because the right of confrontation belongs to the defendant, the arguments presented
here do not suggest that the state should have an equivalent right to insist that defendants
always present their mitigating evidence through the in-court testimony of firsthand witnesses. Cf. Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979), discussed supra note 29.
For another argument that defendants should have a right of confrontation at capital
sentencing hearings, see Note, Fairness to the End: The Right to Confront Adverse Witnesses in Capital Sentencing Proceedings, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1345 (1989); see also Comment, The Right of Confrontation and Reliability in Capital Sentencing, Proffitt v.
Wainwright, 685 F2d 1227 (11th Cir. 1982), 20 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 599 (1983).
33. See infra notes 38-68 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 69-294 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 295-344 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 345-475 and accompanying text.
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II.

INDIVIDUALIZED SENTENCING DOES NOT REQUIRE
ADMITTING HEARSAY

In capital cases, the Supreme Court now requires the same individualized sentencing that it praised in Williams v. New York. 38
But the Court has not granted juries the same freedom from evidentiary rules that Williams extended to judges. Although the
Court encourages states to provide sentencing juries with information about the defendant's prior record, character, and criminal
propensities, it has never indicated that it would extend Williams
to permit prosecutors to submit presentence reports or other hearsay evidence to a sentencing jury. On the contrary, the Court's
modem cases have seriously diminished the precedential value of
the Williams opinion in capital cases.
A. Individualized Sentencing
Statutes that first survived the Court's post-Furman scrutiny
borrowed two features from the proposed Model Penal Code.
They combined a separate penalty hearing with legislative standards to guide the sentencer's discretion. 39 A third provision of the
Code proposed that the capital sentencing hearing dispense with
exclusionary rules of evidence, but retain the law of privilege. 40 In
the accompanying commentary, the drafters explained that they
would permit the prosecution to submit presentence investigation
reports to the jury. 4' The commentary did not discuss Williams
nor did it analyze whether offering hearsay to the jury would interfere with the defendant's right to confront adverse witnesses.42
37. See infra notes 476-499 and accompanying text.
38. 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
39. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
40. The Code provision permits all relevant, unprivileged evidence to be presented,
without regard to ordinary rules of admissibility:
In the proceeding, evidence may be presented as to any matter that the Court
deems relevant to sentence, including but not limited to the nature and circumstances of the crime, the defendant's character, background, history, mental
and physical condition and any of the aggravating or mitigating circumstances
enumerated in Subsections (3) and (4) of this Section. Any such evidence, not
legally privileged, which the court deems to have probative force, may be received, regardless of its admissibility under the exclusionary rules of evidence,
provided that the defendant's counsel is accorded a fair opportunity to rebut
such evidence.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 (1980).
41. Id. comment 8.
42. See id. In 1970, a commission assigned to propose revisions to the federal crimi-
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After the 1976 cases, the Model Code appeared to exemplify a
sentencing scheme that met the Court's post-Furman standards.
The Court has frequently cited the Code with approval in other
decisions on capital sentencing. 3 Nonetheless, the decisions that
require individualized sentencing have never approved the portion
of the Model Penal Code, or any statute, that permits the prosecution to submit ordinarily inadmissible hearsay to a sentencing
44
jury.
For example, in the first of the 1976 cases, Gregg v. Georgia,4
the Supreme Court quoted the Model Penal Code commentary and
applauded its suggestion that states abandon, in the sentencing
phase of a capital trial, the rules of evidence that restrict what information is relevant. But nothing in the opinion suggests that the
Court also endorsed the Model Penal Code's view that the prosecution could permissibly submit hearsay evidence to the jury.
Rather, Gregg assumed that the Georgia statute revised the rules of
evidence only to accommodate a broad view of the types of evinal code adopted the Model Penal Code's provision for suspending the exclusionary rules
of evidence at the penalty hearing. Although the commission noted that California
courts prohibited hearsay in the penalty hearing and further noted that one commentator
criticized the New York provision that permitted hearsay, it concluded that allowing the
defendant to rebut any hearsay statements maintained the fairness of the proceedings.
See Memorandum on the CapitalPunishment Issue, in NATIONAL COMM'N ON REFORM
OF FED. CRIMINAL LAW, 2 WORKING PAPERS 1347, 1372-73 (1970).
43. See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969, 2984 (1989) (minimum age for
execution); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830 n.33 (1988) (execution of children); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 157 (1987) (some forms of felony murder).
44. The Court first discussed the Model Penal Code's capital sentencing procedures a
year before Furman. In McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971), an appeal from
one of California's bifurcated capital trials, the Court held that the due process clause did
not require that states formulate specific statutory standards to guide juries as they decided between life and death. In a case consolidated with McGautha, Crampton v. Ohio,
the Court held that juries may constitutionally decide guilt and punishment in the same
proceeding. Despite its holding, the Court recognized the problems posed by unitary
trials like Ohio's and also acknowledged that unguided discretion might be undesirable
even when states like California provide a separate hearing to determine punishment.
The opinion, however, suggested that only state legislatures-not federal courts-could
appropriately reform capital sentencing procedures. The Court noted that the American
Law Institute's proposed Model Penal Code attempted to solve the problems posed by
unitary trials and standardless discretion. The McGautha Court doubted whether any
legislative formula-including the Model Penal Code's-could adequately determine and
articulate in advance exactly which criminals deserved death and which deserved mercy.
The Court was also skeptical that any preset written standards would adequately guide a
jury in carrying out legislative policy. Nevertheless, the Model Penal Code's suggested
capital punishment procedures appear as an appendix to the McGautha opinion, which
never discussed the provision that suspends the exclusionary rules of evidence at the penalty phase of the capital trial.
45. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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dence that are relevant to imposing a proper sentence.46 The Court
assumed that Georgia's penalty hearing permitted the parties to
submit "relevant information under fair procedural rules. ' 47 In
this light, the Court's comment that Georgia "wisely" had refrained from imposing "unnecessary restrictions" on the evidence
admissible at the penalty hearing must be read to approve only a
broadened standard of relevance.4" The Gregg opinion does not
suggest that the rule against hearsay or the right of confrontation
are "unnecessary restrictions."49 In the Court's view, the jury
should have as much information as possible at the sentencing
hearing, "[s]o long as the evidence introduced do[es] not prejudice
a defendant." 50 The Court did not explain what sort of evidence
impermissibly might prejudice defendants in capital sentencing
hearings.
The Court in Proffitt v. Florida,5 a companion case to Gregg,
held that Florida's capital sentencing scheme adequately directed
the sentencer's discretion. In Florida, the judge may reject the sentence the jury recommends, and the Court noted that the Florida
statute permits the judge to order that a presentence report be prepared. Nothing in the opinion, however, suggests that the Court
would approve submitting the hearsay information in a
presentence report directly to a sentencing jury. On the contrary,
the opinion suggests that presentence reports are appropriate only
when trial judges impose sentence. 2 Noting that presentence re46. In a footnote, the Court noted that it was reviewing an early version of the Georgia statute. An amended version, not before the Court, deleted the phrase "subject to the
laws of evidence." Although the Court was not sure whether the amendment aimed
simply to increase the "types of evidence" admissible at the sentencing hearing, id. at 164
n.7, the Georgia Supreme Court later removed any uncertainty. The sentencing inquiry
expands the types of information that may be proved at the punishment phase of capital
trials, but the familiar rules of evidence with regard to reliability are retained. Fair v.
State, 245 Ga. 868, 871, 268 S.E.2d 316, 320, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 986 (1980).
47. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 192. The quoted portion is a transition as the Court began to
discuss the need for standards to guide the jury's discretion. The Court said, "But the
provision of relevant information under fair procedural rules is not alone sufficient to
guarantee that the information will be properly used in the imposition of punishment,
especially if sentencing is performed by a jury." Id.
48. Id. at 203.
49. Id. In support of its assertion that Georgia approved "open and far-reaching
argument" and imposed no unnecessary restrictions on the evidence admissible at the
penalty hearing, the Court cited Brown v. State, 235 Ga. 644, 220 S.E.2d 922 (1975).
Brown held that a defendant who declined to testify in the guilt phase cannot be prohibited in the penalty phase from testifying to the circumstances of the crime. Id. at 649-50,
220 S.E.2d at 927.
50. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 204.
51. 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
52. The Court said: "Because the trialjudge imposes sentence the Florida court has
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ports often contain information relevant to sentencing, the Court
cited to a section of the Gregg opinion. 53 That section of Gregg
discusses the ideal of individualized sentencing, as expressed in several law reform studies and Supreme Court opinions, including
Williams v. New York. 54 These authorities, the Gregg opinion
noted, all assumed that a judge, not a jury, would determine the
appropriate sentence."
Another of the 1976 opinions, Woodson v. North Carolina,5 6 rejected a statute that mandated death for certain crimes. The
Supreme Court declared that in capital cases, the Constitution requires that sentencers consider each defendant's particular background, record, and character, as well as the circumstances of the
crime itself.5" With this decision, the "enlightened policy" that endorsed individualized sentencing in Williams v. New York became
a constitutional command. Although the Court cited Williams as
it discussed the goal of individualized sentencing, it never suggested that Williams's technique for conveying information to the
sentencer, a hearsay-infected presentence report, would be equally
valid in a jury proceeding.
B. Eroding the Williams Decision
The rationale of Williams has continued to guide the Supreme
Court when defendants invoke the Constitution to question a
judge's evidentiary basis for imposing a prison sentence. 5 In capital cases, however, the post-Furman decisions of the Court have
seriously eroded Williams's value as a guide for determining what
procedures the Constitution permits at capital sentencing.5 9
ruled that he may order preparation of a presentence investigation report to assist him in
determining the appropriate sentence." Id. at 252 n.9 (emphasis added).
53. Id. (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 n.37 (1976)).
54. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189.
55. Id. at 190.
56. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
57. Id. The court observed:
While the prevailing practice of individualizing sentencing determinations generally reflects simply enlightened policy rather than a constitutional imperative,
we believe that in capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment . . . requires consideration of the character and

record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense
as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of
death.
Id. at 304 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality opinion)).
58. See, e.g., United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 48-49 (1978).
59. Even before Furman revolutionized capital sentencing procedures, the Supreme
Court already had distinguished Williams and determined that the due process clause
guaranteed defendants the right to counsel, to present evidence, and to confront adverse
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In Gardner v.. Florida,6° a Florida judge based a sentence of
death in part on an undisclosed portion of a presentence report.
Because the defendant's counsel had no opportunity to rebut, deny,
or explain the secret information, the Court ruled that the sentence
violated due process.6 1 It distinguished Williams as a case in which
the judge revealed in detail the facts he used from the presentence
report and thus provided the defendant an opportunity to challenge their accuracy.62 In requiring disclosure, Gardner rejected
one rationale behind the Williams decision-the fear that people
who provide crucial information in presentence investigations
would refuse to talk if they knew they must later testify in court.
Although Gardnerdid not discuss whether defendants could insist
that the sources testify in person, the plurality explained that the
risk of losing sources could not justify withholding the presentence
report from the defendant.
The Gardner opinion offered three additional reasons for discounting the precedential value of the Williams decision. First, the
nature of sentencing had changed. When the Williams Court
witnesses at certain kinds of sentencing proceedings. See the discussion of Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967), infra notes 371-87 and accompanying text.
60. 430 U.S. 349 (1977) (plurality opinion).
61. Id. at 362 (plurality opinion). The plurality opinion, written by Justice Stevens
and joined by Justices Powell and Stewart, represented the views of the three justices who
controlled the outcomes in the 1976 capital cases.
Spurning the plurality's due process analysis, Justice White concurred, but relied on
the eighth amendment's heightened need for reliability in capital cases. Id. at 363-64
(White, J., concurring). Thus, Justice White would regard the Gardnerplurality opinion
as precedent in capital cases.
Justice Blackmun concurred on the ground that the result in Gardner followed from
the joint opinion of Justices Powell, Stewart, and Stevens in the two 1976 cases that
rejected mandatory capital sentencing, which Justice Blackmun evidently regarded as
binding precedent. Id. at 364 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citing Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) and Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976)). Chief Justice
Burger concurred in the judgment without opinion. Id. at 362. Justices Brennan and
Marshall both agreed with the plurality's due process analysis but dissented from the
Court's decision to remand for resentencing. See id. at 364-65 (Brennan, J., dissenting);
id. at 365 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Five members of the Court thus agreed with the plurality's due process analysis, and
Justice White can be counted as a sixth vote if Gardner's procedural requirements were
restricted to capital cases. Likewise, the concurrences of Justice Blackmun and Chief
Justice Burger contribute to the strength of Gardner's holding as a precedent in capital
cases. Only Justice Rehnquist would have affirmed the judgment of the Florida Supreme
Court. Id. at 371 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 356 (plurality opinion). The Gardner Court did not suggest how judges
should proceed when defendants challenge the facts contained in a presentence report.
The plurality opinion regarded some sort of hearing as necessary if the judge could not
simply disregard the disputed information. It considered "the time invested ascertaining
the truth" to be worthwhile if it makes a difference in the judge's decision. Id. at 355-56
(plurality opinion).
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wrote in 1949, judges wielded complete discretion and could impose any penalty within the limits set by the legislature. Their decisions were virtually unreviewable and reversible error was almost
impossible. By 1977, however, the Court recognized that capital
sentencing is different from other sentencing, 63 a proposition that
Williams explicitly rejected.
According to Gardner's modern
view of capital sentencing, defendants and society both have a
stake in ensuring that death sentences are based on reason, not
whim or passion.65 Second, thirty years after Williams, the Court's
cases had more clearly applied the guarantees of the due process
clause to sentencing procedures. 66 A final reason for limiting Williams appeared in the text of the opinion itself, which "recognized
that the passage of time justifies a re-examination of capital sentencing procedures. ' 67 In Gardner, the Court acknowledged its
continuing responsibility to conduct that re-examination in the
light of "evolving standards of procedural fairness in a civilized
society. ' ' 6 As the next section will demonstrate, Illinois violates
those evolving standards of procedural fairness by permitting juries
to sentence defendants to death on the basis of information that
does not fit any of the standard exceptions to the rules against
hearsay or the right of confrontation.
63. Id. at 357-58 (plurality opinion).
64. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 251 (1949).
65. Gardner, 430 U.S. at 357-58 (plurality opinion).
66. Id. at 358 (plurality opinion). As examples, the Court cited Mempa v. Rhay, 389
U.S. 128 (1967) and Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967). Mempa extended the right
to counsel to the sentencing phase of criminal trials. Specht granted defendants the right
to present evidence, as well as the rights to counsel and confrontation, at certain kinds of
sentencing proceedings. For further discussion of Specht's application to a right of confrontation at capital sentencing, see infra notes 371-87 and accompanying text. The
Gardner Court further noted that even when sentencers have total discretion, and defendants thus have no legitimate stake in any particular outcome, they retain a stake in the
character of the proceedings. For this proposition, the Court cited Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 521-23 (1968) (state cannot excuse jurors for cause simply because
they harbor conscientious scruples against the death penalty). A footnote in the Gardner
opinion noted that application of due process to sentencing did not necessarily incorporate all the procedural protections of a criminal trial. Gardner,430 U.S. at 358 n.9 (plurality opinion). As the Court's discussion concerned post-Williams developments, it
omitted Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948), which held that judges violate due
process when they impose sentences based on information that is actually erroneous. See
generally Note, Gardner v. Florida and the Application of Due Process to Sentencing, 63
VA. L. REV. 1281 (1977).
67. Gardner,430 U.S. at 356 (plurality opinion).
68. Id. at 357.
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CONFRONTATION AT ILLINOIS CAPITAL SENTENCING
HEARINGS

A.

The Illinois Capital Punishment Statute

The Illinois capital punishment statute, 69 enacted in 1977, provides for a separate sentencing hearing to determine whether defendants convicted of first-degree murder shall be sentenced to
death. 7° The guilt-phase jury also determines the sentence, unless
the defendant elects to be sentenced by the judge. 71 The penalty
hearing proceeds in two separate stages.72
First, the jury determines whether the defendant is eligible for
the death penalty in a fact-finding hearing conducted according to
the rules of evidence and procedure that govern criminal trials.73
The jury decides whether the prosecution has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that any of the aggravating circumstances listed in
the statute apply to the defendant's crime.74 If so, the penalty
69. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1 (1989). The Illinois procedures for imposing capital punishment in 1972 were unconstitutional under the holding of Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). See Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 800 (1972).
The first post-Furman capital sentencing statute in Illinois, enacted in 1973, provided
that a specially convened three-judge court would sentence eligible defendants to death
unless there were compelling reasons for mercy. The Illinois Supreme Court held that
the grounds for mercy were unconstitutionally vague under Furman and further ruled
that the Illinois Constitution of 1970 granted the legislature no power to establish threemember panels of trial court judges. The court thus ruled that the 1973 statute was
unconstitutional. See People ex rel. Rice v. Cunningham, 61 111. 2d 353, 336 N.E.2d 1
(1975); see also Note, supra note 23, at 870.
70. The hearing takes place only if the prosecution so requests. In this respect, the
Illinois statute differs from any capital punishment statute yet approved by the United
States Supreme Court. See Eddmonds v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 894, 896 (1984) (Marshall, J.,
joined by Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
71. A defendant who pleads guilty to first-degree murder or who is convicted in a
bench trial may still choose to be sentenced by a jury. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9l(d) (1989). When referring in general terms to the Illinois sentencing procedures, this
Article will assume that juries make the sentencing decision.
72. See ILL. SUPREME COURT COMM. ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES, ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL No. 7B.00 (2d ed.
Supp. 1989). The Illinois statute does not actually require that courts conduct the penalty trial in two stages. The Illinois Supreme Court prefers bifurcated hearings, see People v. Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d 504, 539, 473 N.E.2d 1246, 1262 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S.
1044 (1985), but it continues to uphold sentences of death imposed after unitary proceedings, see, e.g., People v. Thompkins, 121 Ill. 2d 401, 448-50, 521 N.E.2d 38 (jury waived),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 871 (1988); People v. Lego, 116 Ill. 2d 323, 343-44, 507 N.E.2d 800,
807 (1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 902 (1988) (jury sentencing).
73. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1(e), (g) (1989).
74. See id. para. 9-1(b). The aggravating factors, briefly stated, are:
1. the victim was a peace officer or fireman killed in the course of duty;
2. the victim was a prison or jail employee killed in the course of duty, or an
inmate or official visitor killed within the prison;
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hearing proceeds to a second stage. Here, the jury decides only one
issue: whether the defendant shall die." The parties may introduce evidence relevant to any aggravating or mitigating factors,
whether they are listed in the statute or not.76 Although evidence
must be relevant, the statute expressly abandons the rest of the
rules of evidence that ordinarily prevail in criminal trials.17 Under
this scheme both sides may introduce hearsay testimony, and the
defendant has no right to confront and cross-examine out-of-court
declarants. If the jury unanimously determines that no mitigating
factors preclude the death penalty, the judge must sentence the defendant to death. 8
B.

The Illinois Supreme Court's Treatment of the Statute

The Illinois Supreme Court holds that the statute "suspends"
the rules of evidence at the second stage of the sentencing proceed3. the defendant has been convicted of murdering two or more people;
4. the murder was the result of hijacking;
5. the murder was by contract;
6. the victim was killed in the course of certain felonies committed by the
defendant;
7. the victim was under 12, and the murder was exceptionally brutal, heinous,
or cruel;
8. the murder was done to prevent testimony;
9. the murder was part of a conspiracy; or
10. the murder was cold, calculated, and premeditated.
Id.
75. Id. para. 9-1(g).
76. Id. para. 9-1(e).
77. The statute provides: "Any information relevant to any additional aggravating
factors or any mitigating factors indicated in subsection (c) may be presented by the State
or defendant regardless of its admissibility under the rules governing the admission of
evidence at criminal trials." Id. para. 9-1(e). Subsection (c) provides a nonexclusive list
of mitigating factors.
As paragraph 9-1(b) provides that the prosecution must follow the rules of evidence
when introducing evidence relevant to any of the aggravating factors actually listed in the
statute, a literal reading of paragraph 9-1(e) would confine the prosecution's use of hearsay to showing nonstatutory aggravating factors and the absence of mitigating factors.
This reading would bar the prosecutor, even in the second stage, from introducing hearsay evidence that is arguably relevant to one of the statutory aggravating factors. The
Illinois Supreme Court has not read the statute so literally. Once the prosecution has
proved a statutory aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt, further evidence that is
also relevant to statutory aggravating factors may be introduced in the second stage without regard to ordinary trial rules of evidence. E.g., People v. Davis, 95 Ill. 2d 1, 47, 447
N.E.2d 353, 375-76, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1001 (1983) (permitting the prosecution to
introduce, in the second phase of the penalty hearing, hearsay evidence that defendant
was the triggerperson, a statutory aggravating factor under subsection (b)(6)).
78. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1(g) (1989).
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ing. 79 The court has upheld this provision without adequately addressing the fact that the law has generally been willing to relax the
rules against hearsay only when judges, not juries, evaluate evidence.8 0 When defendants have demanded the right to confront
the witnesses against them, the Illinois Supreme Court has relied
on Williams v. New York without analyzing whether the stricter
procedural safeguards required in post-Furman capital penalty trials have diminished Williams's value as precedent.
If the statute literally suspended the rules of evidence, prosecutors could introduce a broad range of potentially unfair and untrustworthy evidence. For example, the test of mere relevance
would not bar anonymous letters accusing the defendant of additional crimes, nor would it forbid a polygraph examiner from testifying to the veracity of other prosecution witnesses." At first, the
Illinois Supreme Court appeared ready to limit this potential for
unfairness by requiring judges to ensure that only accurate information reaches the jury.8 2 The court later permitted sentencing
juries to hear any evidence that is both relevant and reliable. 3 As
this section will show, however, the court has offered unclear and
inconsistent standards for determining when evidence is properly
admitted. Because the rationales the court advances are not persuasive, its rulings on evidence sometimes appear as nothing more
than unexamined ad hoc justifications for upholding the trial
judge's decision to admit ordinarily inadmissible hearsay against
defendants who face a sentence of death.
1. Early Cases: A Tough Standard
The ancestor of the Illinois Supreme Court's opinions on the evidence admissible at post-Furman capital sentencing hearings is
79. See People v. Free, 94 Ill. 2d 378, 422, 447 N.E.2d 218, 239, cert. denied, 464 U.S.
865 (1983).
80. See infra note 317.
81. Suspending the rules of evidence leaves additional room for the prosecutor's creativity. If not constrained by the rules of privilege, the state could compel testimony from
the defendant's priest, spouse, psychotherapist, attorney, or even the defendant himself.
Evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment might be permitted, and a clairvoyant could arguably qualify as an expert in his field and offer an opinion based on "facts"
gleaned from a rhapsodic vision. With no statutory guidance about the meaning of "any
additional" aggravating factors, see ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1(e) (1989), and thus
no statutory limits on what information is relevant to the life-or-death decision, the prosecution could conceivably introduce evidence that the defendant was a lineal descendant
of Richard Speck and argue that a theory of bad genes supported a verdict of death.
82. See infra notes 84-96 and accompanying text.
83. See infra notes 118-277 and accompanying text.
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People v. La Pointe,s4 a 1981 decision allowing judges to consider
evidence of prior unadjudicated crimes. Evidence of other
crimes-adjudicated or not-is ordinarily inadmissible in the guilt
phase of a criminal trial."5 However, the La Pointe court, relying
on Williams v. New York, explained that a broader standard of rel86
evance operates as a judge considers the appropriate sentence.
The court nevertheless warned that trial judges must proceed carefully when admitting evidence of prior unadjudicated crimes.8 7
They "must exercise care to insure the accuracy of information" 8
and "should be sensitive to the possibilities of prejudice to defendant if inaccurate information is considered."8 9 In this case, the
court said, the other-crimes evidence appeared trustworthy because the defendant had the opportunity for in-court cross-examination and did not challenge the accuracy of the testimony. 9°
Another early case, People v. Devin, 91 articulated a tough standard for evaluating the accuracy of information introduced in a
capital sentencing hearing. In Devin, the court admonished prosecutors that they must not offer questionable evidence even to
judges and reminded judges that they must scrupulously insulate
themselves from the possible influence of improper information. 92
Psychiatric testimony in Devin described the defendant as a soci84. 88 Ill. 2d 482, 431 N.E.2d 344 (1981). Subsequent capital sentencing cases have
cited La Pointe and quoted its standard without noting or attributing any significance to
the fact that the La Pointe sentencing was not imposed under the capital punishment
statute. See, e.g., People v. Ramirez, 98 Ill. 2d 439, 460-61, 457 N.E.2d 31, 41-42 (1983),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1796 (1990). Because the prosecutor did not seek the penalty of
death after La Pointe pled guilty to murder, the judge sentenced under what is now ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-8-1(a)(1)(b) (1989), which permits judges to impose a
maximum sentence of natural life if they find any of the aggravating circumstances listed
in the capital punishment statute. See La Pointe, 88 Ill. 2d at 490-91, 431 N.E.2d at 34748.
85. Knowlton, supra note 6, at 1111-12.
86. The La Pointecourt quoted extensively from Williams and approved a wide-ranging inquiry into the defendant's character, background, morals, and inclinations to commit other crimes. See La Pointe, 88 Ill. 2d at 496-98, 431 N.E.2d at 350-51.
87. Id. at 498, 431 N.E.2d at 351.
88. Id. at 494, 431 N.E.2d at 349 (quoting People v. Adkins, 41 111. 2d 297, 300-01,
242 N.E.2d 258, 260 (1968)).
89. Id. at 499, 431 N.E.2d at 351.
90. Because firsthand testimony supplied the evidence of the prior crime, id., the La
Pointe opinion did not consider any arguments that hearsay, lack of confrontation, or
otherwise unreliable evidence tainted the sentencing.
91. 93 Ill. 2d 326, 444 N.E.2d 102 (1982).
92. The Devin court warned both prosecutors and judges to be wary of incompetent
evidence:
[T]he prosecutor is under both a legal and moral duty not to offer anything for
the consideration of the trial judge which may be of doubtful competency and
materiality....
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opath.93 The supreme court considered that evidence relevant to
94
whether he could reform or instead would commit future crimes.
The court took exception, however, when witnesses testified that
the defendant bragged that he had once pushed a Viet Cong prisoner out of a helicopter, that he had murdered in cold blood, and
that he had been well paid as a hired killer. 95 Because no evidence
corroborated this testimony, and because the medical evidence already suggested that the defendant fantasized, the court reasoned
that the trial judge should have issued an instruction to steer the
jury from reaching a conclusion about the conduct of the defendant solely on the basis of his fantasies. The high court reversed the
death sentence because the trial judge failed to "exercise care to
insure the accuracy of information considered." 96 In later cases,
however, the Illinois Supreme Court evaluated trial judges' evidentiary rulings with much greater deference.
2.

No Difference Between Judge and Jury

In two cases decided a few weeks apart in late 1982 and early
1983, the Illinois Supreme Court announced that the evidentiary
standards applicable when a judge imposes sentence also govern
when juries determine a defendant's punishment. However, the
court failed to provide convincing reasons to support its view that
judge and jury sentencing are equivalent.
Obviously the trial judge owes the same duty to the defendant to protect his
own mind from the possible prejudicial effect of incompetent evidence that he
would owe in protecting a jury from the same contaminating influence. The
prosecutor in such circumstances owes the duty of not only protecting the defendant but also the judge from such prejudicial matter.
Id. at 346-47, 444 N.E.2d at 112 (quoting People v. Riley, 376 Ill. 364, 367-68, 369, 33
N.E.2d 872, 874, 875, cert. denied, 313 U.S. 586 (1941)).
93. Id. at 342, 444 N.E.2d at 110.
94. Id. at 342-44, 444 N.E.2d at 110-11.
95. Id. at 348, 444 N.E.2d at 113.
96. Id. at 349, 444 N.E.2d at 113. The reports of the defendant's out-of-court boasting raise no concerns under the hearsay rules or the confrontation clause, as they are
admissions by a party, which are defined as nonhearsay under the federal rules and as an
exception to the hearsay rule under Illinois common law. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2);
E. CLEARY & M. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF ILLINOIS EVIDENCE § 802.1 (4th ed. 1984).
Nevertheless, the court questioned whether the statements were reliable evidence that the
defendant actually engaged in the exploits he reported. A limiting instruction would
have reminded the jury that there was no independent corroborating evidence.
The fact that the statements were made, however, appears to be reliable evidence of the
defendant's fantasies, which are further evidence of his sociopathic personality and thus
relevant to his prospects for rehabilitation. It is unclear whether the court regarded the
defendant's fantasies themselves as proper evidence in support of a sentence of death.
The opinion did not specify how the trial judge should have framed a limiting instruction.
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In the first of these cases, People v. Jones,9 7 the court cited cases
from other jurisdictions to support its holding that a sentencing
jury may properly receive the same information as a sentencing
judge. But the authorities cited do not support the court's reading
of them. After first reviewing the goal of matching the sentence to
both the offender and the crime, the court declared that juries deserve the same latitude as judges in considering information relevant to sentencing. 98 It asserted that other courts had reached the
same conclusion, and in support, cited cases collected in American
Law Reports. 99
The court next rejected the defendant's argument that he was
deprived of the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses when the jury considered secondhand information compiled
by an investigator from the probation office.1°° Relying on Williams v. New York,' 0 ' the court simply declared that defendants
have no right to cross-examine all out-of-court declarants who supply information to the sentencer. 0 2 Citing again to the cases in
American Law Reports, the court asserted that sentencers may
properly rely on presentence reports for information about a defendant's prior criminal activity. 10 3
The reasoning in Jones is faulty because the court obscured and
overlooked the distinction between two separate aspects of the evidentiary freedom that judges enjoy under the holding of Williams
v. New York."° First, Williams recognized that the range of information relevant to sentencing is broad enough to include the defendant's background, character, previous criminal record, and
employment history. 10 5 The cases the Illinois Supreme court cited
in Jones do support the proposition that juries serving as sentencers
10 6
may assess this broader range of information.
97. 94 Ill. 2d 275, 447 N.E.2d 161 (1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 920 (1983).
98. Id. at 286, 447 N.E.2d at 166.
99. Id. (citing Annotation, Court's Right, in Imposing Sentence, to Hear Evidence of
or to Consider, Other Offenses Committed by Defendant, 96 A.L.R.2d §§ 13-16, at 768,
811-18 (1964 & Later Case Servs. 1976 & 1981)).
100. Id. at 287, 447 N.E.2d at 167.
101. 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
102. Jones, 94 Ill. 2d at 288, 447 N.E.2d at 167.
103. Id.
104. See supra text accompanying notes 3-4.
105. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246 (1949).
106. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court considers it "essential" that the sentencing jury be able to consider "all possible relevant information" about the defendant.
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 274-76 (1976). Moreover, states cannot preclude capital
sentencing juries from looking for mitigating factors in any aspect of the defendant's
background and character. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978).

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 22

Second, Williams permitted sentencing judges to consider hearsay without affording defendants the right to confront and crossexamine the out-of-court sources of information.107 The collected
cases the Illinois Supreme Court cited in American Law Reports'
do not support the proposition that courts have permitted sentencing juries to consider hearsay evidence. Indeed, cases that appear
in the cited section of the annotation reached the opposite conclusion. 0I 9 Although one section of the annotation collects cases supporting the court's narrow statement that sentencers may properly
consider information in presentence reports, none of those cases
involved sentencing by juries.
The Jones court correctly ruled that both juries and judges must
be equally free to consider the broader range of information that is
relevant to sentencing. The court, however, failed to explain why
they should be equally free to consider hearsay. By blurring the
distinction between broadening the standard of relevance and relaxing the constraints of the hearsay rule, the Jones opinion obscured the fact that the cases it cited do not support fully its
holding. This confusing and misleading clouding of the distinction
is especially apparent in the court's discussion of the broadened
standard of relevance that individualized sentencing permits. The
court quoted from an older opinion, which noted that judges may
consider information that would be excluded in an adversary
trial. "0 Like Williams, the quoted decision refused to limit either
the "sources" or "types" of information that judges may consider
in sentencing."'I This quotation supports both relaxed hearsay
rules and a broader standard of relevance, and the Jones court announced, without further analysis, that "there is no valid reason ' to
12
apply a different rule where the jury makes the determination." "
Jones was also the first case to hold that a sentencing jury had
properly considered evidence of prior unadjudicated crimes.113 As
107. Williams, 337 U.S. at 246-52.
108. People v. Jones, 94 Ill. 2d 275, 286-88, 447 N.E.2d 161, 166-67 (1982), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 920 (1983).
109. See Annotation, supra note 99 parenthetical (citing Harmon v. State, 277 Ark.
262, 641 S.W.2d 21 (1982) (certificate signed by warden inadmissible hearsay evidence of
prior conviction); People v. Purvis, 56 Cal. 2d 93, 362 P.2d 713, 13 Cal. Rptr. 801 (1961)
(reversing death sentence because sentencing jury heard hearsay evidence of prior
crimes); State v. English, 367 So. 2d 815 (La. 1979) (parole officer's testimony about
defendant's prior conviction inadmissible hearsay)).
110. Jones, 94 Ill. 2d at 286, 447 N.E.2d at 166 (quoting People v. Adkins, 41 111. 2d
297, 300, 242 N.E.2d 258, 260 (1968)).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Jones pled guilty to the murders for which he was being sentenced, and the jury
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if to bolster confidence that its ruling would not foster unfair proceedings, the court remarked that judges and prosecutors remain
to reject evidence that is more prejudicial than
duty-bound
4
relevant. 1"

A few weeks later, in People v. Free, the court proclaimed a new
standard to govern the admissibility of evidence at the second
phase1 5of the capital sentencing hearing: "relevance and reliability."'

The court declared that the sentencer's identity made no

difference: "The same benchmarks of relevance and reliability apply whether the sentencing authority is the trial judge or the
no authority for this proposition and
jury."'16 The Free court cited
7
all.'
at
offered no analysis
'

was convened only to decide his punishment. While in custody, Jones volunteered information about additional killings for which he claimed responsibility; he directed detectives to additional evidence that substantiated his admissions. At the sentencing hearing,
the jury heard Jones's six-page confession to these uncharged crimes and some additional
corroborating evidence. In holding that the evidence was properly submitted, the court
relied on a 1938 case, United States v. Dalhover, 96 F.2d 355, 360 (7th Cir. 1938).
Dalhover permitted the prosecution to present a similar confession to uncharged crimes
before a jury convened solely to decide the punishment for a defendant who pled guilty.
Without articulating any general principles that would necessarily apply to all evidence of
uncharged crimes, the Jones decision held that the evidence was proper in this case. The
court based its conclusion on the defendant's plea of guilty, the voluntary confession to
the additional crimes, and the "substantial" corroboration of the defendant's detailed
admissions. Jones, 94 Ill. 2d at 291-92, 447 N.E.2d at 167-69.
114. Jones considered, but rejected, the defendant's argument that the jury was inflamed and prejudiced when the prosecution introduced grotesque photos depicting the
victims of the uncharged killings. The court explained that the photographs added nothing to the "grim and detailed description" in the defendant's confession. They showed
one victim with a bludgeoned head and severely lacerated throat. Another victim had
been decapitated. In the court's view, the photos were relevant evidence of the defendant's brutality. Jones, 94 Ill. 2d at 292-93, 447 N.E.2d at 169-70.
By a strange twist of reasoning, the court concluded that the photos were not impermissibly prejudicial, because after viewing the photos the jury decided on the death penalty in only twenty minutes:
Since the jury deliberation took approximately 20 minutes it is clear that there
was little difficulty in deciding that the death penalty was warranted, and we do
not believe that the admission of these photographs at this late date in the proceedings deprived defendant of the right to be sentenced by a rational tribunal.
Id. at 294, 447 N.E.2d at 170. The court did not consider whether the photographs
helped speed the jury's decision.
115. People v. Free, 94 Ill. 2d 378, 426, 447 N.E.2d 218, 241-42, cert. denied, 464
2d, 431 N.E.2d
U.S. 865 (1983). Although the court cited People v. La Pointe, 88 Ill.
344 (1981), the standard of relevance and reliability was first enunciated in the Free case.
For a discussion of La Pointe, see supra notes 84-90 and accompanying text.
116. Free, 94 Ill. 2d at 423, 447 N.E.2d at 240.
117. The opinion in Free did not mention Jones, which had been decided only a few
weeks earlier.
Later, again without citing any authority, the court tacitly assumed that whether juries
or judges make the sentencing decision, the same standard generally governs the admissi-
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3. The Standard of Relevance and Reliability
The central concern of the confrontation clause, the Supreme
Court maintains, is to ensure that the prosecution's case rests only
upon testimony that is reliable. 1 8 Live testimony, which is preferred," 9 sufficiently ensures reliability because the fact finder can
observe the demeanor of the witnesses as they testify under oath
and endure the test of cross-examination. 20 Nonetheless, the prosbility of evidence of prior unadjudicated crimes. At the sentencing hearing in People v.
Ramirez, 98 Ill. 2d 439, 457 N.E.2d 31 (1983), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1798 (1990), the
jury heard evidence of seven arrests that had not resulted in trials or convictions. In
holding that the evidence was relevant, the court simply quoted and applied the holding
of LaPointe,see supra notes 84-90 and accompanying text, without noting that a judge
determined the sentence in LaPointe. Because the majority cited no authority for extending the holding of LaPointe to jury sentencings, it is not evident that the court regarded the difference between judges and juries as even potentially significant. Ramirez,
98 Ill. 2d at 460-61, 457 N.E.2d at 41-42. Only the specially concurring opinion of Justice Simon raised the issue whether different considerations should apply when juries hear
evidence of unadjudicated criminal activity. The entire Ramirez court seemed unaware
that a year earlier in Jones, it permitted a sentencing jury to hear evidence of an unadjudicated crime when the defendant voluntarily admitted it and led detectives to "substantial" corroborating evidence that was presented in court. See supra note 113 and
accompanying text. No citation to Jones appears in either the majority opinion or in the
separate opinion of Justice Simon, who regarded Ramirez as the first case to consider
whether juries may hear such evidence at capital sentencing hearings. See Ramirez, 98
Ill. 2d at 473-77, 457 N.E.2d at 48-50 (Simon, J., concurring). The Illinois Supreme
Court continues to cite LaPointe,but not Jones, when permitting juries to hear evidence
of unadjudicated crimes at capital sentencing hearings. See, e.g., People v. Young, 128
Ill. 2d 1, 54, 538 N.E.2d 461, 475 (1989); People v. Owens, 102 Ill. 2d 88, 110, 464
N.E.2d 261, 271, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 963 (1984).
118. Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3163 (1990). The Supreme Court has also
said that the confrontation clause aims to "advance... the accuracy of the truth-determining process in criminal trials." Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970) (plurality
opinion), quoted in United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 396 (1986). The Court has been
criticized for overemphasizing the utilitarian value of confrontation and cross-examination. Aside from its value in uncovering the truth, the right of confrontation is also basic
to our sense that judicial proceedings are conducted fairly. See Halpern, The Confrontation Clause and the Search for Truth in Criminal Trials, 37 BUFFALO L. REV. 165, 168
(1988); Massaro, The Dignity Value of Face-To-FaceConfrontations,40 U. FLA. L. REV.
863 (1988).
119. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980).
120. Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3163 (citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970)).
Some opinions suggest that defendants are not deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine out-of-court declarants if they could be subpoenaed as defense witnesses and questioned as adverse witnesses during the defense's case. See Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530,
549 n.3, (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 397
(1986) (defense right of compulsory process cited as reason for relieving prosecution of
need to show that a coconspirator is unavailable); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 88 n. 19
(1970) (plurality opinion); id. at 96 n.3 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 506 (1987) (defense "presumably" could cross-examine declarants
who provide information used in victim impact statements). In at least one case, the
Illinois Supreme Court has noted that the defendant was not deprived of the right of
confrontation when the prosecution introduced double hearsay in the capital sentencing
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ecution may introduce out-of-court statements that bear sufficient
"indicia of reliability." 121 A statement falling within a traditional
exception to the hearsay rule is sufficiently reliable, 122 while statehearing, because the absent declarant could have been subpoenaed as a defense witness
and cross-examined. See People v. Davis, 95 Ill.
2d 1, 47, 447 N.E.2d 353, 376, cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 1001 (1983), discussed infra note 212. The Supreme Court has never
held that defendant's right of compulsory process, by itself, is sufficient to satisfy the
confrontation clause, and commentators have criticized such an interpretation. The compulsory process clause supplements, but does not replace, the confrontation clause, which
puts the burden on the prosecution to produce its witnesses and tender them for the
defendant to cross-examine. Moreover, cross-examination is most effective immediately
after the fact finder has heard the direct testimony. Defendants should not be forced to
defer cross-examination until after the prosecution's case-in-chief. See Graham, The
Right of Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses Another One, 8
CRIM. L. BULL. 99, 135 (1972); Halpern, The Confrontation Clause and the Search for
Truth in Criminal Trials, 37 BUFFALO L. REV. 165, 193-94 (1988); Lilly, Notes on the
Confrontation Clause and Ohio v. Roberts, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 207, 229-32 (1984); Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of Evidence for Criminal
Cases, 91 HARV. L. REV. 567, 577-79 (1978).
121. Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139, 3146 (1990). In Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56
(1980), the Court held that the state may introduce transcripts of former testimony that
bear sufficient indicia of reliability if the prosecutor also demonstrates that the declarant
is not available to testify in person. Although the Court continues to ascribe some importance to a preliminary showing that the declarant is unavailable to testify, see Wright, 110
S. Ct. at 3146-47, such a showing is not necessary to introduce the out-of-court statements of coconspirators, United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 400 (1986).
122. Statements admitted under "firmly rooted" hearsay exceptions are sufficiently
reliable. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183 (1987). In Bourjaily, the Court
held that the exception that permits the prosecution to use the out-of-court statements of
coconspirators, as formulated in FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E), is firmly rooted in our legal
traditions, thus requiring no independent inquiry into reliability. Unlike most of the
exceptions to the rule against hearsay, the rationale for admitting the statements of coconspirators, like the rationale for admitting the out-of-court admissions of the defendant, does not rest on the purported trustworthiness of the statements. Instead, these
exceptions are regarded as products of the adversary system. See E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 262, at 775-76 (3d ed. 1984). Because out-of-court admissions by
the defendant and his coconspirators traditionally are allowed, but do not share the indicia of trustworthiness otherwise associated with admissible hearsay, the federal rules define both types of statements as nonhearsay. See id. at 775 n.6; FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2).
After Bourjaily approved the use of out-of-court statements under a hearsay exception
that is not traditionally associated with guarantees of trustworthiness, several commentators predicted that the Court will find that the requirements of the confrontation clause
are satisfied whenever a statement is admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence.
See, e.g., 4 J. WEINSTEIN, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 800-35 (1988); Jonakait, Restoring
the Confrontation Clause to the Sixth Amendment, 35 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 557, 570-74
(1988); Massaro, The Dignity Value of Face-to-Face Confrontations, 40 U. FLA. L. REV.
863, 881 (1988) ("justices... warming to Wigmore's argument that whenever the hearsay rules, as they evolve, are satisfied, the confrontation clause requirements are also
met"). While the rules reflect the standard announced in Roberts that the declarant be
unavailable before the prosecution may introduce former testimony, only a few of the
hearsay exceptions depend on the declarant's unavailability. Thus, the decision in Inadi,
that the statements of an available coconspirator are admissible, is also consistent with
the federal rules. The decision in Wright, which held that statements admitted under
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ments that the hearsay rules would exclude are presumed unreliable without "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." ' 23
The Court's reference to "guarantees of trustworthiness" brings
to mind the residual exceptions to the hearsay rules, which sometimes permit out-of-court statements that carry "circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness" equivalent to those of the recognized hearsay exceptions.1 24 That standard suggests that courts
should look to the rationale that justifies the hearsay exceptions
and determine whether the declarant made the statement in circumstances that reduce the risk that it was the product of insincerity, faulty memory, impaired perception, or poor narrative
ability. 25 Indeed, in Idaho v. Wright, 26 the Court confirmed that
the rationale for carving out exceptions to the rule against hearsay
should direct courts as they determine whether traditionally inadmissible hearsay is nevertheless acceptable under the confrontation
clause. 127 Consequently, courts must confine their search for particularized guarantees of trustworthiness to the circumstances that
surround the making of the statement. 12 1 Only when the totality of
those circumstances suggests that the declarant is particularly worthy of belief, so that foregoing cross-examination would not pose a
significant risk of unreliable testimony, does the confrontation
Idaho's clone of FED. R. EvID. 803(24) are inadmissible under the confrontation clause,
does not refute these commentator's predictions. See infra note 129.
123. Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 543 (1986) (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56,
66 (1980)).
124. See FED. R. EvID. 803(24), 804(b)(5); see also Jonakait, supra note 122, at 573.
125. Cross-examination can expose the witness's faulty perception, poor memory,
ambiguous description, and lack of sincerity. G. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
LAW OF EVIDENCE, § 6.1, at 182-83 (2d ed. 1987). Admitting hearsay creates the danger
that these latent defects in the declarant's report, the so-called "hearsay dangers," will
pass without detection. Jonakait, Subversion of the Hearsay Rule: Residual HearsayExceptions, CircumstantialGuarantees of Trustworthiness, and Grand Jury Testimony, 36
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 431, 434 n. 13 (1985). Most statements that are admissible under
the traditional exceptions to the rule against hearsay are made under circumstances that
suggest that at least one of the hearsay dangers is not present. See id.at 475; 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW, § 1422, at 254 (Chadbourn rev. 1974).
Consequently, when determining whether a statement fits a traditional hearsay exception,
courts look to the circumstances under which the statement was made. Commentators
have urged courts to follow a similar approach in applying the residual hearsay exceptions and the exceptions to the confrontation clause. See Jonakait, supra, at 474; Sonenshein, The Residual Exceptions to the FederalHearsayRule: Two Exceptions in Search of
a Rule, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 867, 879 (1982). See also E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EvIDENCE, § 324.2, at 908-09 (3d ed. 1984) ("equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" refer to factors operating when declarant made statement).
126. 110 S. Ct. 3139 (1990).
127. Id. at 3148.
128. Id. at 3148-49.
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clause permit an exception to the normal rule of live testimony. 12 9
The Illinois Supreme Court has reiterated that evidence at capital sentencing hearings must be both relevant and reliable, a determination left to the discretion of the trial judge. 30 By declaring
that trial judges should admit only reliable testimony, the court
appears to set a standard that matches the standard of the confrontation clause. In practice, however, the Illinois Supreme Court's
standard of reliability is often far more lenient than the Supreme
Court's confrontation cases would permit.'13 When admitting evidence that does not fall within a traditional exception to the hearsay rules, the Illinois Supreme Court rarely looks for reliability in
the circumstances under which the statement was made and seldom appears concerned with finding particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness. Instead, the court has erratically applied several
"tests" of reliability that prosecutors find easy to meet.
129. Id. In Wright, the trial judge admitted the hearsay statements under Idaho's
residual hearsay exception. Id. at 3144. Relying in part on independent evidence that
partially corroborated the hearsay, the Idaho Supreme Court agreed that the statements
were admissible under the state rule of evidence, which duplicates the language of FED.
R. EVID. 803(24). Nevertheless, the Idaho Court held that the statements were admitted
in violation of the confrontation clause. Wright, 110 S. Ct. at 3145.
The Supreme Court affirmed. After ruling that the residual hearsay exception is not
"firmly rooted," the Supreme Court also concluded that the statements lacked the particularized guarantees of trustworthiness that the confrontation clause requires. Id. at 314748. The Court thus held that statements admissible under Idaho's equivalent of FED. R.
EVID. 803(24) are nevertheless inadmissible under the confrontation clause.
This ruling does not refute the commentators who predict that the Supreme Court will
find that statements admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence will also satisfy the
demands of the confrontation clause. See supra note 122. Rules of evidence formulated
by state legislatures or developed by state courts may admit hearsay more liberally than
the Federal Rules of Evidence. Although the Supreme Court had no power to say that
Idaho courts had misapplied the state's residual hearsay exception, the Wright opinion
strongly suggests that the Supreme Court would have reached the opposite result under
the identically worded provision of FED. R. EVID. 803(24). The rationale of Wright suggests that when the courts look for "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness"
equivalent to those of the other hearsay exceptions codified in the federal rules, they must
look solely to the circumstances in which the out-of-court statement was made and not to
any independent corroborating evidence. Consequently, the hearsay statements in
Wright would fail to satisfy Rule 803(24) for the same reason they failed to satisfy the
confrontation clause. Wright thus suggests that the Federal Rules of Evidence would
exclude some hearsay, including the hearsay in this case, that the Idaho rules would
approve.
130. See, e.g., People v. Rogers, 123 Ill. 2d 487, 521, 528 N.E.2d 667, 683 (1988),
cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 878 (1989); People v. Foster, 119 Il. 2d 69, 96, 518 N.E.2d 82, 94
(1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1047 (1988).
131. In a few cases, however, the Illinois Supreme Court has deemed testimony to be
unreliable even when it would satisfy the standards of the confrontation clause. See infra
notes 150-53 and accompanying text; see also People v. Barrow, 133 Ill. 2d 226, 283, 549
N.E.2d 240, 266, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3257 (1990) (discussed infra note 159).
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The Illinois Supreme Court purports to apply the same standard
of admissibility in all capital sentencing hearings. In nonjury
sentencings, however, the court will often presume, without explanation, that the trial judge considered only reliable evidence. 3 2 In
the court's view, hearsay is reliable if the defendant does not directly challenge its accuracy' 3 3 or if it is corroborated by other evidence. 13 4 The court considers double hearsay to be reliable when
other evidence corroborates just a portion of the out-of-court statements. 35 In some cases, the court declares that the prosecution's
hearsay evidence is reliable simply because a police officer gathered
the secondhand information during an official investigation 3

6

.or

because the out-of-court declarations were not "inherently unreliable." 37 In other cases, for example when permitting the prosecution to present hearsay evidence of the opinions that nontestifying
psychiatrists have formed about the defendant, the court simply
rejects defendants' challenges without explaining why the secondhand evidence meets the standard of reliability.13 8 In only one area
has the Illinois Supreme Court really scrutinized ordinarily inadmissible hearsay to see if it contains particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness. Tacitly abandoning the reasoning of earlier decisions, the court now holds that some statements of absent accomplices are presumptively unreliable and should not be used as a
39
basis for imposing a sentence of death.'
a. Evidence When Trial Judges Sentence
The Illinois Supreme Court has repeatedly ruled that the same
standard of relevance and reliability applies whether juries or
judges fix the sentence."4 When defendants waive jury sentencing
and object to the evidence presented to the judge, the court sometimes has explained why it regards the disputed evidence to be relevant and reliable.' 4' Because the rationales of these decisions
132. See infra text accompanying notes 140-160.
133. See infra text accompanying notes 161-202.
134. See infra text accompanying notes 203-24.
135. See infra text accompanying notes 225-42.
136. See infra text accompanying notes 243-49.
137. See infra text accompanying notes 250-53.
138. See infra text accompanying notes 254-63.
139. See infra notes 264-77 and accompanying text.
140. See, e.g., People v. Harris, 129 111. 2d 123, 162-65, 544 N.E.2d 357, 374-75
(1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 1323 (1990); People v. Free, 94 Ill.
2d 378, 423, 447
N.E.2d 218, 240, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865 (1983).
141. See, e.g., People v. Foster, 119 Ill. 2d 69, 98-99, 518 N.E.2d 82, 95 (1987), cert.
denied, 486 U.S. 1047 (1988).
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reappear in opinions that review evidentiary rulings in jury
sentencings,I42 this Article draws its examples from cases analyzing
both jury and nonjury sentencing.
Despite the purportedly unwavering standard of relevance and
reliability, the Illinois Supreme Court sometimes reviews the record of nonjury sentencings with less scrutiny. The court readily
presumes that a judge considered only proper evidence and
screened out improper evidence.143 Such a presumption may be
warranted when the court reviews bench trials, because judges are
experienced at applying the rules governing evidence in criminal
trials.I" It may be unwarranted, however, as judges struggle with
the new and unfamiliar rules governing evidence in capital sentencing hearings.14 5
The decisions of the Illinois Supreme Court are sometimes unclear and inconsistent in explaining the standards of both relevance
and reliability. Although some decisions suggest that uncorroborated hearsay is unreliable, 146 other cases consider it trustworthy
enough if the out-of-court declarant supplied the information to a
police officer.'47 Generally, victims and other eyewitnesses may re142. For example, in People v. Salazar, 126 Ill. 2d 424, 535 N.E.2d 766 (1989), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 3288 (1990), the sentencing jury heard secondhand evidence suggesting
that the defendant belonged to a gang. The court explained that the information was
reliable because a police officer gathered it in the course of an official investigation and
the defendant did not directly challenge its accuracy. The court first articulated these
rationales while reviewing capital sentencing hearings conducted without a jury, and the
case cited in Salazar was also a nonjury sentencing. Id. at 468-69, 535 N.E.2d at 785.
143. See, e.g., People v. Foster, 119 Ill. 2d 69, 96-97, 518 N.E.2d 82, 94 (1987), cert.
denied, 486 U.S. 1047 (1988); People v. Erickson, 117 Il1. 2d 271, 300, 513 N.E.2d 367,
380 (1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1017 (1988); People v. Johnson, 114 Ill. 2d 170, 205,
499 N.E.2d 1355, 1371 (1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 951 (1987); People v. Eddmonds,
101 Ill. 2d 44, 65-66, 461 N.E.2d 347, 357, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 894 (1984). On occasion, the court has first acknowledged that certain disputed testimony may have been
unreliable before invoking the magic prosecution-saving presumption that the judge considered only proper evidence. See, e.g., E rickson, 117 Ill. 2d at 300, 513 N.E.2d at 380.
144. See Note, Improper Evidence in Nonjury Trials: Basis for Reversal?, 79 HARV.
L. REV. 407, 412-13 (1965).
145. See generally Kaplan, Evidence in Capital Cases, I FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 369
(1983); cf United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 578-81 (1968) (noting that the prospect
of separate proceedings on penalty pose novel procedural and evidentiary questions and
thus "[i]ndividuals forced to defend their lives ...must do so without the guidance that
defendants ordinarily find in a body of procedural and evidentiary rules spelled out in
advance," and explaining that legislatures, not judges, should determine the propriety of
and procedure for separate penalty proceedings).
146. See, e.g., People v. Erickson, 117 Ill. 2d 271, 513 N.E.2d 367 (1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1017 (1988), discussed infra notes 228-40 and accompanying text.
147. See infra text accompanying notes 243-49. Other decisions, without considering
whether the out-of-court statements are corroborated or not, have approved hearsay and
double hearsay by simply announcing either that it is reliable or that the rules of evidence
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liably provide firsthand testimony accusing the defendant of prior
crimes, even without any corroborating evidence. 48 Even when
that live testimony squarely conflicts with other testimony and is
not corroborated by independent documentary records that would
presumably exist if the state's witness were testifying accurately,
the court has held the testimony admissible and left the determination of credibility for the fact finder. 149 Nevertheless, the court also
has applied a stricter standard and held that some live cross-examined testimony is unreliable. 150 For example, instead of permitting the fact finder to evaluate credibility in People v. Harris,5 ' the
court ruled that firsthand testimony implicating the defendant in a
prior killing was unreliable and thus inadmissible. 52 The court
discounted the testimony because other evidence contradicted it
impeaching evidence revealed the bias of one
and because
53
witness.
and the right of confrontation do not apply at sentencing. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 260-63 (out-of-court psychiatric experts); see also People v. Davis, 95 Ill. 2d
69, 518 N.E.2d 82 (1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1047 (1988), discussed infra note 212.
148. E.g., People v. Erickson, 117 Ill. 2d 271, 299, 513 N.E.2d 367, 379 (1987) (uncorroborated rape), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1017 (1988); People v. Ramirez, 98 Il1.2d 439,
460-61, 457 N.E.2d 31, 41-42 (1983), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1053 (1987). In another case,
however, the court ruled without explanation that a victim's firsthand but uncorroborated testimony of a jailhouse rape was too unreliable to consider at a capital sentencing
hearing. See People v. Foster, 119 Ill. 2d 69, 100, 518 N.E.2d 82, 96 (1987), cert. denied,
486 U.S. 1047 (1988), discussed infra note 251.
149. In People v. Brisbon, 129 Ill. 2d 200, 544 N.E.2d 297 (1989), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 1796 (1990), a prison guard testified that he saw the defendant stab another inmate.
The prosecution produced no medical records to corroborate the testimony, and the inmate testified and denied that Brisbon stabbed him. The court held that the guard's
testimony, even though contradicted and uncorroborated, was sufficiently reliable to be
admissible and that the jury should be the judge of its credibility. Id. at 213, 544 N.E.2d
at 306.
150. See People v. Harris, 129 Ill. 2d 123, 143-46, 164, 544 N.E.2d 357, 365-67, 375
(1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1323 (1990); Foster, 119 11. 2d at 100, 518 N.E.2d at 9596; see also People v. Barrow, 133 Ill. 2d 226, 245, 283, 549 N.E.2d 240, 248 (1989), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 3257 (1990) (excluding some firsthand evidence as unreliable by applying what is really a rule of relevance), discussed infra note 159.
151. 129 Ill. 2d 123, 544 N.E.2d 357 (1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1323 (1990).
152. Id. at 164-65, 544 N.E.2d at 374-75.
153. Id. at 143-46, 164, 544 N.E.2d at 365-67, 375. The court explained that both
witnesses were unreliable because they testified that the defendant used a rifle, while the
defendant's ballistics expert demonstrated that a handgun was used. Id. at 146, 164, 544
N.E.2d at 367, 375. One witness was further impeached by a prior inconsistent statement
and the other by his membership in a gang that had a rivalry with the defendant's gang.
Id. at 164, 544 N.E.2d at 375.
Even when evaluating whether hearsay testimony is sufficiently reliable, the court generally does not examine the believability of the out-of-court declarant so closely. For
example, in People v. Salazar, 126 Ill. 2d 424, 535 N.E.2d 766 (1988), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 3288 (1990), the court held that a hearsay accusation blaming the defendant for a
shooting was sufficiently reliable, even though the secondhand report shared the same
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The court's standard of relevance also varies. Because the sentencer may consider any evidence that shows the defendant's character, the court has held that evidence of mere suspicious activity is
relevant to show the defendant's "propensity to conduct himself in
a particular manner." 54 Hearsay evidence of prior criminal activity is reliable and relevant to show the defendant's "character,"
"past conduct," or "unprosecuted misconduct,"' 55 even when
there has been no arrest' 56 or when charges have been dismissed for
lack of probable cause.' 57 Despite that seemingly broad standard
of relevance and reliability, however, the court occasionally holds
that trial judges should have excluded reports of the defendant's
past suspicious behavior or criminal conduct, even when eyewitnesses testified in court and submitted to cross-examination.'
In
defects as the firsthand accusations in Harris. Id. at 470-71, 535 N.E.2d at 786. Ferguson, the out-of-court declarant in Salazar, was also a member of a rival gang, id. at 472,
535 N.E.2d at 787, a fact the court did not even mention when evaluating whether his
statement was sufficiently reliable. He had also given contradictory statements to the
police, and his version of the shooting differed in arguably material details from the reports of eyewitnesses. Ferguson told police that Salazar fired while driving an automobile
that also carried three black men. Two independent eyewitnesses, however, said that the
assailant rode alone on a motorcycle. Id. at 471, 535 N.E.2d at 786. The court in Salazar
chose to overlook this inconsistency, which seems no less impeaching than the discrepancy in Harris over whether a rifle or a handgun was used. For further discussion of
Harris,see infra note 159.
154. People v. Salazar, 126 Ill. 2d 424, 468, 535 N.E.2d 766, 785 (1988), cert. denied,
110 S.Ct. 3288 (1990).
155. See People v. Richardson, 123 111. 2d 322, 361-62, 528 N.E.2d 612, 628 (1988),
cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1577 (1989) (history); People v. Hall, 114 Ill. 2d 376, 417, 499
N.E.2d 1335, 1352 (1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 951 (1987) (unprosecuted misconduct);
People v. Morgan, 112 Ill. 2d 111, 142-44, 492 N.E.2d 1303, 1316-17 (1986), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 1101 (1987) (character); People v. Brisbon, 106 Ill. 2d 342, 364-65, 478 N.E.2d
402, 412, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 908 (1985) (past conduct).
156. See, e.g., People v. Foster, 119 Ill. 2d 69, 97-99, 518 N.E.2d 82, 94-95 (1987),
cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1047 (1988); People v. Montgomery, 112 Ill. 2d 517, 528-33, 494
N.E.2d 475, 479-81 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1101 (1987).
157. In People v. Brisbon, 106 Ill. 2d 342, 478 N.E.2d 402, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 908
(1985), the court held that hearsay evidence linking the defendant to an earlier killing was
relevant to show the defendant's "past conduct," even though charges had been dismissed
for lack of probable cause. Id. at 364-65, 478 N.E.2d at 412; see also People v. Morgan,
112 Ill. 2d 111, 142-44, 492 N.E.2d 1303, 1316-17 (1986) (charges dismissed), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1101 (1987).
The court even has suggested that evidence of an arrest, by itself, is relevant to the
sentencing decision, even without further evidence of misconduct. See People v. Hall,
114 Ill. 2d 376, 417, 499 N.E.2d 1335, 1352 (1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 951 (1987)
("hearsay testimony that the defendant had been charged in an earlier murder, but that
the charges were dismissed for want of probable cause, admissible at sentencing hearing
as relevant to defendant's unprosecuted misconduct"; summarizing the holding of
Brisbon).
158. See, e.g., People v. Barrow, 133 Ill. 2d 226, 245, 283, 549 N.E.2d 240, 248, 266
(1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 3257 (1990); People v. Adams, 109 Ill. 2d 102, 128-29, 485
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these decisions, the court tacitly applied a more narrow standard of
59
relevance.
N.E.2d 339, 349 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1088 (1986). The relevance-based rationale of these cases conflicts with other holdings of the Illinois Supreme Court. For an
analysis, see infra note 159.
159. The Illinois Supreme Court's most explicit ruling that evidence of a prior crime
should be excluded as irrelevant came in People v. Harris,in which the court also ruled
that firsthand eyewitness testimony, which implicated the defendant in an earlier and
unrelated 1969 killing, was unreliable. The defendant had been charged with murder in
the prior case, but the prosecutor dropped the charges in 1972. The Illinois Supreme
Court ruled that the trial judge in Harris erred by refusing to admit a transcript of the
1972 nolle prosequi hearing in which the prosecutor explained that he believed Harris
was not guilty. The Illinois Supreme Court found reasons to distrust the eyewitnesses,
concluded that their testimony was unreliable, and also regarded the excluded statement
of the prosecutor as probative of Harris's innocence. See People v. Harris, 129 Ill. 2d
123, 143-46, 162-65, 544 N.E.2d 357, 365-68, 374-75 (1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1323
(1990); see also discussion supra note 153. This persuasive evidence of the defendant's
innocence explains the court's ruling that the testimony of the eyewitnesses was irrelevant
as well as unreliable. As the United States Supreme Court noted in another context,
evidence of other crimes is relevant only if there is sufficient credible evidence to conclude
that the crime occurred and the defendant was the actor. See Huddleston v. United
States, 485 U.S. 681, 689 (1988).
In other cases, the rule of relevance supplies the sole rationale for the court's conclusion that evidence was improperly admitted at the capital sentencing hearing. These
cases are not easily distinguishable from other decisions that would appear to regard the
same evidence as proper.
The principle of relevance best explains two decisions in which the Illinois Supreme
Court ruled that some firsthand cross-examined testimony should have been excluded at
the sentencing hearing. In People v. Adams, 109 111. 2d 102, 485 N.E.2d 339 (1985), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1088 (1986), an officer testified that when he responded to a report of a
robbery, he found "two blacks" getting into a car about two blocks from the scene.
When they ran in different directions, the officer chased and apprehended one, who was
the defendant. As no other evidence linked the defendant to that robbery, no charges
were filed. The court speculated that the robbery victim probably failed to identify the
defendant. Without articulating whether the evidence failed the test of relevance or the
test of reliability, the court concluded that the officer's testimony was improperly admitted. Id. at 128-29, 485 N.E.2d at 349.
Similarly, in People v. Barrow, 133 Ill. 2d 226, 245, 549 N.E.2d 240, 248 (1989), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 3257 (1990), a witness who worked with the defendant at a convenience
store testified that she saw him weigh several packets of white powder on a scale. Id. at
245, 549 N.E.2d at 248. Again, the court ruled that this live, cross-examined testimony
about the witness's firsthand observations was improperly admitted. The court explained
that the testimony was unreliable evidence that the defendant possessed drugs and therefore did not meet the standard of accuracy that governs information offered in the sentencing hearing. Id. at 283, 549 N.E.2d at 266.
As the witnesses in Barrow and Adams conveyed their firsthand observations in court
where the defendant had an opportunity to cross-examine, their reports satisfy the confrontation clause and other decisions of the Illinois Supreme Court that have defined the
standard of reliability. Although Barrow stated that the testimony about the powder was
unreliable, not irrelevant, both Barrow and Adams make sense when viewed as rulings on
conditional relevance: the otherwise sufficiently reliable testimony must be excluded
without more substantial or additional evidence linking the defendant to the proposition
the prosecution is attempting to prove.
In evaluating the relevance of the state's evidence, however, the Illinois Supreme Court
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Without consistent guidance on the meaning of relevance and
reliability, trial judges will have trouble distinguishing between evidence the high court would approve and evidence it would spurn.
When the record clearly reveals that the judge relied on testimony
that the Illinois Supreme Court later concludes was improper, it
will reverse a sentence of death. 11 But trial judges do not invariably list every scrap of testimony that affected their decision. Given
the uncertainties about what evidence is proper, the Illinois
Supreme Court may be too trusting in its deferential approach.
b. Reliable Because Defendant Fails to Challenge
The Illinois Supreme Court has sometimes explained that the
statements of out-of-court declarants are reliable, and therefore admissible, because the defendant never "directly challenged" the
prosecution's hearsay. 6 ' In these cases, the court clearly avoids
has failed to provide trial courts with clear and consistent guidance in how to match the
probative value of the state's evidence with the propositions the prosecution may permissibly prove.
For example, the court held in People v. Free, 94 Ill. 2d 378, 447 N.E.2d 218, cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 865 (1983), that an officer properly testified about stopping and questioning the defendant around 4 a.m. the day before the defendant committed the murder
for which he was convicted. Id. at 424, 447 N.E.2d at 240. Although the testimony
presented no evidence of criminal behavior, the court regarded Free's conduct as "suspicious" and in later cases cited Free when explaining that evidence is relevant when it
merely shows a defendant's "propensity to conduct himself in a particular manner." People v. Salazar, 126 Ill. 2d 424, 468, 535 N.E.2d 766, 785 (1988) (characterizing the holding of Free), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3288 (1990); see also People v. Johnson, 128 Ill. 2d
253, 284, 538 N.E.2d 1118, 1132 (1989) (Free's conduct "suspicious"). A similar rationale could have permitted the testimony in Adams, on the ground that defendants act
suspiciously and show their character and propensities when they flee from police officers.
Likewise, a court could regard the testimony in Barrow as relevant evidence of the defendant's lifestyle, "suspicious" conduct, and "propensity to conduct himself in a particular manner," even without direct evidence identifying the powder in Barrow's packets.
Barrow and Adams are difficult to reconcile with Free and other cases that hold evidence
properly relevant if it shows anything about the defendant's character or past conduct.
These contradictory rulings do not inspire confidence that trial judges will automatically
rely only on the evidence the Illinois Supreme Court considers proper.
160. See People v. Harris, 129 Ill. 2d 123, 164-65, 544 N.E.2d 357, 374-75 (1989),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1323 (1990) (reversing sentence of death because trial judge acknowledged relying on evidence that the Illinois Supreme Court considered improper).
161. See, e.g., People v. Salazar, 126 Ill. 2d 424, 469, 535 N.E.2d 766, 785 (1988),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3288 (1990) (defendant "never directly challenged" hearsay testimony that he was gang member); People v. Foster, 119 Ill. 2d 69, 98-99, 518 N.E.2d 82,
95 (1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1047 (1988) (hearsay "never directly challenged"); People v. Hall, 114 Ill. 2d 376, 400-01, 417, 499 N.E.2d 1335, 1344, 1353 (1986), cert. denied,
480 U.S. 951 (1987) (secondhand report of misconduct reliable because defendant "did
not claim at trial that the incident did not occur"); People v. Johnson, 114 Ill. 2d 170,
206, 499 N.E.2d 1355, 1371 (1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 951 (1987) (secondhand report
of uncharged killing "never directly challenged"). In most of these opinions, the court
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asking whether the declarant made the statement under circumstances that suggest it is worthy of belief. Instead, the court borrows a principle that generally operates when judges sentence
convicted felons-that judges may properly rely on any uncontested information contained in presentence reports.162 The Illinois
Supreme Court should not automatically assume, however, that it
may properly apply the same rule in the trial-like procedures of
capital sentencing, where adverse parties control the evidence and
present it all in open court before a jury. 63 Moreover, by applying
this rule of felony sentencing in capital proceedings, the Illinois
Supreme Court has made it more difficult for defendants to alert
the sentencer that it may be relying on inaccurate information.
In practice, the rule evaluates the admissibility of evidence only
in retrospect. Until both parties have presented their witnesses, the
court does not know whether the defendant has directly challenged
the prosecution's hearsay. In nonjury proceedings, judges are accustomed to hearing all potentially questionable evidence and ruling later on its admissibility or basing their decision only on the
clearly admissible evidence.' 64 With a jury, however, such a procedure is untrustworthy, as evidentiary rules of exclusion aim to keep
improper evidence from ever reaching the jury. 165 Courts attempt
offered additional reasons for finding the hearsay reliable. Yet the opinions suggest that
the defendant's failure to challenge can be sufficient, by itself, to consider the prosecution's hearsay admissible.
162. Such reliance is proper when defendants have the opportunity to review and
criticize the contents of the reports. See, e.g., 3 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE
§ 18-6.4 commentary (1979); Note, A Hidden Issue of Sentencing: Burdens of Prooffor
Disputed Allegations in Presentence Reports, 66 GEO. L.J. 1515, 1529 (1978); see also
Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 362 (1977) (sentencer may rely only on information
that defendant has had a chance to deny or explain), discussed supra notes 60-68 and
accompanying text.
163. The Illinois Supreme Court maintains that the same standards of relevance and
reliability govern the admissibility of evidence at all capital sentencing hearings, whether
they are conducted before a judge or jury. See supra text accompanying note 140. The
court has reasoned that unchallenged hearsay is reliable in both jury and nonjury sentencings. See People v. Salazar, 126 Ill. 2d 424, 468, 535 N.E.2d 766, 785 (1988), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 3288 (1990) (jury sentencing); People v. Hall, 114 Ill. 2d 376, 416-17, 499
N.E.2d 1335, 1352 (1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 951 (1987) (judge).
164. See 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 16:3(5) (2d ed. 1979).
Similarly, when sentencing judges decline to rely on a disputed section of a presentence
report, they remain aware of the information they purport to disregard.
165.

Cf E. CLEARY & M. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF ILLINOIS EVIDENCE § 103.9

(4th ed. 1984) ("[t]o the extent practicable, proceedings are to be conducted so as to
prevent inadmissible evidence from being suggested to the jury by any means"); see also
E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 353 (3d ed. 1984) ("[a]dmission of evidence in
a jury trial is often considered the last effective legal control over the use (or abuse) of
such evidence because of the assumption that the jury will rely upon or be swayed by it
regardless of whether its reliability has been established").
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to correct the occasional error by instructing the jury to disregard
improper testimony. Yet it seems anomalous to fashion a rule of
admissibility that permits the jury to hear all the prosecution's
hearsay and then relies on later instructions to strike the inadmissible portions.' 66 Sitting as a court of review, the Illinois Supreme
Court can examine all the evidence with hindsight and determine
that the defendant did not directly challenge the state's hearsay.
But such a backward-looking evaluation provides no guidance to
trial judges who must decide, in the middle of a jury proceeding,
whether the prosecution's hearsay is sufficiently reliable to be admitted as evidence.
Defendants could conceivably challenge the prosecution's hearsay by presenting their own witnesses or by cross-examining the
prosecution's witnesses. However, the Illinois Supreme Court applies a strict standard in judging whether a defendant's challenge is
sufficiently direct.167 It sometimes appears that defendants cannot
"directly challenge" the prosecution's hearsay unless they personally take the witness stand. 6 For example, while cross-examining
a correctional officer who testified for the state, the defendant in
People v. Hall 69 challenged a hearsay allegation that he helped
other inmates stab a prisoner. He elicited evidence that a mere
fistfight took place, 70 thus countering the hearsay allegation of an
armed assault with evidence that no weapons were involved. Yet
the Illinois Supreme Court reasoned that the defendant did not
challenge the accusation directly because he did not deny in court
that the altercation occurred.'
Defendants also have failed to "directly challenge" the prosecution's hearsay even when calling friendly witnesses to rebut the
7 2
state's evidence. In People v. Salazar,1
the defendant presented
two character witnesses to counter the prosecution's hearsay evidence that he belonged to a street gang. The court's ruling that
these witnesses did not directly challenge the evidence of gang
membership appears to leave defendants little opportunity for
166. If some evidence were indeed admissible solely because the defendant failed to
challenge it, then the judge's decision to allow the prosecution to present hearsay would
become an error of law as soon as the defendant later produced witnesses who directly
challenged its accuracy. Presumably the judge would then instruct the jury to disregard
the now-inadmissible hearsay.
167. See infra notes 169-74 and accompanying text.
168. Id.
169. 114 Ill. 2d 376, 499 N.E.2d 1335 (1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 951 (1987).
170. Id. at 400-01, 499 N.E.2d at 1344.
171. Id. at 400-01, 417, 499 N.E.2d at 1344, 1352.
172. 126 Ill. 2d 424, 535 N.E.2d 766 (1989); cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3288 (1990).

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 22

mounting a sufficiently direct challenge unless they take the witness stand themselves.17 3 Indeed, without cooperative testimony
from self-admitted gang members, which nonmembers would have
difficulty arranging, it is difficult to imagine any other method by
which a defendant could directly challenge a hearsay allegation
that he belonged to a street gang. The court's opinions in Hall and
Salazar do not expressly rely on the defendant's failure to testify.
Nevertheless, by concluding in these cases that the defendant's
challenge to the state's hearsay is not sufficiently direct and that
the absence of direct challenge renders the state's hearsay reliable,
1 74
the court infers far too much from the defendant's silence.
The Supreme Court long has recognized that there are many
reasonable explanations why even an innocent defendant may de173. Id. at 469-70, 535 N.E.2d at 785-86. In Salazar, the state presented secondhand
evidence that the defendant belonged to a street gang in the summer before the September
1984 murder for which he was being sentenced and additional hearsay that he was a
lieutenant. To rebut this accusation, the defendant presented two character witnesses
who testified that they had known him for many years and had never known him to be a
gang member or to carry a gun. In the court's view, these defense witnesses did not
directly challenge the evidence of membership. Id. One witness knew the defendant
since junior high school, but had seen him only once in the fourteen months before the
murder. The second witness, a boxing coach, had not seen the defendant since 1983 and
admitted hearing rumors of the defendant's membership. By pointing out the dates that
these witnesses were best acquainted with the defendant, the court appeared at first to
regard their testimony as probative, but stale. Yet if the witnesses have presented relevant and probative evidence that the defendant was not a gang member in 1983, then it
seems they have challenged the prosecution's evidence that the defendant was a top-level
officer only a year later. As the court ruled that these witnesses did not directly challenge
the evidence of membership, id., it appears that the defendant can realistically hope to
mount a sufficiently direct challenge only by taking the witness stand himself.
174. People v. Johnson, 114 Ill. 2d 170, 499 N.E.2d 1355 (1986), cert. denied, 480
U.S. 951 (1987), provides another example in which the defendant's failure to challenge
the prosecution's hearsay does not logically support an inference that it is reliable. At the
sentencing hearing, the prosecution presented secondhand and some thirdhand testimony
implicating Johnson in another murder for which he was not yet charged. On review, the
Illinois Supreme Court announced that the secondhand evidence was sufficiently reliable
because Johnson did not directly challenge its accuracy. Id. at 206, 499 N.E.2d at 1371.
Yet if prosecutors were planning to file criminal charges for this second murder, the need
to prepare a defense provides an alternative explanation for Johnson's silence. Anticipating a trial in that as-yet-unfiled murder case, a defense lawyer might reasonably discourage Johnson and his witnesses from providing sworn testimony that prosecutors might
later turn to their advantage, especially because the out-of-court declarants, who would
have to testify in person at the upcoming trial, had neither appeared, given testimony, nor
been cross-examined. This obvious explanation, the dictates of trial strategy and preparation, reasonably accounts for the defendant's silence and also preserves the presumption
of innocence that must govern the upcoming trial. The Illinois Supreme Court appeared
confident that the sentencer, who knew charges had not yet been filed, properly weighed
the secondhand evidence of the second murder. The opinion did not explain how the fact
that no charges had yet been filed affected the weight to be given the secondhand
evidence.
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cline to testify at a criminal trial. 75 Some witnesses will present
poorly to a jury, especially if they are nervous or inarticulate and
must explain suspicious or embarrassing actions. 176 A defendant
may have even more reason to remain silent in a capital sentencing
hearing when confronted with hearsay accusations that he has, for
example, committed additional crimes or belongs to a criminal organization.'7 If the defendant testified in the guilt phase of the
trial, the vote to convict may reflect the jury's view that he lied. In
the sentencing phase, even if the defendant truthfully rebuts the
prosecution's additional hearsay allegations, a jury that has already
78
voted to convict may view his testimony with undue skepticism. 1
Furthermore, the defendant cannot take the witness stand simply
to rebut the prosecution's hearsay evidence of one particular act of
misconduct; he must submit to complete cross-examination if he
testifies at all. 179 Some defendants may choose to forego this allencompassing cross-examination18 0 before a jury from which the
most potentially sympathetic listeners--citizens who are the most
hesitant to impose the penalty of death-have already been removed by law.'
If, as the Illinois Supreme Court suggests, 8 2 the state's hearsay
175. As the Court observed almost a hundred years ago:
It is not every one who can safely venture on the witness stand though entirely
innocent of the charge against him. Excessive timidity, nervousness when facing others and attempting to explain transactions of a suspicious character, and
offences charged against him, will often confuse and embarrass him to such a
degree as to increase rather than remove prejudices against him. It is not every
one, however honest, who would, therefore, willingly be placed on the witness
stand.
Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60, 66 (1893), quoted in Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S.
288, 300 n.15 (1981).
176. Id.
177. In another context in which the Court debunked the probative value of a defendant's silence, it recognized that even innocent people are more likely to remain justifiably
silent in proceedings in which they cannot cross-examine their accusers. See Grunewald
v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 422-23 (1957).
178. Indeed, the defendant in Salazar testified in the guilt phase of the trial, but not
in the penalty phase. See People v. Salazar, 126 Ill. 2d 424, 447, 535 N.E.2d 766, 776
(1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3288 (1990).
179. See People v. Szabo, 113 Ill. 2d 83, 95, 497 N.E.2d 995, 1000 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1101 (1987).
180. See Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 792 (1987) (experienced trial counsel may
properly decide to forego presenting mitigating evidence because cross-examination of
defendant or his witnesses may harm chances for a life sentence).
181. See Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 433 (1985) (explaining standard for removing, for cause, jurors whose scruples against capital punishment inhibit their willingness to vote for death); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 513-23 (1968).
182. See, e.g., People v. Hall, 114 111. 2d 376, 417, 499 N.E.2d 1335, 1352 (1986), cert.
denied, 480 U.S. 951 (1987).
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is reliable because the defendant failed to challenge it directly, then
the prosecutor presumably could present such an argument to the
sentencing jury. But that argument collides with the defendant's
fifth amendment rights, which fully apply in capital sentencing trials.' 8 3 The fifth amendment forbids the prosecutor from reminding
the jury in any way that the defendant failed to testify. 184 When
the missing rebuttal could have come only from the defendant himself, the prosecutor may overstep the line if he argues that the government's hearsay has gone unchallenged. 8 1 Indeed, whether the
prosecution makes the argument or not, neither the judge nor the
jury may draw any adverse inference from the defendant's silence.'8 6 Consequently, when the Illinois Supreme Court regards
the prosecution's hearsay as reliable because the defendant did not
challenge it directly, and if it also looks to the defendant's testimony as the sole source of a sufficiently direct challenge,' 87 the
18
court draws inferences forbidden by the fifth amendment.
Moreover, importing the rule of felony sentencing into capital
sentencing proceedings raises concerns that lie beyond the scope of
183. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 462-63 (1981).
184. See Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 297-98 (1981); Griffin v. California, 380
U.S. 609, 613-15 (1965).
185. Professor Cleary believes that prosecutors may sometimes violate the fifth
amendment by arguing that the state's evidence is uncontradicted:
[I]t is permissible as a general matter for the prosecution to argue that particular evidence is uncontradicted, although Griffin may be violated by such an
argument if it appears that the jury would most likely conclude that the natural
source of contradictory evidence would have been the defendant's personal
testimony.
E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 131, at 321 (3d ed. 1984).
186. Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 301 (1981).
187. See supra notes 169-74 and accompanying text.
188. Even if the fifth amendment sometimes forbids sentencers in capital proceedings
from inferring that unchallenged hearsay is reliable, it does not necessarily forbid similar
inferences in noncapital sentencing. When the Supreme Court held that the fifth amendment applied to capital sentencing, it relied on the similarities between a capital sentencing hearing and a criminal trial. See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 462-63 (1981).
Barring the prosecutor from commenting on the defendant's failure to testify follows
naturally from the rationale and holding of Smith. It is not clear, however, that the
Court would extend Smith's fifth amendment holding to nonadversary sentencings in
which a judge relies on a presentence report. See 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 4 n.54
(Tiller rev. 1983). When the fifth amendment is not implicated, the Court has permitted
the fact finder to draw adverse inferences from the silence of the accused. See Baxter v.
Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 319 (1976) ("aside from the privilege against compelled selfincrimination, the Court consistently has recognized that in proper circumstances silence
in the face of accusation is a relevant fact not barred from evidence by the Due Process
Clause") (prison disciplinary proceeding). The Illinois Supreme Court never has considered the fifth amendment implications of its view that unchallenged hearsay is reliable in
capital sentencing proceedings.
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the fifth amendment. When uprooted from its home turf and
transplanted into the world of adversary capital sentencing proceedings, the rule that unchallenged hearsay is reliable poses a
greater risk that the sentencer may rely on information that actually is inaccurate. The adversary format in capital cases makes it
more difficult for defendants to challenge unfounded hearsay.
In a system without specific mandatory penalties for every
crime, the procedures for sentencing convicted felons are designed
to help the trial court exercise its discretion to choose a sentence
within the range authorized by the legislature. 89 Felony sentencing is not a purely adversary process, as the prosecution and the
defendant do not control the information provided to the decision
maker. Although the parties may provide supplementary evidence
in an adversary format, an officer of the court, who is theoretically
neutral, prepares the presentence report."9 Defendants generally
may examine presentence reports in advance and thus may determine whether and how to challenge any inaccurate information.' 9 1
Assertedly incorrect information may be brought to the judge's attention by way of objection that can be resolved informally if the
judge announces he will ignore the disputed portion of the report
and rely only on the unchallenged facts. 19 2 As a result, the defendant may sometimes correct an inaccurate presentence report without necessarily giving sworn testimony and submitting to crossexamination. In addition, Illinois felons retain the common law
right of allocution, the right to make an unsworn statement before
being sentenced.' 93
Capital sentencing works differently. The parties control the ev194
idence, which they present in a trial-like adversary proceeding.
189. See United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 45-49 (1978).
190. See United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 136-37 (1980) (sentencing inquiry "nonadversary in nature"); Note, supra note 162, at 1529 (presentence report prepared by neutral officer).
191.

See, e.g.,

FED.

R.

CRIM.

P. 32(c)(3)(A); ILL.

REV. STAT.

ch. 38, para. 1005-3-

4(b)(2) (1989).
192. See W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 25.2(i) (1985); see also
People v. Meeks, 81 111. 2d 524, 411 N.E.2d 9, 14 (1980); FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(3)(A)
(defendant provided opportunity to comment on report); 32(c)(3)(D)(ii) (court may disregard disputed portions).
193. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-4-1(a)(5) (1989); see also People v. Gaines,
88 Ill. 2d 342, 378-80, 430 N.E.2d 1046, 1062-65 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1001

(1982).
194. The Illinois Supreme Court clearly holds the defendant-not the court-responsible for marshaling and submitting mitigating evidence at capital sentencing hearings.
For example, in People v. Wright, 111 Ill. 2d 128, 160, 490 N.E.2d 640, 653 (1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1101 (1987), the defendant was convicted of murder and some related
noncapital felonies. A presentence report prepared for sentencing on the latter charges
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The Illinois statute does not provide for presentence reports,19 and
the Illinois Supreme Court has held that the prosecution has no
obligation to disclose its witnesses or its evidence to the defense in
advance. 196 Consequently, defendants sometimes will not know
what hearsay accusations they must challenge until the formal
hearing begins. 197 Moreover, the decisions of the Illinois Supreme
Court prevent defendants from presenting their own versions of the
facts unless they submit to cross-examination, even though they
have no right to cross-examine the prosecution's hearsay declarants. 98 For example, after holding that defendants have no right
turned up mitigating evidence that was not considered at the defendant's earlier capital
sentencing hearing. Despite the existence of this mitigating evidence, the court ruled that
the defendant must suffer the consequences of his own failure to submit the evidence to
the capital sentencer.
195. Although the Illinois statute does not require presentence reports in capital sentencing, see People v. Madej, 106 Ill. 2d 201, 211-12, 478 N.E.2d 392, 396, cert. denied,
474 U.S. 935 (1985) (nonjury sentencing); People v. Gaines, 88 Ill. 2d 342, 372-74, 430
N.E.2d 1046, 1061-62 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1001 (1982) (jury sentencing), judges
have sometimes ordered them prepared when the defendant has waived jury sentencing,
see, e.g., People v. Boclair, 129 Ill. 2d 458, 486, 544 N.E.2d 715, 728 (1989). In some
early cases, probation officers investigated the defendant's background and testified to
their findings in court before the sentencing jury. See, e.g., People v. Free, 94 Ill. 2d 378,
424-26, 447 N.E.2d 218, 240-41, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865 (1983); People v. Jones, 94 Ill.
2d 275, 287, 447 N.E.2d 161, 167 (1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 920 (1983).
196. See People v. Foster, 119 Ill. 2d 69, 101-03, 518 N.E.2d 82, 96-97 (1987), cert.
denied, 486 U.S. 1047 (1988). Some prosecutors apparently supply the defense with a list
of witnesses even though they are not required to do so. See, eag., People v. Collins, 106
Ill. 2d 237, 280-81, 478 N.E.2d 267, 286, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 935 (1985).
197. Even a list of witnesses would not necessarily help the defendant prepare to
rebut the prosecution's hearsay in a capital sentencing hearing. A list would reveal only
the names of persons who may actually testify, not the names of the out-of-court declarants whose accusations the named witnesses might report. Even if the prosecution provided a list of all the hearsay declarants, the defendant would often be the only one who
could directly challenge the prosecution's evidence of prior unadjudicated crimes. The
prosecution could easily put on hearsay evidence of a ten-year-old crime simply by finding the officer who investigated it or by finding a different officer to testify to the contents
of a ten-year-old report. Even with prior notice that the state intended to use this evidence, the defendant would have a much harder time tracking down witnesses who could
rebut it. Thus, even if the hearsay accusations are false, the defendant may be faced with
the choice of countering the accusation with personal testimony or not at all. A judge
sentencing on the basis of a presentence report, when advised that the defendant disputes
the report's version of a decade-old incident, might choose to avoid unfairness by declining to rely on the contested information. A sentencing jury could not implement a similar solution.
198. When an FBI agent testified for the state at the sentencing hearing in People v.
Ramirez, the defendant attempted to elicit, on cross-examination, an item of mitigating
information: that he telephoned the FBI and offered to surrender peacefully on a prior
charge. The court's opinion reveals that a written FBI report confirmed the defendant's
version and the prosecution did not dispute its accuracy. The testifying agent, however,
did not receive the defendant's call and had no firsthand knowledge of the conversation.
Because the defendant's question asked for hearsay, the trial judge ruled that the agent
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of allocution at capital sentencing,' 9 9 the court ruled that trial

judges may forbid expert witnesses from recounting their conversations with the defendant2 °° Such testimony, the court explained,
would permit defendants to submit unsworn statements. 0 1 Judges
also may exclude the defendant's sworn statements if they are submitted as affidavits instead of testimony. 202 These rulings make it
more difficult for defendants to controvert the government's case,
and the Illinois Supreme Court cannot safely presume that defendants accept the accuracy of the prosecution's hearsay simply because they fail to challenge it directly.
c.

Corroboration

A majority of the Supreme Court now has held that the existence of independent corroborating evidence is irrelevant to a
court's inquiry into whether an otherwise inadmissible out-of-court
statement carries such particularized guarantees of trustworthiness
that it qualifies as an exception to the confrontation clause. 20 3 In
an earlier plurality opinion, and in cases in which the confrontation clause did not apply, the Court sometimes noted that the existcould not answer. He further ruled that if the defendant testified about the call, the FBI
report could be admitted as corroborating evidence. In upholding the trial judge's ruling,
the Illinois Supreme Court noted that the defendant could have testified personally. Despite previous rulings that permitted hearsay at the sentencing hearing, the court said
that the defendant "defie[d] logic" by arguing that he was prevented from presenting
mitigating evidence by a ruling that merely barred a witness from testifying about "a
conversation to which [he] was not even a party." People v. Ramirez, 98 Ill. 2d 439, 464,
457 N.E.2d 31, 43 (1983).
199. People v. Gaines, 88 Ill. 2d 342, 374-80, 430 N.E.2d 1046, 1062-65 (1981), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 1001 (1982).
200. People v. Stewart, 104 Ill. 2d 463, 496-97, 473 N.E.2d 1227, 1242 (1984), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1120 (1985).
201. "We do not consider that the trial court abused discretion in refusing to allow
these witnesses to pass on to the jury what the defendant had told them. An accused
should not be permitted to make in this way what would be an unsworn statement to the
jury." Id. (citation omitted). But see People v. Gacy, 125 Ill. 2d 117, 131, 530 N.E.2d
1340, 1345 (1988) (in explaining basis for diagnosis, psychiatric expert may relate conversations with defendant); People v. Anderson, 113 Ill. 2d 1, 12-13, 495 N.E.2d 485, 490,
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1012 (1986) ("[psychiatric] expert must be allowed to repeat [defendant's] statements if relevant").
202. People v. Perez, 108 Ill. 2d 70, 88-89, 483 N.E.2d 250, 259 (1985), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 1110 (1986). Nor may defendants take the stand with a guarantee that crossexamination will be limited to a narrow issue on which the defendant seeks to offer evidence. People v. Szabo, 113 Ill. 2d 83, 95, 497 N.E.2d 995, 1000 (1986), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1101 (1987). Defendants also failed to benefit from the suspension of the rules of
evidence when the court held that the results of polygraph tests are inadmissible in the
second phase of an Illinois capital sentencing hearing. People v. Szabo, 94 Ill. 2d 327,
362-63, 447 N.E.2d 193, 210 (1983), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1101 (1987).
203. See Idaho v. Wright, 110 S.Ct. 3139, 3150 (1990).

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 22

ence of independent corroborating evidence bolsters the reliability
of hearsay that may be otherwise inadmissible under state or common law rules of evidence that govern criminal trials. 2 1 Corroboration functions in these decisions to supplement some indicia of
reliability that the Court has already found in the circumstances in
which the out-of-court statement was made. 20 5 The Supreme
Court has never held that corroboration, by itself, can transform
inadmissible hearsay into reliable evidence that may be submitted
to a jury, 2°e and commentators have criticized lower court opinions
that rely solely on corroboration to find guarantees of trustworthiness purportedly equivalent to those provided by the traditional
exceptions to the hearsay rule.2 °7
In contrast, the Illinois Supreme Court regards the existence of
minimal corroborating evidence as a sufficient condition for admitting hearsay in capital sentencing hearings, without any inquiry at
all into the circumstances surrounding the making of the out-ofcourt statement.2 °8 In some of these cases, moreover, the court appears unconcerned even when the most damaging details of the
out-of-court accusations pass with no corroboration at all.
When the prosecution has introduced evidence in capital sen204. See, e.g., Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 97 (1979); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410
U.S. 284, 298-301 (1973); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 88-89 (1970) (plurality opinion).
205. Green and Chambers did not implicate the principles of the confrontation clause,
because the defendant contested the exclusion of his evidence, not the admission of the
prosecution's testimony. The plurality opinion in Dutton, which interpreted the confrontation clause, pointed to corroboration as one of four factors that suggested that the hearsay in that case carried indicia of reliability. The Supreme Court has now explained that
Dutton's mention of corroborating evidence is "more appropriately" viewed as an explanation that any error in admitting the hearsay in that case was harmless. Idaho v.
Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139, 3150-51 (1990).
206. In Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 180-81 (1987), the Court held that
corroborated hearsay can be sufficiently probative under FED. R. EViD. 104, which provides that trial judges may determine preliminary issues of fact without regard to the
rules of evidence. The Court noted that corroboration may increase the probative value
of information that is unreliable in isolation. Although trial judges may make preliminary evidentiary determinations without regard to the rules of evidence, Bourjaily did not
hold that corroboration is a sufficient guarantee of reliability to submit ordinarily inadmissible hearsay to a jury. See also United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 172-77 (1974)
(corroborated hearsay sufficiently reliable when trial judge decides motion to suppress
evidence).
207. See, e.g., Cole, Residual Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule, LITIGATION, Fall 1989,
at 26, 30; Grant, The Equivalent CircumstantialGuaranteesof Trustworthiness Standard
for Federal Rule of Evidence 803(24), 90 DICK. L. REV. 75, 97-99 (1985); Jonakait, The
Subversion of the Hearsay Rule: The Residual HearsayExceptions, CircumstantialGuarantees of Trustworthiness, and Grand Jury Testimony, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 431,
465-66 (1985); Sonenshein, The Residual Exceptions to the FederalHearsay Rule: Two
Exceptions in Search of a Rule, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 867, 884 (1982).
208. See infra notes 209-24 and accompanying text.
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tencing hearings of the defendant's prior criminal activity, the Illinois Supreme Court has permitted police to relate the contents of
self-serving out-of-court statements taken from former accomplices
just after their arrest. 20 9 The court reasoned that the statements of
former codefendants are reliable when they are corroborated by
the defendant's conviction of the prior offense. 2 ° The court's reasoning ignores the fact that a conviction establishes only the bare
elements of a crime as the statutes define it. It does not corroborate the juicy details that former accomplices can include in their
accusations. This is especially true when a former accomplice
names the defendant as the ringleader, the initiator of a pre-conceived plan to murder,21 or the triggerperson. 1 2 The Illinois
Supreme Court persisted in its lenient attitude toward codefendants' accusations even after the United States Supreme Court, in
Lee v. Illinois, 21 3 identified the finger-pointing statements of code209. See People v. Foster, 119 Ill. 2d 69, 98, 518 N.E.2d 82, 95 (1987), cert. denied,
486 U.S. 1047 (1988); People v. Lyles, 106 Ill. 2d 373, 415, 478 N.E.2d 291, 309 (1985),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 859 (1985).
210. For example, in People v. Foster, 119 Ill. 2d 69, 98, 518 N.E.2d 82, 95 (1987),
cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1047 (1988), the court approved secondhand testimony about the
role the defendant played in an earlier tavern robbery for which he was convicted. An
accomplice arrested for that crime told police that he purposely foiled the defendant's
purported plan to kill the bartender. Although the accomplice did not testify and submit
to cross-examination, his postarrest statement was "clearly reliable," the court explained,
because it was corroborated by the defendant's conviction for robbery. See also People v.
Lyles, 106 Ill. 2d 373, 415, 478 N.E.2d 291, 309 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 859 (1985)
(double hearsay about defendant's 1968 juvenile crime, consisting of former state's attorney's testimony about contents of investigators' interviews with former codefendant in
juvenile proceedings, "strongly corroborated" by defendant's plea in juvenile court).
211. See, e.g., Foster, 119 Ill. 2d at 97, 518 N.E.2d at 94.
212. In People v. Davis, 95 Ill. 2d 1, 447 N.E.2d 353, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1001
(1983), the defendant was convicted of murder. In the sentencing hearing, the prosecution introduced a videotape that depicted a pretrial discussion between the defendant and
the state's attorney. In the recorded interview, the state's attorney told the defendant
that Holman, a second man arrested for the killing, named the defendant as the triggerperson. Id. at 47, 447 N.E. 2d at 375. Because no such evidence surfaced during the
guilt phase of the trial, the sentencing jury's only information that Davis allegedly pulled
the trigger came from this recording portraying the unsworn, nontestifying state's attorney announcing that an unsworn, out-of-court co-arrestee made the accusation.
The court did not assert that the verdict of guilt corroborated the accusation, nor did it
conclude that the videotaped hearsay was otherwise reliable. The court simply declared
that the rules of evidence do not apply at the second stage of a capital sentencing hearing.
Id. at 42-43, 447 N.E.2d at 373. In response to the defendant's objection that he could
not test the reliability of the accusation by cross-examination, the court said that the
defendant could have called Holman to the stand as an adverse witness. Id. at 47, 447
N.E.2d at 376. For criticism of the view that the defendant's right to subpoena witnesses
adequately satisfies the right of confrontation, see infra note 120.
213. 476 U.S. 530 (1986). The Illinois Supreme Court decided People v. Foster, 119
Ill. 2d 69, 518 N.E.2d 82 (1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1047 (1988), one year after Lee v.
Illinois.
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fendants as particularly unreliable and stated that cross-examination is essential for subjecting these suspect accusations to
appropriate scrutiny.214
More recently, the Illinois court changed course and abandoned
its view that convictions adequately corroborate codefendants' accusations. 215 Nevertheless, the court continues to apply laxly its
"test" of corroboration when the presumptively suspect statements
of accomplices are not at issue. In People v. Young,21 6 a decadeold out-of-court statement from a surviving victim of a robberymurder accused the defendant of pulling the trigger in that earlier
crime. 217 When questioned in 1978, the defendant admitted participating in the robbery, but maintained that he merely stood guard
while an accomplice carried out the crime that left one victim dead
and one wounded.2"' In the view of the Illinois Supreme Court,
the defendant's admitted presence at the scene sufficiently corroborated the out-of-court assertion that he fired the actual shots. 21 9 At

a murder trial, whether the defendant pulled the trigger would not
matter to a jury that followed instructions; the defendant's explanation of the ten-year-old crime amounted to an admission of felony murder. But who fired the shot is more important to a jury
pondering whether someone should live or die., On a key item of
fact that determined the degree of Young's moral responsibility,
his prior statement directly challenged that of the out-of-court declarant. Nevertheless, in a perverse twist of logic, the Illinois
Supreme Court reasoned that Young's statement sufficiently cor214. " '[T]he [post]arrest statements of a codefendant have traditionally been viewed
with special suspicion. Due to his strong motivation to implicate the defendant and to
exonerate himself, a codefendant's statements about what the defendant said or did are
less credible than ordinary hearsay evidence.'" Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 541 (1986)
(quoting Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 141 (1968) (White, J., dissenting) (citations omitted)). The Lee opinion explained that "when one person accuses another of a
crime under circumstances in which the declarant stands to gain by inculpating another,
the accusation is presumptively suspect and must be subjected to the scrutiny of crossexamination." Id.
215. See infra notes 264-77 and accompanying text.
216. 128 Ill. 2d 1, 538 N.E.2d 461 (1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 3290 (1990).
217. Id. at 52-53, 538 N.E.2d at 474. At Young's sentencing hearing, a police officer
testified that he investigated a 1978 incident in which one person was killed and another
wounded. The surviving victim, who said he was robbed and shot after two intruders
placed a robe over his head, reportedly identified the defendant as the triggerperson.
Charges filed against the defendant for this prior crime had been dismissed. Id.
218. Id. at 53, 538 N.E.2d 474. Although the Young opinion describes the defendant's version in only one sentence, it appears that Young admitted participating in the
robbery, but not the shootings. The opinion says that "[following his arrest [for the 1978
incident], the defendant made an oral statement in which he admitted to standing in the
doorway of the apartment while an accomplice committed the attacks." Id.
219. Id. at 54, 538 N.E.2d at 475.
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roborated the absent accuser's version. 220 This corroboration rendered the out-of-court statement reliable, and therefore
admissible.22'
The purportedly corroborating evidence in Young came from the
defendant's earlier statement, which is admissible under the confrontation clause and the rules of evidence.222 Yet the Illinois
Supreme Court has also held that hearsay is sufficiently reliable
when it is corroborated by other hearsay that does not fit any standard exceptions to the rule of exclusion.223 It appears that hearsay
may sufficiently corroborate other hearsay even when the reports
of out-of-court declarants differ in significant material details. 2 4
These decisions, along with the cases discussed in the next section,
show that when the prosecution presents hearsay or even double
hearsay in capital sentencing hearings, the Illinois Supreme Court
will regard the presence of even slight corroborating evidence as a
sufficient condition for finding that the statements of out-of-court
declarants are reliable, without any independent inquiry into the
circumstances in which the hearsay statements were made. Even
without corroboration, however, the prosecution may introduce
hearsay evidence if it otherwise satisfies the Illinois Supreme
Court's generally lenient standards of relevance and reliability.
d. Double Hearsay and Corroboration
Under the usual rules of evidence, double hearsay is admissible
only if each out-of-court statement falls within an exception to the
rule against hearsay.225 In capital sentencing hearings, the Illinois
Supreme Court considers double hearsay to be sufficiently reliable
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. The defendant's statements are admissions by a party. See supra note 96.
223. See, e.g., People v. Salazar, 126 Ill. 2d 424, 467-70, 535 N.E.2d 766, 784-86
(1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3288 (1990) (hearsay report of gang membership corroborated by hearsay report that defendant was officer in gang).
224. In Salazar, the court held that a police officer properly told the sentencing jury
about an accusation made by Ferguson. After telling police that he was shot by a Mexican who drove a car that also carried three black passengers, Ferguson identified the
defendant as his attacker. In holding that Ferguson's accusation was reliable, the court
relied in part on the secondhand reports of two eyewitnesses. Although they told police
that the assailant rode on a motorcycle, alone, the court explained that they corroborated
the "fact and location" of the shooting. Id. at 470-71, 535 N.E.2d at 786. The court
could just as easily have regarded the inconsistencies in the reports as grounds for finding
Ferguson's report unreliable. See supra note 153 for a comparison of Salazar and People
v. Harris, 129 Ill. 2d 123, 544 N.E.2d 357 (1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1323 (1990).
225. See FED. R. EvID. 805; E. CLEARY & M. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF ILLINOIS
EVIDENCE § 805 (4th ed. 1984).
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if other evidence corroborates "at least some parts" of the out-ofcourt declarants' assertions. 226 The court's decisions are confusing,
as they sometimes approve double hearsay without applying this
"test" of partial corroboration, 227 while other cases seem to suggest that corroboration is necessary before even "single" hearsay
can be deemed reliable.
The Illinois Supreme Court nearly concluded that some of the
prosecution's uncorroborated hearsay was improper in People v.
Erickson.228 In that case, a police detective testified about a conversation with the defendant's ex-girlfriend.229 She reportedly said
that the defendant slapped her and threatened to kill her if she told
anyone that he got her pregnant.23 ° She also said, according to the
police officer's testimony, that the defendant claimed he once
stabbed a man to death. 231 Under the Illinois common law rules of
evidence, the report of the stabbing is double hearsay, while the
report of the slapping and the threat is "single" hearsay.232 Recalling that a prior decision preferred at least some corroboration
before permitting double hearsay, the court noted that the record
corroborated none of the police officer's testimony.233 This "raised
226. People v. Erickson, 117 Ill. 2d 271, 300, 513 N.E.2d 367, 379-80 (1987), cert.
denied, 486 U.S. 1017 (1988).
227. See, e.g., People v. Brisbon, 106 Ill. 2d 342, 364-65, 478 N.E.2d 402, 412, cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 908 (1985) (double hearsay); People v. Davis, 95 Ill. 2d 1, 447 N.E.2d
353, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1001 (1983), discussed supra note 212; see also People v. Jones,
94 Ill. 2d 275, 287, 447 N.E.2d 161, 167 (1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 920 (1983) (investigator related contents of psychiatrist's written report on defendant).
228. 117 Ill. 2d 271, 513 N.E.2d 367 (1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1017 (1988).
229. Id. at 285, 513 N.E.2d at 372-73.
230. Id. at 285, 513 N.E.2d at 373.
231. Id.
232. See infra note 233.
233. In the court's analysis, the double hearsay included two statements the defendant allegedly made to his ex-girlfriend: the threat and his report that he had once stabbed
a man. Id. at 299-300, 513 N.E.2d at 379.
The court, however, should not regard the report of the threat as double hearsay. A
statement is not hearsay unless it is an assertion offered to prove the truth of what it
asserts and thus relies on the credibility of an out-of-court declarant. E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 246, at 730 (3d ed. 1984). The threat is significant because it
was made; it is not an assertion and is not offered to prove the truth of its contents. To
conclude that the threat was made, the fact finder needs to rely on the credibility of the
girlfriend, not the credibility of the threatener. As the ex-girlfriend could testify in court
and recount the threat without violating the rule against hearsay, the detective's secondhand report of the threat, like the report of the slapping, is only "single" hearsay.
The report of the stabbing is double hearsay under the Illinois common law rules of
evidence, as the fact finder must accept the credibility of two absent declarants: the exgirlfriend and the defendant. The report of the second declarant, the defendant, would
pose no problem under the hearsay rules. Admissions by a party are exceptions to the
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at least a question" about reliability.234 Without answering that
question, however, the court presumed that the trial judge, who
determined the sentence without a jury, considered only proper
evidence.235
The Erickson decision illustrates how erratically the Illinois
Supreme Court decides what evidence the prosecution may introduce at capital sentencing trials. By recognizing that a defendant
may legitimately object to evidence by invoking the rule against
hearsay, the opinion departs from prior rulings without explaining
the inconsistency. 236 The court's suggestion that double hearsay is
unreliable without partial corroboration undermines other decisions that approved double hearsay by simply declaring, without
explanation, that the testimony was reliable or that the rules of
237
evidence do not apply.

The Erickson decision is confusing because it begins by considering only double hearsay and thus seems to overlook the defendant's
objection to the "single" hearsay that Erickson slapped his girlfriend.238 In pointing out that the police officer's testimony lacked
hearsay rule in Illinois and are defined as nonhearsay under the federal rules. See supra
note 96.
234. Erickson, 117 Ill. 2d at 299-300, 513 N.E.2d at 390-80.
235. Id. at 304, 513 N.E.2d at 381.
236. In People v. Perez, 108 Ill.
2d 70, 483 N.E.2d 250 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
1 110 (1986), the court held that defendants cannot rely on the rules against hearsay as a
basis for objecting to testimony introduced in the sentencing hearing, because hearsay is
not objectionable per se under the capital sentencing statute. Under Perez, defendants
can get the court's attention only by asserting that the prosecution's evidence is unreliable. Id. at 87, 483 N.E.2d at 258; see also People v. Owens, 102 Ill. 2d 88, 110, 464
N.E.2d 261, 271, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 963 (1984).
237. See, e.g., People v. Davis, 95 Ill. 2d 1, 447 N.E.2d 353, cert. denied, (1983),
discussed supra note 212. In People v. Brisbon, 106 Ill. 2d 342, 364-65, 478 N.E.2d 402,
412, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 908 (1985), the court approved the use of single and double
hearsay that accused the defendant of a prior homicide. A police detective testified that
the victim, before dying, named the defendant as the assailant. The detective also related
a conversation with the defendant's girlfriend, who reportedly said that the defendant
admitted the shooting. A charge of murder was dismissed for lack of probable cause,
however, when neither the girlfriend nor any eyewitnesses testified at a preliminary hearing. The Brisbon court declined to analyze whether the victim's statement fit the dying
declaration exception to the hearsay rule, because evidence at the sentencing hearing need
not comply with the hearsay exceptions. Without explanation or analysis, the court declared that "[c]onsidering the circumstances," the out-of-court statements of both the
victim and the girlfriend were reliable. Id. at 365, 478 N.E.2d at 412.
238. See Erickson, 117 Ill. 2d at 299, 513 N.E.2d at 379. Opening the discussion of
the detective's testimony, the court said, "Defendant next challenges the admission of
Detective Greenway's double hearsay testimony in aggravation." Id. The defendant's
objection, however, clearly covered the detective's entire testimony about his conversation with the girlfriend, including the "single" hearsay that the defendant slapped her.
See Supplementary Brief and Argument of Defendant-Appellant at 56-57, People v. Er-
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corroboration, however, the court appeared to question the reliability of all the police officer's testimony. 239 The Erickson opinion
leaves it unclear whether the court looks to corroborate only what
it characterizes as double hearsay, or whether even "single" hearsay must be corroborated. 24
A few months after Erickson, when reviewing a police officer's
"single" hearsay testimony that the defendant bound and beat a
woman twelve years earlier, the court in People v. Foster appeared
to look for corroboration. 24' There was none. Nevertheless, the
ickson, 117 Ill. 2d 271, 513 N.E.2d 367 (1987) (No. 59058), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1017
(1988).
The opinion further confuses by regarding the report of the threat as "double" hearsay,
even though it relies on the credibility of only one out-of-court declarant, the ex-girlfriend. See supra note 233.
239. The court stated that "the record of the death penalty proceeding in this case
does not reveal corroboration of any portion of [Detective] Greenway's testimony, therefore raising at least a question of its reliability." Erickson, 117 I11.2d at 300, 513 N.E.2d
at 380.
240. Nowhere else in the opinion does the Erickson court discuss the reliability of the
detective's report that the girlfriend accused the defendant of slapping her. This failure
to discuss the "single" hearsay separately suggests at least four possible interpretations.
First, the court may have suggested that all of the detective's testimony was unreliable.
This reading of Erickson suggests that without corroboration, the report of the slapping is
not sufficiently reliable, even though it rests on the credibility of only one out-of-court
declarant. Such an interpretation is consistent with other decisions that look for corroborating evidence before branding "single" hearsay as reliable. See, e.g., People v.
Salazar, 126 Ill. 2d 424, 470-71, 535 N.E.2d 766, 786 (1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3288
(1990). But in other cases the court has not looked for such corroboration. See, e.g.,
People v. Davis, 95 Ill. 2d 1, 447 N.E.2d 353 (1983), discussed supra note 212.
Second, the court may have looked to corroborate only what it considered to be double
hearsay and may not object to uncorroborated "single" hearsay. This interpretation of
Erickson is consistent with the court's comment that the hearsay nature of secondhand
information goes to its weight, but not its admissibility. Erickson, 117 111. 2d at 299, 513
N.E.2d at 379. In later decisions, the court explicitly stated that uncorroborated hearsay
is sufficiently reliable when a police officer relates what an out-of-court declarant purported to observe. Cf infra notes 243-49 and accompanying text (hearsay reliable if gathered in course of official investigation).
Third, the court may simply have neglected to address the defendant's objection to this
"single" hearsay. In other capital sentencing cases in which defendants raised evidentiary objections, the court's opinion has similarly failed to discuss or analyze all of the
challenged testimony. See, e.g., People v. Montgomery, 112 Ill. 2d 517, 528-33, 494
N.E.2d 475, 479-81 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1101 (1987) (court did not discuss
defendant's objection to social worker's testimony that ten years earlier, the defendant's
mother said that the defendant carried guns and had once stabbed someone).
Finally, the Erickson court may have been satisfied that it adequately answered the
defendant's objection to the "single" hearsay by repeating the formula that a judge is
presumed to consider only proper evidence. Trial judges would have an easier time living
up to this presumption if they received more guidance about what evidence the Illinois
Supreme Court considers proper.
241. See People v. Foster, 119 I11. 2d 69, 98-99, 518 N.E.2d 82, 94-95 (1987), cert.
denied, 486 U.S. 1047 (1988). In Foster, a police officer testified about a conversation that
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state high court listed three additional reasons, never suggested in
Erickson, for approving the hearsay: the testimony was not inherently unreliable; the testifying officer obtained the information during an official inquiry; and the defendant did not directly challenge
the substance of the testimony.242 Nothing in the reported decisions suggests that these same rationales could not have equally
supported admission of the uncorroborated testimony in the Erickson case.
e.

Obtained During Official Police Investigation

Even when the Illinois Supreme Court has found no corroboration for the statements of out-of-court declarants, it has approved
the admission of hearsay on the theory that information obtained
by police in the course of an official investigation is sufficiently reliable. At the sentencing hearing in People v. Morgan,2 4 3 for example, a police officer implicated the defendant in a ten-year-old
crime. 2 " The officer admitted that he had not seen the events himself and further testified that charges filed against the defendant
had been dismissed.2 4 Nevertheless, the Illinois Supreme Court
upheld the trial court's refusal to strike the testimony. "[G]iven the
facts that the officer compiled the information during an official
investigation ...we cannot say that the judge abused his discretion
' '2 4
in finding the testimony to be reliable.
In criminal trials, even when written police reports fall within an
exception to the hearsay rule, only the firsthand observations of
police officers may be admitted as evidence.247 What bystanders
took place twelve years earlier, when a woman named the defendant and three others as
the people who had tied her up and beat her. The Illinois Supreme Court acknowledged
that the testimony was not corroborated, Id.
242. The court did not enunciate these factors in the form of a three-part test, but
merely offered them as reasons why the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting the hearsay. Id. at 98-99, 518 N.E.2d at 95.
243. 112 Ill. 2d 111, 492 N.E.2d 1303 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1101 (1987).
244. The officer testified that he investigated a reported robbery-shooting and learned
that Morgan had "shot two female Blacks in his apartment." Id. at 143, 492 N.E.2d at
1316.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 144, 492 N.E.2d at 1317.
247. Police reports that record the firsthand observations of officers may be admissible under the public records exception, which applies only in civil, not criminal, cases.
See FED. R. EVID. 803(8)(B); G. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
§ 7.19, at 274 (2d ed. 1987). Reports may also qualify as business records under FED. R.
EVID. 803(6). As the exception covers only information recorded in the ordinary course
of business, it does not include the accounts of bystanders who relate information to the
police. See FED. R. EVID. 803(6) advisory committee note; G. LILLY, supra, § 7.17, at
266-67.
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tell the police does not fall within any exception, and the Illinois
Supreme Court has not explained why the sentencer has an adequate basis for evaluating the truth of what the police are told during their investigations. 248 Nevertheless, the court continues to
employ the "official investigation" rationale to approve the use of
hearsay when both judges and juries determine whether defendants
shall live or die.249
f

Not Inherently Unreliable

The court's most baffling explanation for approving evidence to
which the defense has objected is that the information is "not inherently unreliable. ' 25 ° Because this rationale has so far appeared
only in cases in which the sentencing hearing was conducted without a jury, it may simply restate the Illinois Supreme Court's faith
that judges will not rely on evidence that is actually unreliable. 2 1'
Nevertheless, it marks an unsettling departure from the court's
248. Cf. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 161 (1970) (confrontation clause aims to
assure that fact finder has "satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior
statement").
249. See People v. Salazar, 126 Ill. 2d 424, 469, 535 N.E.2d 766, 785 (1988), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 3288 (1990).Oury sentencing); People v. Foster, 119 Il. 2d 69, 98-99,
518 N.E.2d 82, 95 (1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1047 (1988) (nonjury sentencing). In
People v. Richardson, 123 Ill. 2d 322, 362, 528 N.E.2d 612, 628 (1988), cert. denied, 109
S. Ct. 1577 (1989), the court held that hearsay evidence of four unadjudicated crimes was
reliable, as the police officers who testified in court had talked with the complaining
witnesses.
250. In People v. Whitehead, 116 Ill. 2d 425, 508 N.E.2d 687, cert. denied, 484 U.S.
33 (1987), the prosecution produced reports containing statements the defendant had
made ten years earlier, when he signed himself into a mental hospital while charges were
pending against him for attempted rape and aggravated battery. There was evidence that
the defendant hoped to fabricate an insanity defense, and he told hospital staff that after
suffering feverish feelings that generally lasted a week, he often committed sexual attacks
against young girls whom he found in deserted areas. There was no independent evidence
that any such crimes ever occurred, yet the trial judge mentioned these purported molestations in explaining why he decided to sentence the defendant to death. Id. at 451-53,
508 N.E.2d at 697-98. Although the Illinois Supreme Court acknowledged that the defendant's uncorroborated admissions were not sufficient evidence to convict him of those
crimes under Illinois law, sentencing was different. Because the defendant's statements
were not "inherently unreliable," the Illinois Supreme Court upheld the trial court's use
of the evidence. Id. at 454-55, 508 N.E.2d at 698-99.
Later, in People v. Foster, 119 Ill. 2d 69, 518 N.E.2d 82 (1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S.
1047 (1988), the court upheld a trial judge's decision to admit secondhand evidence of an
unprosecuted battery after citing Whitehead and pointing out that the uncorroborated
hearsay was "not inherently unreliable." Id. at 98-99, 518 N.E.2d at 95.
251. In People v. Foster, the court appeared to distinguish between testimony that
cannot be considered reliable and testimony that is "inherently" unreliable. Only the
latter, it appears, would serve as grounds for reversing a trial court's decision to impose a
sentence of death: "We consider that Wagner's testimony ... lacked sufficient corroboration to be considered reliable. Nevertheless, we do not judge that thereby the defendant
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earlier admonition that trial judges must take care to ensure the
accuracy of information considered at sentencing.252 By upholding
the admission of any evidence that is not inherently unreliable, the
Illinois Supreme Court neglects the proper inquiry: whether there
25 3
is reason to regard the challenged evidence as worthy of belief.
g. Hearsay Reports of PsychiatricExperts
In Barefoot v. Estelle,254 the United States Supreme Court refused to bar the prosecution from offering expert psychiatric testimony to predict a defendant's future dangerousness, despite
vigorous arguments that such predictions are extremely unreliable. 255 The Court regarded the asserted unreliability of the predictions to be a matter of weight the jury should consider, rather than
grounds for wholesale exclusion. 256 The Court reasoned that defendants had the procedural and evidentiary tools to expose unreliable opinion testimony to the jury.25 ' In Barefoot, the
prosecution's psychiatric expert testified in court subject to crossexamination. 2 8 The opinion, written in broad language, appeared
to assume that confrontation would always accompany such expert
testimony in capital sentencing hearings.259
The Illinois Supreme Court, however, has permitted hearsay evidence of psychiatric evaluations, depriving the defendant of the
face-to-face confrontation that the Supreme Court assumed would
accompany the presentation of such evidence of expert opinion. In
People v. Del Vecchio, a prosecution psychiatrist testified about the
opinions of other psychiatrists who also had examined the defendant but who did not testify at the sentencing hearing. 210 The Illiwas denied a fair sentencing hearing, because it was not inherently unreliable.
Foster, 119 Ill. 2d at 100, 518 N.E.2d at 96 (citations omitted).
252. See supra text accompanying notes 87-89.
253. See Whitehead, 116 Ill. 2d at 471, 508 N.E.2d at 706 (Simon, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
254. 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
255. Id. at 896.
256. Id. at 898-99.
257. Id. at 901.
258. Id. at 884.
259. "[T]he rules of evidence generally extant at the federal and state levels anticipate
that relevant, unprivileged evidence should be admitted and its weight left to the
factfinder, who would have the benefit of cross-examination and contrary evidence by the
opposing party." Id. at 898. As the Texas sentencing in Barefoot was conducted according to the rules of evidence, the Court found no constitutional violation. The decision
does not actually require that other states present psychiatric testimony according to the
rules of evidence. See infra notes 493-96 and accompanying text.
260. People v. Del Vecchio, 105 Ill. 2d 414, 437-38, 475 N.E.2d 840, 851, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 883 (1985).
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nois Supreme Court refrained from invoking some familiar
justifications for admitting this hearsay. The court did not claim
that the hearsay testimony was corroborated or that the defendant
failed to challenge the testimony directly. Nor did the court otherwise attempt to assert that the out-of-court psychiatric testimony
was reliable. When the defendant argued that he was deprived of
his right to confront and cross-examine the absent psychiatrists,
the Illinois Supreme Court simply recited the fact that the capital
punishment statute suspends the rules of evidence at sentencing
hearings.261
The court took the identical approach in People v. Lyles, in
which one psychiatrist offered, as substantive evidence, the opinions of six additional out-of-court experts.2 62 In People v. Jones,
the state supreme court approved, without explanation, the testimony of a probation investigator who recounted the contents of a
written psychiatric report that he found in the defendant's files at
the parole board.263 With these decisions, defendants cannot expose potential unreliability to the jury by cross-examining psychiatric experts face-to-face. Although the Illinois court repeats its
formulaic incantation that evidence must be both relevant and reliable, it has designed no substitutes for the procedural safeguards
that the Barefoot Court presumed would govern the presentation of
psychiatric opinions in capital sentencing hearings.
h.

Accusations of Former Accomplices

In a tacit repudiation of earlier cases,2 4 the Illinois Supreme
Court has now held that the admissions of an accomplice are "presumptively unreliable. ' 265 Accordingly, the court reversed death
sentences in two cases in 1988 and 1989 because the record did not
include sufficient additional indicia of reliability to overcome the
261. Id.
262. People v. Lyles, 106 Ill. 2d 373, 417-18, 478 N.E.2d 291, 311, cert. denied, 474
U.S. 859 (1985).
263. People v. Jones, 94 Il1.2d 275, 287-88, 447 N.E.2d 161, 167 (1982), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 920 (1983).
264. See supra notes 209-14 and accompanying text.
265. "[I]n the sentencing hearing the confessions of an accomplice which incriminate
the defendant are presumptively unreliable and should not be admitted into evidence,
unless sufficient indicia of reliability exist to overcome the presumption." People v. Turner, 128 Ill.
2d 540, 567, 539 N.E.2d 1196, 1207-08 (1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 337
(1990) (characterizing the court's view of the holding in People v. Rogers, 123 Ill. 2d 487,
521, 528 N.E.2d 667, 684 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 878 (1989)). The court relied
partly on Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530 (1986), in which the United States Supreme Court
regarded the self-serving statements of codefendants as especially suspicious and more
unreliable than ordinary hearsay. See supra note 214.
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presumption. 66 In both cases, the Illinois court examined the accomplices' statements at length and in depth, analyzing them in
the light of all the other evidence.
In the first case, People v. Rogers,261 the prosecution introduced
the tape-recorded confessions of two codefendants. 26 The opinion
said nothing about depriving the defendant of the right to confront
and cross-examine witnesses, but simply noted several factors, specific to the facts of the case, that convinced the court that the contents of the recordings were not sufficiently reliable.269 In the
second case, People v. Turner,27 ° a police officer testified to the
statements of a co-arrestee. 27 ' The prosecution argued that other
testimony sufficiently corroborated the accomplice's statements.272
If the Illinois Supreme Court had applied the standard of prior
cases, 273 the defendant's conviction itself would have sufficiently
corroborated the additional details supplied by the nontestifying
accomplice. Instead, the court declared that a confession of a codefendant requires special scrutiny when "it minimizes his own
role and shifts greater blame to the defendant. '274 After several
pages that compared in detail the challenged testimony with the
other evidence, the court noted several instances in which the accomplice's story did not fit perfectly with other evidence. 5 The
court concluded, "Because [the accomplice] did not testify, the defense was unable to cross-examine him on these differences, inconsistencies, and things he left out. ' ' 276 By emphasizing the value of
266. See People v. Turner, 128 Ill. 2d 540, 539 N.E.2d 1196 (1989), cert. denied, 110
S. Ct. 337 (1990); People v. Rogers, 123 I11.2d 487, 528 N.E.2d 667 (1988), cert. denied,
109 S. Ct. 878 (1989).

267. 123 Ill. 2d 487, 528 N.E.2d 667 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 878 (1989).
268. Id. at 493, 528 N.E.2d at 670.
269. In a later review of the Rogers decision, the court offered three reasons to explain why the tape-recorded confessions of the defendant's two accomplices were erroneously admitted at Rogers's sentencing hearing: the two codefendants had notice of their
impending arrest and thus had a chance to contrive their stories; the accomplices' statements did not correspond with some other evidence, including the defendant's statement
that he did not pre-plan the killing; and one accomplice had a criminal record. See Turner, 128 Ill. 2d at 567, 539 N.E.2d at 1208.
270. 128 Ill. 2d 540, 539 N.E.2d 1196 (1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 337 (1990).
271. Id. at 556-57, 539 N.E.2d at 1202.
272. Id. at 572, 539 N.E.2d at 1210.
273. See, e.g., People v. Foster, 119 Ill. 2d 69, 518 N.E.2d 82 (1987), cert. denied, 486
U.S. 1047 (1988); People v. Lyles, 106 Ill. 2d 373, 478 N.E.2d 291, cert. denied, 474 U.S.
859 (1985).
274. Turner, 128 Ill. 2d at 572, 539 N.E.2d at 1210.
275. See id.
276. Id. at 573, 539 N.E.2d at 1210.
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cross-examination in the sentencing hearing, the Turner court
moved a step toward endorsing the thesis of this Article.
In these two cases, the Illinois Supreme Court concluded that
the prosecution must either dispense with the challenged hearsay
testimony or produce the accomplices in court, where the defense
can cross-examine them. The court reversed the death sentences in
these cases without acknowledging that its holding conflicted with
earlier cases 277 and without altering its view that the prosecution
may use ordinarily inadmissible hearsay against defendants in capital sentencing hearings. In these cases, however, the court appeared willing for the first time in many years to hold the
prosecution to a meaningful standard that actually would exclude
some hearsay testimony as unreliable. Continued close scrutiny
and rigorous enforcement of the standard of reliability could eventually achieve the same result this Article advocates, by requiring
the prosecution to present its case through the live testimony of
witnesses who are subject to cross-examination.
4.

Confrontation Revisited

When defendants have challenged the introduction of the statements of out-of-court declarants on confrontation grounds, the Illinois Supreme Court has usually dismissed the argument quickly.
The court has relied on the statement in Williams v. New York 278
that defendants do not have a due process right to cross-examine
all out-of-court statements upon which the sentencer relies." 9 The
277. In earlier cases, the court permitted the prosecution to introduce evidence of the
defendant's prior crimes through the out-of-court accusations of his former accomplices.
The court reasoned that the defendant's conviction for those prior crimes adequately
corroborated the accomplice's statements. See supra notes 209-14 and accompanying
text. In Rogers and Turner, the accomplices were coparticipants in the very crime for
which the defendant was being sentenced. If that is a significant difference that explains
the court's closer scrutiny, it is not evident from reading the opinions. Moreover, the
postarrest statements of coparticipants in crime should be equally suspect, whether the
statements are offered to prove a ten-year-old crime or the crime for which the defendant
is being sentenced.
By requiring that the prosecution produce its witnesses for cross-examination, Rogers
and Turner also silently undermine the ruling in People v. Davis, 95 Ill. 2d 1, 447 N.E.2d
353, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1001 (1983). In Davis, the defendant argued that he was
deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine his accuser when the prosecution introduced a videotape that portrayed the state's attorney conveying the accusation of an absent accomplice. The court replied that the defendant could cross-examine the
accomplice by calling him as a defense witness. Id. at 47, 447 N.E.2d at 376. See the
discussion of Davis supra note 212.
278. 337 U.S. 241, 250 (1949).
279. See, e.g., People v. Foster, 119 Ill. 2d 69, 98, 518 N.E.2d 82, 95 (1987), cert.
denied, 486 U.S. 1047 (1988); People v. Johnson, 119 Ill. 2d 119, 149, 518 N.E.2d 100,
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court has not questioned whether Williams applies to adversary
capital penalty trials conducted before a jury.280
Given the court's repeated refusal to apply the right of confrontation in capital sentencing, its opinion in People v. Szabo 28 is puzzling. After Szabo's first conviction and death sentence were set
aside, the trial court reinstated Szabo's conviction on remand.282
At a second sentencing hearing, the prosecution simply read the
transcripts of five witnesses' testimony from the previous penalty
hearing.283 The defendant argued that this procedure violated his
right to confront adverse witnesses.284 In an unusual departure
from prior cases, the Illinois Supreme Court did not cite Williams
v. New York but instead appeared to accept that the confrontation
clause applied at the sentencing stage. 285 Analyzing the Supreme
Court's confrontation cases, the Illinois court reasoned that the
sixth amendment permits the state to introduce prior testimony in
criminal trials if the witness is presently unavailable and sufficient
"indicia of reliability" suggest that the prior testimony is trustworthy.28 6 In this case, the court said, the transcripts clearly bore the
required indicia of reliability because the defendant had ample op28 7
portunity to cross-examine the witnesses in the former hearing.
The court then stated, "It is not clear whether the unavailability
requirement applies at sentencing as well as during the guilt phase
of the trial. ' 288 The court disposed of the case on procedural
grounds without deciding the merits of the confrontation issue. 289
Although the Szabo court appeared to accept that the right of
confrontation applied at a capital sentencing trial, it made no effort
to reconcile its reasoning with past cases. The court appeared ob114 (1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1047 (1988); People v. Brisbon, 106 Ill. 2d 342, 365, 478
N.E.2d 402, 412, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 908 (1985); People v. Jones, 94 Ill. 2d 275, 286,
447 N.E.2d 161, 166 (1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 920 (1983).
280. See infra notes 325-44 and accompanying text.
281. 113 Ill. 2d 83, 497 N.E.2d 995 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1101 (1987).
282. Id. at 87, 497 N.E.2d at 996.
283. Id. at 88, 497 N.E.2d at 996.
284. Id. at 94, 497 N.E.2d at 999.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 94, 497 N.E.2d at 999-1000.
287. Id. at 94, 497 N.E.2d at 1000.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 93-95, 497 N.E.2d at 999-1000. Earlier in the opinion, the court ruled
that despite the statute authorizing automatic appeal of a death sentence to the Illinois
Supreme Court, the defense waives any objections to the penalty proceedings that are not
contained in a posttrial motion that lists alleged errors. Because the posttrial motion had
not been filed, the court reviewed the record only for plain error. Id. at 93-94, 497
N.E.2d at 999. The court decided that the confrontation violation, if there was one, was
not sufficiently egregious. Id. at 94-95, 497 N.E.2d at 1000.
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livious to the fact that a host of prior evidentiary rulings depended
on rejecting a right of confrontation at sentencing.
Nor did the court follow up on Szabo in future cases. By avoiding decision on the confrontation question, the opinion appeared to
leave open the possibility that the prosecution must first show that
a declarant is unavailable before introducing his out-of-court statements. In a later case, however, the Illinois Supreme Court simply
rewrote history and invented a new version of Szabo's analysis. In
People v. Johnson,29 ° the court cited Szabo for the proposition that
"hearsay testimony is not 'per se' inadmissible during the second
phase of a sentencing proceeding.., even where there has been no
showing that the declarant is unavailable to testify."' 291 Johnson
thus cited Szabo as authoritative support for a proposition that the
Szabo court itself regarded as an open question.
The Illinois Supreme Court also declined to follow Szabo's confrontation analysis in People v. Rogers, in which it ruled that the
tape-recorded confessions of two accomplices were too unreliable
to be admitted as evidence against the defendant in the sentencing
hearing.292 Although one accomplice was available to testify, the
state's attorney in Rogers admitted that he preferred to rely on the
tape; he feared his witness would not be credible testifying in person and subject to cross-examination.293 The Illinois Supreme
Court thus had the opportunity to answer the question left open in
Szabo: whether the prosecution must produce an available witness
for live testimony. Instead, the court simply declared that the
tape-recorded statements were unreliable, without mentioning
Szabo or the right to confront or cross-examine witnesses.2 94
As this section has shown, the Illinois Supreme Court has permitted prosecutors to introduce ordinarily inadmissible hearsay evidence at the second stage of a capital sentencing hearing.
Although the court purports to impose limits by allowing only evidence that is both relevant and reliable, the court's decisions all too
frequently dispatch defendants' challenges with a cursory dismissal
that does not truly explain why the state's evidence is worthy of
belief. The court's refusal to grant defendants the right to confront
the witnesses against them is ultimately based on one fundamental
290. 119 Il.2d 119, 518 N.E.2d 100 (1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1047 (1988).
291. Id. at 149, 518 N.E.2d at 114.
292. People v. Rogers, 123 Ill. 2d 487, 521, 528 N.E.2d 667, 684 (1988), cert. denied,
109 S. Ct. 878 (1989). See the discussion of Rogers supra notes 267-69 and accompanying
text.
293. Rogers, 123 Ill. 2d at 522, 528 N.E.2d at 684.
294. Id.
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premise: that Williams v. New York permits both judges and juries
to consider hearsay when determining sentences. As the next section will demonstrate, the Illinois Supreme Court has erroneously
extended the holding of Williams.
IV.

THE RATIONALE OF WILLIAMS DOES NOT JUSTIFY
SUBMITTING HEARSAY TESTIMONY TO A JURY IN AN
ADVERSARY PROCEEDING

In approving the prosecution's use of hearsay evidence at the
second stage of capital sentencing hearings, the Illinois Supreme
Court has mistakenly relied on Williams v. New York. 29 5 As this

section will show, two traditional rationales for excluding hearsay
did not apply to the sentencing the Supreme Court considered in
Williams, but they do apply to modem capital sentencing hearings.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has never suggested that its holding
in Williams would support submitting hearsay evidence to a jury
deciding a sentence in an adversary proceeding. On the contrary,
the Court's cases suggest that the adversary nature of modem capital sentencing and the jury's role as decision maker provide two
independent reasons to distinguish Williams and require a full
right of confrontation throughout the entire capital sentencing
proceeding.
A.

Two Explanationsfor the Rule Against Hearsay

Scholars offer two overlapping explanations for the origins of the
exclusionary rules of evidence.296 First, they point to the fear that
a jury of lay people cannot rationally evaluate certain types or
forms of evidence.297 Courts often have quoted Professor
Thayer, 298 who regarded the exclusionary rules, including the rule
against hearsay, as "the child of the jury system. ' 299 Professor

Morgan offered a second explanation. He argued that the exclusionary rules, including the rules governing hearsay and the right
to confront and cross-examine witnesses, are products of the adver295. 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
296. See E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 244 (3d ed. 1984).
297. See, e.g., 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 16:3, at 225 (2d ed.
1979); 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 19 (3d ed. 1940) ("the system of Evidence rules was
devised for the special control of trials by jury"), quoted in Brinegar v. United States, 338
U.S. 160, 174 n.12 (1949); Morgan, The Jury and the Exclusionary Rules of Evidence, 4
U. CHI. L. REV. 247, 255 (1936).
298. See, e.g., Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 179 n.2 (1987); United States
v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 175 n.12 (1973).
299. J. THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 47 (1899).
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sary system. 300 Even without the institution of the jury, Morgan
wrote, an adversary system would still develop a rule requiring incourt face-to-face testimony. a1 In the Williams era, judges determined criminal sentences without an adversary hearing and without a jury. Thus, neither rationale for developing a rule against
hearsay applied. Both rationales apply, however, to modem capital sentencing trials, in which juries decide the sentence in what the
Supreme Court regards as a full-fledged adversary proceeding.
B.

Juries Are Different from Judges

30 2
The Williams case itself discussed only judicial sentencing.
Although jury sentencing was not unknown at the time, juries determined sentences in the same proceeding in which they determined guilt. In those unitary trials, the rules against hearsay
already restricted the evidence the jury received. Bifurcated trials,
in which the jury determines the sentence in a second hearing with
broader standards of relevance, did not develop until after the Wil-

300. Morgan attributed the rules of hearsay and cross-examination to a system in
which the parties, not the judge and not the jury, control the introduction of evidence.
He acknowledged that cross-examination is sometimes said to advance the accuracy of
the ultimate verdict by preventing an unskilled jury from ascribing too much weight to
the testimony of a witness with concealed bias, impaired memory, defective perception, or
poor ability to narrate. He pointed out, however, that parties are not obligated to crossexamine, although they cannot be deprived of the opportunity. Furthermore, the rule
against hearsay does not protect the jury from potentially untrustworthy evidence when
the adversary consents or fails to object. Morgan, The Jury and the Exclusionary Rules of
Evidence, 4 U. CHI. L. REV. 247, 253-56 (1936).
Morgan conceded, however, that the jury system underlies at least a portion of the
legal system's concern about the dangers of hearsay. "In judicial discussions dealing with
accepted or proposed exceptions to the hearsay rule, there is much to be found indicating
a distrust of the jury's capacity to handle such hearsay as does not carry some warranty
of verity." Id. at 255.
One traditional common law exception to the rule against hearsay permits parties to
introduce admissions that their opponents made out of court. Most commentators agree
that this exception owes its origin to the adversary system and not to a belief that the
admissions are trustworthy. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) advisory committee's note.
301. The revisers of the latest edition of Wigmore's treatise lend some support to
Morgan's thesis. They note that when the decision maker has little role in investigation,
the rules against hearsay force the parties to find and produce the most trustworthy evidence: live testimony from witnesses with firsthand knowledge. Referring the reader to a
section that discusses the rules of presenting evidence before administrative tribunals,
which conduct adversary proceedings without juries, the treatise states:
[W]e have suggested that rules of evidence, such as the hearsay rule, effectively
function as preferential rules that force the parties to look for and produce more
reliable evidence-a matter of no small concern when the finding and presentation of evidence is largely left in the hands of the parties rather than the court.
1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 4D.1, at 230 (Tiller rev. 1983).
302. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 242 (1949).
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liams decision.3 °3
There is evidence, however, that the Court of the Williams era
distrusted the jury's ability to handle hearsay evidence. Three
weeks after Williams, the Court explained why judges, in ex parte
hearings to determine probable cause, are trusted to consider evidence that the law forbids juries to ponder. 3 4 The primary reason,
the Court explained in a quotation from Wigmore, is that "'the
system of Evidence rules was devised for the special control of trials by jury.' ,30' The Court trusted judges to appropriately handle
evidence that juries might misunderstand or misuse. It also suggested that judges possess a superior ability to assess the trustworthiness and probative value of testimony that has not been subject
to cross-examination. a°
The Court of the Williams era also regarded sentencing by juries
and sentencing by judges as different. A few years after Williams,
in Chandlerv. Fretag,a07 the Court reviewed a case in which a jury
concluded that the defendant was an habitual offender, a finding
that authorized a life sentence.30 s In ruling that the defendant
should have had the right to retain counsel, the Court, without
discussion, distinguished a jury sentencing from the judicial sentencing in Williams.3 9
As the movement for bifurcated trials gained momentum in the
late 1960s, the Supreme Court indicated that Williams had not settled what rules of evidence would govern a separate capital sentencing hearing conducted before a jury. In United States. v.
Jackson,310 the Court explained that the prospect of conducting
303. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. Early commentators who wrote
about bifurcated trials believed that the Williams holding clearly applied only to judges
and would not justify submitting hearsay evidence to sentencing juries. Courts in California and Pennsylvania, the first states to adopt bifurcated capital trials, did not permit the
jury to consider hearsay evidence in the sentencing phase. See Note, Jury Sentencing in
Virginia, 53 VA. L. REV. 968, 997-1000 (1967); Note, The Two-Trial System in Capital
Cases, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 50, 61-73 (1964).
304. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
305. Id. at 174 n.12 (quoting 1 J.WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 19 (3d ed. 1940)).
306. Id. at 173.
307. 348 U.S. 3 (1954).
308. Id. at 5.
309. "Even though the [Habitual Offender] Act does not create a separate offense, its
applicability to any defendant charged with being an habitual criminal must be determined by a jury in a judicial hearing. Compare Williams v. New York." Id. at 8.
310. 390 U.S. 570 (1968). The government charged the defendants with violating the
Federal Kidnapping Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1964). The statute provided for a sentence
of death only if the jury so recommended. As the Court read the statute, defendants
could avoid the risk of execution by pleading guilty and being sentenced by the judge.
The statute thus unconstitutionally pressured defendants to waive their right to jury trial.
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jury proceedings solely to determine punishment posed many difficult and unanswered questions, including whether conventional
rules of evidence and privilege would apply."' 1 The Jackson opinion thus recognized that sentencing by juries posed different questions than the Williams case resolved.3"2
More recently, in Chaffin v. Stynchcombe,313 the Court noted
that jury sentencing differs from judicial sentencing "in a number
of fundamental ways. "314 Separating the guilt and sentencing
phases, the Court observed, "would not wipe away the fundamental differences between jury and judicial sentencing. '315 Judges can
explain on the record the reasons for the sentences they impose.
Even with bifurcated proceedings, a jury cannot. This difference
suggests that sentencing juries should not be permitted to consider
uncross-examined hearsay. The fear that a jury inappropriately
weighed marginally reliable evidence could never be dispelled by
examining the record.
The Court's post-Furman316 cases have reduced some of the differences between judge and jury sentencing in capital cases. But
they have not changed the law's traditional view that a jury cannot
Jackson, 390 U.S. at 583. The government unsuccessfully argued that the statute, by
implication, authorized trial judges to accept guilty pleas and then impanel a jury that
would consider only the sentence to be imposed. Although the Court noted that some
state legislatures had already authorized separate penalty hearings, it declined to divine
any similar Congressional intent in the kidnapping act. See id. at 578-79.
311. Id. at 579.
312. When future Chief Justice Warren Burger served as a judge on the District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, he also recognized that Williams v. New York did
not necessarily resolve the evidentiary questions raised by conducting sentencing proceedings before a jury instead of a judge:
Other problems exist to which the advocates of a two-trial system have not
addressed themselves: Who would prove what at the "second trial" and what
would be the standard of proof? Would the conventional rules of evidence,
including the exclusionary rules, be abrogated for the second proceeding as has
always been true on imposition of penalty by the "penalty-fixer" in order to
permit the penalty to be determined in the light of pre-sentence reports and
other sources not subject to cross-examination?
Frady v. United States, 348 F.2d 84, 115 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (Burger, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (citing Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949)).
313. 412 U.S. 17 (1973). To guard against the potential for vindictive sentencing
after a defendant has won a new trial and been convicted a second time, the Court requires judges to state valid reasons if they impose a more severe sentence. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969). In Chaffin, the Court ruled that Pearce does not
apply when juries decide the sentence after a retrial. Chaffin, 412 U.S. at 26-28.
314. Chaffin, 412 U.S. at 28 n. 15. One fundamental difference, no longer applicable
to modern capital cases, was that sentencing juries did not set the sentence in a separate
proceeding.
315. Id.
316. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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be trusted to make a final determination affecting substantial rights
on the basis of the uncross-examined statements of out-of-court declarants.317 Although the jury's function as sentencer justifies a
broader standard of what evidence is relevant, the Court's cases
have never suggested that the nature of the sentencing decision justifies abolishing every exclusionary rule of evidence that traces its
origin to the jury system.
On the contrary, Booth v. Maryland31i strongly suggests that the
Court continues to regard judge and jury sentencing as sufficiently
different to warrant new exclusionary rules of evidence. Booth
evaluated a capital sentencing statute that permitted the jury to
hear evidence of the crime's effect on the victim's surviving family.3" 9 The Court held that this evidence, prepared as a "victim
impact statement," was not relevant to the decision juries must
make in a capital sentencing hearing. 320 Although Booth also will
apply when judges sentence defendants convicted of capital crimes,
the opinion reveals that the Court was primarily concerned that
juries cannot rationally process the information contained in victim impact statements. 321 The Court explained that the evidence

could "inflame" and "divert the jury's attention" and could "distract the sentencing jury" from considering the defendant's crime
and record. 22 This is the language of jury control, and it is inconceivable that the Court would voice such fears if the decision
317. The law has relaxed the exclusionary rules of evidence for some preliminary
issues and for final determinations in a range of adjudications. Except for grand juries,
the decision maker who is permitted to rely on hearsay is either a judge or a professional
hearing officer, not a jury. For a review of authorities who regard exclusionary rules of
evidence as the product of the jury system and who urge dropping the "erratic, eccentric
and anomalous" rules of evidence in hearings before judges and hearing officers, see 3 K.
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 16:2-16:3 (2d ed. 1978). Although grand
jurors may consider hearsay evidence, their decision to indict is merely a preliminary
determination that there is probable cause to initiate criminal proceedings. Any final
conviction must be based entirely on admissible evidence. In contrast, there is nothing
preliminary about a jury's decision to sentence a defendant to death. Cf Caldwell v.
Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985) (state may not diminish sentencing jury's sense of responsibility by suggesting that vote for death is only preliminary pending review by state
supreme court).
318. 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
319. Id. at 499-500. An officer of the court interviewed the family and prepared a
report called a "victim impact statement." The Maryland statute provided that this report could be read to the jury. Id. at 499. The hearsay nature of the evidence was not an
issue in the case.
320. Id. at 507.
321. Id. at 508.
322. Id. The Maryland procedure posed another problem that is specific to jury sentencing. In the Court's view, the jury might mistakenly regard the victim impact statement, prepared by the department of parole and probation, as representing the official

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 22

maker were a judge presiding over an ordinary criminal sentencing. Indeed, the Court restricted its holding to capital cases, even
though its relevance-based rationale would seemingly apply with
equal force to any criminal sentencing.323 Just as Booth excludes
evidence that may prejudice the jury, the reliability-based rules of
exclusion, including the rule against hearsay, also should apply
when juries determine capital sentences.324
C.

Williams Does Not Apply to an Adversary Proceeding

The exclusionary rules of evidence also owe their existence to the
adversary system.325 Nevertheless, the procedure in Williams, and
in most noncapital sentencing hearings, features two basic attributes of inquisitorial procedure, the very antithesis of an adversarial
model. First, the judge or a judicial officer is primarily responsible
for developing the evidence, usually in the form of a presentence
views of the state. Id. at 509 n. 11. The Court did not discuss use of a limiting instruction, the ordinary solution for such potential confusion.
323. By limiting its holding to capital cases, the Booth Court avoided disrupting the
statutes of 36 states that "permit the use ... in some contexts" of victim impact statements. Id. at 509 n.12.
324. The Illinois legislature could conceivably mute the force of the argument
presented in this section by providing that capital sentencing hearings be conducted without a jury. Such legislation, however, might violate the state constitution's jury-trial
guarantee even though, under Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984), it would not
violate the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution.
In People ex rel. Daley v. Joyce, 126 Ill. 2d 209, 222, 533 N.E.2d 873, 879 (1988), the
Illinois Supreme Court held that the Illinois Constitution of 1970, which preserves the
right to trial by jury "as heretofore enjoyed," grants defendants a broader right than the
sixth amendment to the United States Constitution. The United States Supreme Court
has held that the sixth amendment right to a jury does not entitle a defendant to waive
that right and insist on a bench trial. Thus, in Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24
(1965), the Court upheld FED. R. CRIM. PRO. 23(a), which provides that prosecutors
must agree before a nonjury trial can be held. Under the holding of Joyce, however, an
Illinois defendant's right to a jury is also a right to waive a jury.
When Illinois voters ratified the state constitution in 1970, juries had been entrusted
with the capital sentencing decision for 96 years. See Note, The New Illinois Death Penalty: Double Constitutional Trouble, 5 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 351, 354 n.30 (1974) (citing
BEDAU, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 7, 31 (J. McCafferty ed. 1972)). An extension of Joyce
could hold that the Illinois Constitution of 1970 preserves the right of defendants, "as
heretofore enjoyed," to submit the issue of life or death to the jury.
Even if the Illinois legislature could eliminate the jury's role in capital sentencing, this
Article argues that the adversary nature of the penalty trial also requires a right of confrontation. See infra notes 325-44 and accompanying text; see also Herring v. New York,
422 U.S. 853 (1975) (bench trial is adversary proceeding and counsel cannot be deprived
of right of summation and final argument). Even though judges are generally trusted to
avoid the influence of unreliable hearsay, the rules of evidence and the right of confrontation nevertheless prevail when defendants waive a jury and contest their guilt in an adversary trial conducted before the court.
325. See supra notes 300-01.
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report. a26 Second, the judge is not merely the umpire, but an active
participant in the proceedings.327 In the Williams era, the length of
the sentence and the manner of deciding it were purely discretionary, and judges had no obligation to permit defendants to participate in the decision making at all.3 28 The Williams view of
discretionary sentencing no longer applies to modem capital sentencing hearings,329 which the Supreme Court regards as fully developed adversary proceedings that require many of the formal
procedural protections of criminal trials.33 ° If the rule excluding
the statements of uncross-examined out-of-court declarants is the
child of the adversary system, the rule must be applied to capital
sentencing hearings.
The difference in the adversary nature of capital and noncapital
sentencing is highlighted in the Court's decisions that apply the
fifth amendment's double jeopardy clause to capital sentencing but
not to ordinary felony sentencing. In 1980, the Court in United
States v. DiFrancesco33 I rejected a double jeopardy challenge to a
statute that permitted the United States to appeal a judge's sentence in certain circumstances.3 32 The Court described the ordi-

nary criminal sentencing as a "purely judicial determination" that
is based largely on out-of-court information from a presentence re326. See Note, supra note 162, at 1529.
327. See Goldstein, Reflections on Two Models: Inquisitorial Themes in American
Criminal Procedure, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1009, 1018-19 (1974); Sward, Values, Ideology,
and the Evolution of the Adversary System, 64 IND. L.J. 301, 302 n.3, 313 (1989). Goldstein specifically notes the inquisitorial elements of American sentencing practices, in
which the trial judge works with a presentence report that resembles the "dossier" used
in European criminal proceedings. Goldstein, supra, at 1021.
328. As the Court explained in a later decision, Williams ruled that the Constitution
"did not require a judge to have hearings and to give a convicted person an opportunity
to participate in those hearings when he came to determine the sentence to be imposed."
Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 606 (1967).
In most noncapital sentencing proceedings today, defendants may supplement the
presentence report with additional evidence and may cross-examine witnesses who actually appear in court for the prosecution, thus adding some elements of adversary procedure to the basic inquisitorial character of the sentencing proceeding. Nevertheless, the
Court regards felony sentencing as primarily nonadversarial. See infra text accompanying notes 330-34.
329. See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357-60 (1977).
330. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686-87 (1984).
331. 449 U.S. 117 (1980).
332. The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. § 3576 (1976), applied to
defendants found to be "dangerous special offenders." It authorized prosecutors to ask
for a longer sentence on appeal if they believed the trial judge was too lenient. The defendant argued that the judge had "acquitted" him of the maximum sentence by setting a
shorter term in prison.
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port.3 3 3 The sentencing inquiry, the Court said, is "nonadversary
' 334
in nature.
The Court distinguished DiFrancescoa year later. In Bullington
v. Missouri,335 the Court characterized a capital sentencing hearing
as an adversary trial on the issue of life or death, because the Missouri statute required the prosecution to prove its case that death is
the appropriate punishment. 336 Because capital sentencing hearings are therefore so different from ordinary sentencing proceedings and so much like criminal trials, Bullington extended the
protection of the double jeopardy clause.337
The Court further distinguished felony sentencing from the adversary nature of capital sentencing in Strickland v. Washington, in
which a defendant asserted that he was sentenced to death in violation of his sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. 338 The Court announced that counsel's performance in capital
sentencing hearings must be measured by the same constitutional
standard that is applied in criminal trials. 339 Both types of proceedings feature standards for decision, Justice O'Connor explained, and depend on the adversary process to produce just
results. 340 Therefore, the role of counsel is the same-to ensure
333. DiFrancesco,449 U.S. at 136-37.
334. Id. at 137. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines have narrowed significantly the
range of choices judges may make when exercising their sentencing discretion. See generally Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 652 (1989) (rejecting separation-of-powers
challenge to the sentencing guidelines promulgated under the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3551-3586 (1988), and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1988)); Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 (1988); Ogletree, The Death of Discretion? Reflections on the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1938 (1988). They preserve, however, the
characteristics that led the DiFrancescoCourt to regard sentencing as a "purely judicial
determination." See DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 137. Under the Sentencing Guidelines,
judges continue to rely on presentence reports for most of the information required in
fixing a sentence. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 6A1. 1 commentary (1990). Although both the prosecution and the defense
may supplement the report by presenting witnesses, and the defense may cross-examine
the witnesses who actually testify in court, these elements of adversary procedure were
already a part of the sentencing proceedings that the DiFrancescoCourt concluded were
"nonadversary in nature." See DiFrancesco,449 U.S. at 137.
335. 451 U.S. 430 (1981).
336. Id. at 438.
337. Later decisions read Bullington broadly to apply to all capital sentencings. See,
e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 311 n.33 (1987); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S.
447, 458 (1984); see also infra notes 418-22 and accompanying text (discussing
Bullington).
338. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 675 (1984).
339. Id. at 686.
340. Id. at 687.
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that the opponent's case is subjected to "adversarial testing."' 34' In
contrast, because "ordinary" sentencing may "involve informal
proceedings and standardless discretion," a different standard may
apply. 342
Although the Williams decision still permits judges to rely on
hearsay when they sentence felons to prison terms, capital sentencing today is different. Unlike the sentencing the Court approved
more than forty years ago in Williams, which featured "informal
proceedings and standardless discretion, 3 43 Illinois capital sentencing hearings are fully adversary proceedings conducted before
a jury. 3 " Whether the rule against hearsay is the heir of the jury
system or the child of the adversary system, the Illinois Supreme
Court incorrectly relied on Williams when it permitted prosecutors
to introduce hearsay in these very different proceedings.
V.

DUE PROCESS REQUIRES A RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION
THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE CAPITAL SENTENCING
HEARING

Although the Constitution expressly guarantees the right of confrontation only to defendants in criminal trials, confrontation also
stands as an important procedural component of the due process
clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. Due process usually requires some kind of proceeding in which a target of government action has an opportunity to be heard before losing life,
liberty, or property. 4 In criminal cases, the general mandate of
the due process clauses supplement the specific protections in the
Bill of Rights, and the Supreme Court premised its first forays into
supervising state court criminal procedures on the principle that
the fourteenth amendment's due process clause requires states to
observe "fundamental fairness. "346 As the Court gradually incor341. Strickland recognized that modem capital sentencing hearings are adversary
proceedings:
A capital sentencing proceeding like the one involved in this case ... is sufficiently like a trial in its adversarial format and in the existence of standards for
decision that counsel's role in the proceeding is comparable to counsel's role at
trial-to ensure that the adversarial testing process works to produce a just
result under the standards governing decision.
Id. at 686-87 (citations omitted).
342. Id. at 686.
343. Cf id.
344. See People v. Wright, 111 111. 2d 128, 160, 490 N.E.2d 640, 653 (1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1101 (1987), discussed supra note 194.
345. See generally, Friendly, Some Kind ofHearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975).
346. See generally W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 2.4 (1985).
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porated almost the entire Bill of Rights into the fourteenth amendment, decisions on the right to counsel, the right to remain silent,
and the right to cross-examination, for example, became known as
fifth and sixth amendment precedents rather than due process
holdings. 347 The Bill of Rights, however, does not govern every
detail of criminal procedure between crime and confinement.
When filling gaps, the Supreme Court turns to the fundamental
fairness that due process requires.
The due process clause and the right of confrontation also restrict the government in administrative proceedings. Whenever
the government has authority to deprive individuals only under
certain conditions, the due process clause requires that fair procedures determine whether and when those conditions exist.349 Especially when the validity of a threatened deprivation turns on a
question of fact, the due process clause protects the individual's
stake in assuring that decision makers determine that fact reliably.35° It also guards the individual's opportunity to show that the
government's case relies on untrustworthy evidence.35' More than
thirty years ago, in Greene v. McElroy, the Supreme Court lauded
the right of confrontation as one of the most important
elements of
352
proof.
government's
the
contest
to
right
this
347. Once the Court incorporates a provision of the Bill of Rights, the same precedents and standards govern both state and federal court prosecutions. Id. § 2.5(a). In
reviewing state court decisions, the Court sometimes applies the Bill of Rights without
mentioning either the fourteenth amendment or due process. See, e.g., Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988) (fifth amendment); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985)
(fourth amendment); Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978) (sixth amendment).
348. See, e.g., Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988) (destruction of potentially
exculpatory evidence); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76 (1985) (indigent defendant's
access to psychiatric expert).
349. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 13.8, at
487 (3d ed. 1986).
350. See Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496 (1959).
351. See id.
352. The Court explained that the right of confrontation derives from principles that
are deeply rooted in our nation's legal heritage:
Certain principles have remained relatively immutable in our jurisprudence.
One of these is that where governmental action seriously injures an individual,
and the reasonableness of the action depends on fact findings, the evidence used
to prove the Government's case must be disclosed to the individual so that he
has an opportunity to show that it is untrue. While this is important in the case
of documentary evidence, it is even more important where the evidence consists
of the testimony of individuals whose memory might be faulty or who, in fact,
might be perjurers or persons motivated by malice, vindictiveness, intolerance,
prejudice, or jealousy. We have formalized these protections in the requirements of confrontation and cross-examination. They have ancient roots. They
find expression in the Sixth Amendment which provides that in all criminal
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In the years after the Supreme Court decided Williams in 1949,
the reach of both the due process clause and the right of confrontation expanded on two fronts. First, the Court held that states must
provide almost every procedural protection outlined in the Bill of
Rights, including the right of confrontation. 3 " Additional opinions further expanded the reach of the due process clause in criminal cases.354 Second, the Court launched a "due process
revolution" by broadening the range of interests the clause protects
and imposing procedural formalities in a host of previously unregulated settings.355
The due process clause now sets the minimum procedures that
the government must follow to suspend a driver's license, fire permanent employees, suspend students, terminate welfare benefits,
adjudicate a juvenile offender, or revoke probation or parole.35 6
Although the Constitution often mandates a right of confrontation,
the Court has always applied due process flexibly, requiring procedures that vary according to the public and private interests at
stake. In some cases, the Court simply announced the specific procedures that due process required. 3 7 Later, Mathews v. Eldridge35 8
articulated a balancing test to determine what procedures are required in a given case. Under Eldridge the Court weighs the public
and private interests against the incremental benefits and costs of
cases the accused shall enjoy the right to "be confronted with the witnesses
against him."
Id. at 496-97 (footnote omitted).
353. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403-06 (1965) (confrontation); Rubin, Due
Process and the Administrative State, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 1044, 1063 (1984) (Bill of
Rights).
354. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (criminal convictions require proof
beyond a reasonable doubt); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecutor must
disclose exculpatory evidence).
355. The Court's decision in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), "signaled the
Court's willingness to extend due process protections to the daily operations of virtually
every state and federal administrative agency .... " Rubin, supra note 354, at 1063; see
also Mashaw, The Supreme Court'sDue Process Calculusfor Administrative Adjudication
in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L.
REV. 28, 29 (1976) ("due process revolution").
356. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985) (employees);
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (school suspensions); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S.
778 (1973) (probation); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (parole); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (driver's license); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare benefits); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (juvenile adjudication).
357. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488-89 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254, 267-68 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 56-57 (1967); Specht v. Patterson,
386 U.S. 605, 610 (1967).
358. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 22

more stringent procedures. 359 The Court first applied the Eldridge
balancing in administrative cases to analyze deprivations of property and liberty interests created by statute-the so-called "new
property. ' ' 3 ° More recently, the Eldridge factors appear in decisions that examine what fundamental fairness requires when the
of liberty and property rights that
government deprives individuals
361
exist independent of statutes.
It once appeared that the Court considered its procedural due
process decisions in criminal cases to be conceptually distinct from
their civil and administrative law counterparts.362 Criminal procedure opinions rarely cite Eldridge, although in 1985 the Court decided Ake v. Oklahoma, which balanced the Eldridge factors and
concluded that states must provide expert psychiatric witnesses to
indigent defendants who raise an insanity defense.363 In modern
capital cases, rulings on the procedures required at sentencing
hearings usually rely on the eighth amendment. 3 ' Some also rely
359. Eldridge announced that courts should weigh three factors when determining
what process is due:
[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected
by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
Id. at 335.
360. As late as 1984, Professor Rubin wrote that the Supreme Court had never indicated that it would employ the Eldridge balancing to determine what due process requires in "traditional common law and nonadministrative cases." Rubin, supra note 354,
at 1137.
361. See, e.g., Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc., 481 U.S. 252, 274 n.2 (1987) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (contract rights); Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18
(1981) (termination of parental rights); see also, Rakoff, Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc,
and the New Law of Regulatory Due Process, 1987 Sup. CT. REV. 157. The Court has
also cited Eldridge in two cases approving statutes that authorize preventive detention.
See Salerno v. United States, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987) (adults); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S.
253, 264 (1984) (juveniles).
362. See, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 125 n.27 (due process cases protecting
property from government deprivation "inapposite and irrelevant in the wholly different
context of the criminal justice system"); see also Nowak, Foreword-DueProcessMethodology in the Postincorporation World, 70 J. CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 397, 402 (1979)
(Eldridge's "purely utilitarian" balancing of accuracy against cost not appropriate in
criminal cases, where fairness is also important).
363. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985); see also United States v. Raddatz, 447
U.S. 667, 677-81 (1980).
364. See, e.g., Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987) (evidence of crime's impact on
victim inadmissible at capital sentencing); Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985)
(jury instruction violated eighth amendment).
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on the due process clause,3 65 and in another section of Ake, the
Court expressly applied the Eldridge
factors to discern the proce3 66
dures required at capital sentencing.
In the following section, this Article examines the due process
jurisprudence that developed in the years after the Williams court
nixed a right of confrontation for convicted defendants in sentencing hearings. This section first examines Specht v. Patterson,367
which distinguished Williams and granted defendants a right of
confrontation in some kinds of sentencing proceedings. After concluding that Specht does not unambiguously require a right of confrontation at the second stage of an Illinois capital sentencing
hearing, this section proceeds to balance the Eldridge factors in the
light of the changes in capital sentencing law since Williams. It
concludes that due process guarantees defendants the right to insist, during the entire sentencing proceeding, that adverse witnesses
present their testimony in court where they are subject to cross
examination.
A.

The Relevance of Specht v. Patterson

One decade after Williams, the Court noted in Greene v. McElroy that individuals may generally confront adverse witnesses when
the legitimacy of a threatened government action depends on a
finding of fact. 36 The McElroy decision, however, did not undermine Williams, because the validity of a judge's sentence did not
depend on any facts that a postconviction proceeding may or may
not determine. 69 As the Court later noted, the sentencing statutes
of the Williams era granted judges almost unfettered
discretion to
37
pronounce any sentence within a specified range. 1
The Supreme Court later distinguished Williams and held that
defendants may insist on confronting adverse witnesses at certain
kinds of sentencing hearings. In Specht v. Patterson,3 7' a Colorado
statute provided that a defendant convicted of a crime carrying a
365. See, e.g., Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349
(1977).
366. Ake, 470 U.S. at 83-84; see also, Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 425 (1986)
(Powell, J., concurring) (citing Eldridge in discussing the procedures required when a
prospective execution is challenged on the grounds that the prisoner is insane).
367. 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
368. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496-97 (1959), discussed supra note 352 and
accompanying text.

369. A sentence actually based on inaccurate information, however, did violate the
due process clause. See Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948).
370. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357 (1977).
371. 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
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maximum sentence of ten years could be sentenced for an indefinite
period, up to life in prison, if the judge found after trial that the
defendant endangered the public or was a mentally ill habitual offender.372 The Court held that the due process clause guaranteed
defendants the right to have counsel, to present evidence, and to
confront and cross-examine witnesses at this posttrial hearing.373
The Specht opinion adhered to Williams, but refused to extend it 37
to4
situation.
different
"radically
a
as
viewed
Court
the
what
Describing Williams as a case in which the judge pronounced sentence at the trial's conclusion and in the same proceeding, the
Specht opinion reaffirmed that due process generally provides convicted defendants no procedural rights before sentencing. 75 In
contrast, however, Specht was convicted under one statute, but
sentenced under another, and the basis for the increased sentence
was a new finding of fact that was not an element of the original
offense.376 The Specht opinion does not clearly explain which differences between the Williams and Specht sentencings the Court
regarded as legally significant. It is therefore difficult to predict
how the Court would view sentencing statutes that incorporate
only some features of the Colorado statute. 77
A later opinion revealed, however, that the Court clearly believed that Specht controlled modem capital sentencings where a
posttrial finding of an aggravating circumstance must precede any
sentence of death. In Bullington v. Missouri,37 s the Court noted
that Specht's due process protections, including the right to confront adverse witnesses, are required at sentencing hearings in
which a new finding of fact serves as the basis for an increased
sentence.379 Specht would therefore apply to an Illinois capital sentencing proceeding, in which a murder conviction, by itself, justifies at most a life sentence, but a defendant becomes eligible for the
more severe sanction of death if the sentencer finds a statutory ag372. Id. at 607. The Colorado procedures permitted the judge to make this finding
without a hearing, simply on the basis of a written psychiatric report. Id.
373. Id. at 610.
374. Id. at 608.
375. Id.
376. Id.
377. See Note, The Constitutionality of Statutes PermittingIncreased Sentences for
Habitualor Dangerous Criminals, 89 HARV. L. REv. 356, 368-69 (1975).
378. 451 U.S. 430 (1981).
379. In a parenthetical summarizing the holding of Specht, the Bullington Court
wrote: "[D]ue process protections such as right to counsel, right to confront witnesses,
and right to present favorable evidence are available at hearing at which sentence may be
imposed based upon 'a new finding of fact... that was not an ingredient of the offense
charged.'" Id. at 446 (quoting Specht, 386 U.S. at 608).
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gravating factor. It would follow that Illinois must provide the
Specht protections, including the right to confront adverse witnesses, to defendants in capital sentencing proceedings.
The format of the Illinois capital sentencing hearings complicates the application of Specht. Illinois separates the eligibility
phase of the death hearing from the selection phase. 8 In the first
stage, the prosecution must prove the existence of an aggravating
circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt.38 1 The rules of evidence
apply, and the defendant may confront and cross-examine witnesses. 382 Thus, the full procedural protections that Specht requires already are provided when an Illinois sentencing jury
returns the specific finding that puts a defendant at risk of a death
sentence.
Once the jury finds the defendant eligible for death, the hearing
enters its second phase, and only then does the Illinois defendant
lose the right to confront witnesses.383 The jury continues to receive evidence, but it makes no further discrete finding of historical
fact. Without specific instructions on how to evaluate or balance
the additional evidence in aggravation and mitigation,38 4 the court
simply asks that the jury decide whether any mitigating factors are
sufficient to preclude the ultimate punishment.38 5
If the entire Illinois penalty trial were viewed as a whole, then
Bullington appears to require the procedural protections mandated
in Specht. Examining the second stage separately, however, could
suggest a different result. Applying Specht's slippery rationale, a
court would inquire whether the Illinois procedure more closely
resembles the unconstitutional Colorado sentencing that Specht
disapproved or the Williams sentencing that Specht countenanced.386 The second stage of the Illinois capital sentencing hear380. Although the Illinois statute does not require that courts conduct the penalty
trial in two stages, the Illinois Supreme Court prefers a split hearing. See supra note 72.
381. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1(f) (1989).
382. Id. para. 9-1(e).
383. See People v. Free, 94 Ill. 2d 378, 447 N.E.2d 218, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865
(1983).
384. See People v. Brownell, 79 Ill. 2d 508, 534, 404 N.E.2d 181, 194 (1980).
385. See ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT COMM. ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN
CRIMINAL CASES, ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL No. 7C.06 (2d
ed. Supp. 1989).
386. See 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 4, at 93-96 n.52 (Tiller rev. 1983) (discussing
problem of deciding whether a particular sentencing statute is governed by Williams or
by Specht); cf McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91 (1986) ("[o]ur inability to lay
down any 'bright line' test may leave the constitutionality of statutes more like those in
Mullaney and Specht than is the Pennsylvania statute to depend on differences of
degree").
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ing may correspond more closely to the procedurally permissive
sentencing in Williams. The preliminary finding of an aggravating
circumstance in the eligibility phase is analogous to the guilty verdict in Williams. The selection stage, which parallels the Williams
sentencing, could be said to occur at the conclusion of the eligibility stage and in the same proceeding. Although the Illinois statute
permits a death sentence only if the selection stage jury finds a new
fact-that sufficient mitigating factors do not exist-this is probably not dispositive. Because the jury already has found the prerequisite aggravating circumstance, a further finding of insufficient
mitigating factors does not seem so far removed from the scope of
the already-proven facts that the Specht Court would have required
special procedural protections.387 If the statute at issue in Specht
had simply required the judge to impose the maximum sentence
unless a written presentence report persuaded him that mitigating
factors were sufficient to preclude it, the Court would hardly have
characterized the situation as "radically different" from the one in
Williams. The relationship between the first and second stages of
the Illinois capital sentencing hearing appears more analogous to
the connection between the guilt and sentencing phases of the Williams trial. If that analogy is apt, the Specht opinion is not broad
enough by itself to require a right of confrontation at the second
stage of an Illinois capital sentencing hearing. Nevertheless, additional due process cases suggest that Illinois courts must permit
defendants to confront adverse witnesses who provide aggravating
evidence in the selection phase.
B.

The Eldridge Balancing Test

This section of the Article analyzes the Eldridge factors and argues that, especially in light of the changes in death penalty law
that have occurred since Williams v. New York, defendants have a
due process right to confront the sources of adverse information
the prosecution presents in the second stage of an Illinois capital
sentencing hearing.
1. The Defendant's Stake
The first factor in the Eldridge equation is the private interest at
stake, a8 8 which in capital cases is the defendant's very life. In all
387. Nevertheless, the fact that the defendant's fate turns on the jury's specific factual
finding-the existence or not of sufficient mitigating factors-bolsters the case for procedural protections at the second stage. See infra note 389.
388. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-33 (1975).
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the pages of the United States Reports, no private interest is more
weighty.3 9 The Court now recognizes that because the penalty of
389. The fact that a defendant has been convicted of a capital crime does not diminish his constitutionally protected stake in his life during the sentencing hearing. In the
only Supreme Court case that explicitly applied an Eldridge analysis to capital sentencing
procedures, the Court did not distinguish the weight of the defendant's private interest
during the guilt trial from its significance during the capital sentencing hearing. In both
cases, the Court described the defendant's interest in fair and accurate adjudication as
"compelling." Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 78, 83 (1985).
Ake measured the convicted defendant's stake at a time when the sentencing jury had
not made the factual finding that Ake was eligible for capital punishment. The Supreme
Court has made it clear that once a jury finds a statutory aggravating factor, the eighth
amendment requires no further substantive, reviewable, legislatively set standards to constrain the jury's freedom to choose which death-eligible defendants shall live and which
shall die. At the selection stage, the Constitution permits juries to wield standardless
discretion. See Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 246 (1988); California v. Ramos, 463
U.S. 992, 1008 n.22 (1983) (jury at selection stage may exercise "unbridled discretion");
Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 874-80 (1983).
The Court's relaxed scrutiny of the selection stage raises the question whether, for
purposes of an Eldridge analysis, the defendant's stake becomes less significant once the
finding of eligibility is made. The Court's ruling in McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S.
79 (1986), also suggests this question. In McMillan, the Court reviewed a ruling of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court that applied an Eldridge analysis to a statute that governed
sentencing proceedings for certain noncapital felonies. The statute prohibited probation
and provided for a mandatory minimum sentence of five years if, at a posttrial hearing,
the judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant committed the
crime while visibly possessing a firearm. Id. at 81 & n. 1. The defendant argued unsuccessfully that due process required the state to shoulder a heavier burden of proof. The
Pennsylvania court opined that convicted felons retain only a "diminished" interest in
liberty at their sentencing hearings. Id. at 83-84.
Although the Supreme Court did not explicitly adopt the Pennsylvania court's view
that a conviction reduced the defendant's stake in accurate fact-finding at the sentencing
hearing, it held that proof by a preponderance satisfied due process. The Court based its
conclusion, in part, on the view that the Constitution already considers convictions, by
themselves, sufficient to justify imprisonment. Id. at 92 n.8. Similarly, the Court could
conclude that a postconviction finding of death-eligibility is itself sufficient to justify the
ultimate punishment, as long as the sentencer first considers the defendant's mitigating
evidence. See, e.g., Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. at 246 (1988).
However, even if a postconviction finding of an aggravating circumstance does diminish, in the Eldridge scales, the weight of the defendant's constitutionally protected stake,
the language of the Illinois statute may grant an additional constitutionally protected
interest in reliable fact-finding during the second stage of the sentencing hearing. When
state law sets up "substantive predicates" and "mandat[es] the outcome to be reached
upon a finding that the relevant criteria have been met," it creates an expectation that due
process protects. See Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 109 S.Ct. 1904, 1909
(1989).
Justices O'Connor and White applied this principle in their dissent in Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986). They disagreed with the Court's holding that the Constitution guaranteed death row inmates the right to be free from execution while they are
insane. Yet they agreed that Florida statutes established that right, and they concluded
that the due process clause governed the procedures employed to determine whether
Florida prisoners were insane or not. "[W]here a statute indicates with 'language of an
unmistakable mandatory characterol' that state conduct injurious to an individual will
not occur 'absent specified substantive predicates,' the statute creates an expectation pro-
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death extinguishes life itself, it differs in quality from all other punishments. Consequently, modem capital cases repeatedly emphasize the heightened need for reliable procedures to determine in
each case whether this ultimate, irremediable punishment is appropriate."9 As Justice Stevens noted, by recognizing that death is
different, the Court abandons the view it held in the Williams
9
era. 3 1
2.

The Risk of an Erroneous Deprivation

The second step in the Eldridge balance assesses the risk that a
jury functioning under current procedures may decide erroneously,
and analyzes the likelihood that decision making will improve if
defendants can insist that the prosecution produce its declarants in
court for cross-examination.392 The risk that a capital sentence
tected by the Due Process Clause." Id. at 428 (O'Connor, J., dissenting, joined by White,
J.) (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 471-72 (1983)).
The Illinois statute clearly forbids a sentence of death without a specific substantive
predicate: the second-stage jury must determine that there are no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the death penalty. It also mandates a verdict of life if there are sufficient
mitigating factors. Although the fact-finding required here may not qualify as the sort of
new findings of fact that require additional procedural protections under the holding of
Specht v. Colorado, 386 U.S. 605 (1967), see supra text accompanying note 387, the standard is sufficiently concrete to create a constitutionally protected interest even if none
would exist in its absence.
Indeed, the Illinois Supreme Court regards the jury's second-stage ruling as sufficiently
objective to review it on the merits. In an early case, the court announced that its automatic review of every death sentence "also considers whether there are no mitigating
factors sufficient to preclude imposition of the death sentence." People v. Brownell, 79
Ill. 2d 508, 543, 404 N.E.2d 181, 199 (1980). The Illinois court has reversed some
sentences of death on the basis of the mitigating evidence. See, e.g., People v. Johnson,
128 Ill. 2d 253, 281, 538 N.E.2d 1118, 1130 (1989) (defendant not a person who deserves
death); People v. Buggs, 112 Ill. 2d 284, 293-95, 493 N.E.2d 332, 335-37 (1986) (same);
see also People v. Carlson, 79 Ill. 2d 564, 587-90, 404 N.E.2d 233, 244-45 (1980) (sentence of death reversed after Illinois Supreme Court reweighed aggravating and mitigating evidence); cf People v. Gleckler, 82 Ill. 2d 145, 161-71, 411 N.E.2d 849, 856-61
(1980) (reversing jury-imposed sentence of death on the merits of the mitigating evidence,
but basing decision in part on comparison to sentences codefendants received after separate trials).
Determining that the language of the Illinois statute confers a constitutionally protected expectation, however, does not necessarily reveal how strongly the Court would
weigh the defendant's interest nor how that factor would affect the ultimate resolution of
what procedures are required.
390. See, e.g., Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 238-39 (1988) (quoting Lockett v.
Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978)) (" 'qualitative difference between death and other penalties calls for a greater degree of reliability when the death sentence is imposed' "); Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 329 (1985); California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998-99
(1983).
391. See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357 (1977).
392. See Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 345.
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will be imposed erroneously has also changed since the Williams
era, when a judge's decision to impose the penalty of death was
almost unreviewable as long as the legislature authorized capital
punishment for the defendant's crime. With no limits on the
judge's discretion, there was little concept that legal error could
taint the sentencing decision.393 In contrast, the possibility of an
unreliable or erroneous verdict of death is now a recurrent theme
in the Court's more recent opinions on capital sentencing.394
Assessing the risk of error and the value of additional procedures requires an analysis of the nature of the jury's decision.3 95 At
393. Gardner, 430 U.S. at 357.
394. The rhetoric of error and accuracy pervades the Court's rulings on procedural
due process, figures prominently in capital punishment cases, and thus also appears in
this Article. The Court has said it fashions rules of procedure to reduce the risk of error
that inheres in the search for truth. See Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 344. Yet judgments that
include a subjective moral determination seem less properly regarded as correct or incorrect than pure findings of objective fact. Cf Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 678
(1977) (the Court broke temporarily from the language of accuracy to speak of "unjustified" and "unreasonable" paddling of schoolchildren). The concept of an "erroneous"
outcome seems especially misplaced in discussing a jury's decision to vote for life or
death.
The Court has recognized, but not resolved, this conceptual difficulty in discussing the
rule that prevents habeas petitioners from raising federal constitutional claims that are
already barred by state procedural rules of waiver. See Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527,
537 (1986). Ordinarily, federal courts require a petitioner to show both good cause for
such a procedural default and consequent prejudice. The Supreme Court provides an
exception, however, if applying this standard of cause and prejudice would result in a
" 'fundamental miscarriage of justice.'" Id. at 537-38 (quoting Engle v. Issal, 456 U.S.
107, 135 (1982)). Petitioners qualify under this exception when they can show that the
asserted violation of their constitutional rights "has probably resulted in the conviction of
one who is actually innocent." See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986).
Although the Court acknowledges that it has not explained what it means to be "actually
innocent" of a sentence of death, it continues to refer to such ultimate judgments in terms
of accuracy. See Dugger v. Adams, 109 S. Ct. 1211, 1218 n.6 (1989) (petitioners do not
establish a fundamental miscarriage of justice by demonstrating constitutional violations
of the type that "might affect" the "accuracy" of a death sentence).
One commentator explains that in capital cases, the Court's attention to accuracy and
reliability is not actually grounded in a view that life or death is a "correct" decision in
any particular case. Instead, it reflects the Court's concern that the sentencer's discretion
be adequately informed, with fair procedures that are not impermissibly skewed to favor
execution. See Gillers, The Quality of Mercy: ConstitutionalAccuracy at the Selection
Stage of Capital Sentencing, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1037, 1043 (1985).
As a matter of state law, however, the Illinois Supreme Court has regarded some
sentences of death as "incorrect" and reversed on the merits of the mitigating evidence.
See supra note 398. Thus, under Illinois case law, it is more clear that a sentencer's
second-stage verdict can be analyzed under Eldridge as a factual finding. It carries a risk
of error that improved procedures could mitigate.
395. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 343. ("[c]entral to the evaluation ... is the nature of the
relevant inquiry"); see also Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 608 (1979) ("[w]hat process is
constitutionally due cannot be divorced from the nature of the ultimate decision that is
being made").
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the second stage of an Illinois capital sentencing hearing, the jury
hears evidence of aggravation and mitigation and can impose death
only after a unanimous finding that there are no mitigating factors
sufficient to preclude a sentence of death.396 To make its judgment,
the jury sifts evidence of historical fact about the defendant's
crime, character, and life history. 397 Because some evidence may
suggest that the defendant could be rehabilitated or, conversely,
would be dangerous in the future, the jury also must predict. Its
verdict also includes a discretionary, subjective moral evaluation39
that is only partially informed by the legislature's list of aggravating and mitigating factors. 399 The Illinois jury may weigh each factor as it chooses but must base its decision on the evidence.'
a. HistoricalFact
The Court has said that juries cannot rationally impose a sentence of death unless they rely on accurate information. 4° 1 The
Illinois sentencing hearing currently carries a grave risk of error
when witnesses relate historical facts about the defendant's life.
The rules against hearsay owe their existence in part to fears that
juries will inappropriately weigh unreliable testimony. 402 Especially when the veracity or credibility of witnesses is at issue, confrontation is the time-honored procedural tool for advancing the
determination of the truth.4 °3 Illinois penalty trials provide ample
opportunity for a jury to overvalue the statements of out-of-court
396. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1(g) (1989).
397. See People v. Free, 94 Ill. 2d 378, 428, 447 N.E.2d 218, 242, cert. denied, 464
U.S. 865 (1983).
398. See Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 33, 35 (1986) (jury's judgment discretionary
and "highly subjective"); Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 340 n.7 (1985)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("largely a moral judgment"); Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S.
939, 950 (1983) ("moral, factual, and legal judgment").
399. In addition to the aggravating and mitigating factors listed in the statute, the
jury may consider "any additional" aggravating or mitigating factors. ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, para. 9-1(e) (1989).
400. See People v. Boclair, 129 Ill. 2d 458, 493, 544 N.E.2d 715, 731 (1989) (based on
evidence); People v. Brownell, 79 Ill. 2d 508, 534, 404 N.E.2d 181, 194, cert. dismissed,
449 U.S. 811 (1980) (weighing).
401. In Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), the Court explained that "accurate
sentencing information is an indispensable prerequisite to a reasoned determination of
whether a defendant shall live or die by a jury of people who may never before have made
a sentencing decision." Id. at 190.
402. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 173-74 & n.12 (1949); E. CLEARY,
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 353 (3d ed. 1984) ("[j]ury trial rules of evidence exclude
hearsay on the theory that it is untrustworthy unless within an exception"); Morgan,
supra note 300, at 255.
403. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974) ("[c]ross-examination is the principal
means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested");
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declarants whose credibility might shatter under cross-examination
in court.' 4
The risk is amplified when the prosecution introduces hearsay
statements that implicate the defendant in prior crimes that never
resulted in prosecution or conviction.' °5 Such evidence is particularly inflammatory, 4° 6 especially when the prosecution has introduced testimony, however slight, that links the defendant to other
murders. 40 7 Because the prosecution need not prove the prior
crimes beyond a reasonable doubt," 8 and because the jury receives
see also Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc., 481 U.S. 252, 266 (1987); Greene v. McElroy,
360 U.S. 474, 496-97 (1959).
404. See supra notes 161-263 and accompanying text. By permitting the jury to consider "any additional aggravating factors" at the selection stage, the Illinois statute allows
the prosecution to introduce a potentially unbounded range of information. The statute's
unrestricted definition of relevant evidence intensifies the risk of error by allowing the
prosecution numerous opportunities to prove propositions with hearsay testimony.
In contrast, lack of confrontation poses less risk of error when the prosecution may
introduce only information that is relevant to certain types of aggravating circumstances
specified by the legislature. For example, Pennsylvania restricts admissible aggravating
information to facts about the circumstances of the crime, the status of the victim, and
the defendant's criminal convictions. See Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 110 S. Ct. 1078,
1091-92 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Proof of the victim's status and other circumstances of the crime will generally emerge during the guilt phase of the trial, according to
the rules of evidence, while prior convictions can be proved by documentary records that
easily comport with the hearsay rule. Thus, even if Pennsylvania permitted prosecutors
to introduce hearsay at capital sentencing hearings, they would seldom need to rely on it.
Although 120 defendants waited on Pennsylvania's death row by 1990, see NAACP
LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUC. FUND, INC., DEATH Row, U.S.A. 27-28 (May 30, 1990),
research turned up no decisions that reveal whether or not Pennsylvania prosecutors
must prove their case for death by following the rules of evidence. See supra note 22.
The silence in the reported cases suggests that Pennsylvania prosecutors have not relied
on ordinarily inadmissible hearsay when asking juries to impose sentences of death.
405. See, e.g., People v. Young, 128 Ill. 2d 1, 52-54, 538 N.E.2d 461, 474-75 (1989),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3290 (1990), discussed supra notes 216-21 and accompanying text.
406. Cf Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 562 (1967) (presenting evidence of other
crimes in documentary form minimizes inflammatory impact).
407. Sentencing juries in Illinois may even hear evidence that implicates the defendant in prior killings for which the charges were dismissed for lack of probable cause. See,
e.g., People v. Hall, 114 Ill. 2d 376, 417, 499 N.E.2d 1335, 1352 (1986), cert. denied, 480
U.S. 951 (1987). The Illinois Supreme Court later ruled, however, that when a prosecutor dismisses a charge because he believes the defendant is innocent, evidence linking the
defendant to the unadjudicated crime cannot be introduced at a capital sentencing hearing. See People v. Harris, 129 Ill. 2d 123, 162-65, 544 N.E.2d 357, 374-75 (1989), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 1323 (1990), discussed supra notes 150-53 & 159 and accompanying
text.
408. People v. Sanchez, 115 Ill. 2d 238, 277, 503 N.E.2d 277, 292 (1986), cert. denied,
483 U.S. 1010 (1987); see also People v. Erickson, 117 Ill. 2d 271, 299, 513 N.E.2d 367,
379 (1987) (testimony accusing defendant of rape admissible even though it would be
insufficient to sustain finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt), cert. denied, 486 U.S.
1017 (1988); cf. People v. Balderas, 41 Cal. 3d 144, 205-06, 711 P.2d 480, 516, 222 Cal.
Rptr. 184, 219-20 (1985) (sentencing authority must be instructed to disregard evidence
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no instructions on evaluating the other-crimes evidence, 409 the risk
of error is compounded.4 10 The prosecution has relied on out-ofcourt statements made by unfriendly acquaintances, ex-lovers,
members of a rival gang, and former accomplices in crime,"1 all of
whom may have harbored animosity against the defendant and
stretched the truth. It is critical that these other-crimes witnesses
present their accusations in court. Only then, after the defense has
a chance to cross-examine them, will the jury have a satisfactory
41 2
basis for evaluating whether they are worthy of belief.
of other crimes unless it first finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed them); State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1260 (Utah 1988) (same).
409.

See ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT COMM. ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN

CRIMINAL CASES, ILLINOIS PATrERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL No. 7C.06 (2d
ed. Supp. 1989). The evidence of uncharged crimes is relevant to the sentencing decision,
and thus admissible, only if it is sufficiently probative for a reasonable juror to conclude
that the defendant was involved. See, e.g., People v. Adams, 109 Ill. 2d 102, 128-29, 485
N.E.2d 339, 349 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1088 (1986); cf Huddleston v. United
States, 485 U.S. 681, 689 (1988) (evidence of similar acts irrelevant under federal rules
unless reasonable jury could conclude the act occurred and the defendant was the actor).
Presumably, jurors should not sentence a defendant on the basis of uncharged crimes
unless they actually conclude that the crimes occurred and the defendant committed
them. Such a standard suggests that jurors must be convinced, at least by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant is guilty of the uncharged misconduct. Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 690. Without any instructions to that effect, however, or any other
instructions, it is not clear how jurors will process evidence that the defendant committed
additional crimes.
410. In assessing whether the defendant committed the unadjudicated crimes, there is
a considerable risk that the jurors would evaluate erroneously even if the court did issue
guiding instructions. Because the jurors will have already found the defendant guilty of
the murder for which he is being sentenced, they will not be objective as they assess the
additional evidence. They will tend to overvalue the uncross-examined statements of the
out-of-court declarants who accuse the defendant of additional crimes. In some states,
courts attempt to compensate for this risk of error by instructing the jury that they cannot consider the evidence of other crimes unless they are first convinced, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant committed them. See supra note 408. Because the
Illinois Supreme Court has rejected that standard, however, and because it does not
otherwise require judges to instruct sentencing juries on how to assess or weigh the evidence of additional crimes, the risk of error continues unabated.
411. See, e.g., People v. Young, 128 Ill. 2d 1, 52-54, 538 N.E.2d 461,474 (1989), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 3290 (1990) (acquaintance); People v. Salazar, 126 Ill. 2d 424, 468-69,
535 N.E.2d 766, 785-86 (1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3288 (1990) (rival gang member);
People v. Foster, 119 Ill. 2d 69, 97-98, 518 N.E.2d 82, 95-96 (1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S.
1047 (1988) (former accomplice); People v. Erickson, 117 Ill. 2d 271, 285, 513 N.E.2d
367, 372-73 (1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1017 (1988) (ex-girlfriend).
412. Even if prosecutors presented evidence of prior unadjudicated crimes through
in-court testimony with a full right of confrontation, there are strong reasons to conclude
that such evidence is improper. See Williams v. Lynaugh, 484 U.S. 935, 937 (1987)
(Marshall, J., and Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). The Supreme Court
has never ruled whether such evidence-presented through hearsay or not-is
admissible.
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b. Predictive Judgments
The Supreme Court's cases also emphasize that confrontation
can help the decision maker make predictive judgments. In Specht
41 a the Court granted a right to confront witnesses in a
v. Patterson,
hearing that determined whether the defendant was mentally ill or
an habitual offender who would be dangerous if released. Similarly,
at the selection stage of capital sentencing hearings, the prosecution often calls psychiatrists who testify that the defendant would
be dangerous in the future. 414 Although these medical witnesses
are experts in their field, the Court has considered the risk of error
severe enough to require cross-examination even when life is not at
stake, such as in commitment proceedings." 5 The decision to revoke probation or parole also mixes findings of historical fact with
evaluative and predictive judgments. Here, too, the Court has emphasized the value of live testimony and has permitted only narrow
exceptions to the right of confrontation.41 6
c.

DiscretionaryMoral Judgment

The fact that the sentencing jury admittedly brings its discretionary moral judgment to bear on the verdict distinguishes the
capital sentencing inquiry from most of the Court's due process
cases. The Court's opinions do not agree on how significantly
these discretionary features of the jury's decision differentiate capital sentencing from other fact-findings.4"7 Nor do they agree on
whether the jury's discretion requires greater procedural
safeguards.
By minimizing the extent to which the sentencing jury wields
discretion, the Court justified increased procedural protections in
Bullington v. Missouri.4 8 The Court regarded a capital sentencing
413. 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
414. See, e.g., Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880
(1983).
415. "It is precisely '[tihe subtleties and nuances of psychiatric diagnoses' that justify
the requirement of adversary hearings." Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 495 (1980) (transfer of prisoner to mental hospital) (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 430 (1979)
(civil confinement)); see also Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 898-900 (1983) (crossexamination valuable safeguard to expose flaws in psychiatric predictions of future dangerousness), discussed infra notes 493-96 and accompanying text.
416. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (probation); Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471 (1972) (parole); cf. Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1
(1979) (decision to grant parole is subjective and predictive; cross-examination not an
issue).
417. See Dolinko, Foreword: How to Criticize the Death Penalty, 77 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 546, 564 (1986).
418. 451 U.S. 430 (1981).
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jury's discretion to be sufficiently constrained so that a decision
against death should be accorded the same finality as an acquittal.41 9 Instead of selecting among a range of possible sentences, the
jury was permitted to vote only yes or no.420 By limiting the options available to the jury and requiring it to evaluate evidence according to substantive standards, the penalty trial differed from
discretionary noncapital sentencing and resembled a full trial on
the issue of life or death.421 Consequently, the Court concluded, to
guard against the risk that subsequent penalty retrials might result
in an "erroneous" verdict of death, the principles underlying the
double jeopardy clause must apply to the sentencing phase of capital proceedings.422
419. Id. at 446.
420. Id. at 438.
421. Id.
422. Id. at 445-46. Ordinarily, defendants who contest their convictions and win a
retrial face the risk of a greater sentence if they are subsequently reconvicted. See North
Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 719-21 (1969).
Instead of writing in broad language that could easily apply to all capital sentencings,
the Bullington Court grounded its opinion in the provisions of the Missouri statute.
Although the Court emphasized trial-like features that are common to most capital sentencing schemes, it also appeared to rely on some features of Missouri's procedures that
constrain the sentencing jury's discretion more severely than the legislation of other
states. For example, sentencing juries in Missouri make the eligibility and selection decisions in one combined hearing. The prosecution must disclose aggravating evidence in
advance, must follow the rules of evidence and shoulder the burden of proof on every
issue, and the jury must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating
factors outweigh the mitigating factors and that the aggravating factors are sufficient to
warrant the penalty of death. Evidence is restricted to the statutory aggravating factors,
which serve as the exclusive basis for any sentence of death. Bullington, 451 U.S. at 43235. The Bullington opinion did not reveal how it would apply to capital sentencing statutes that did not follow all of Missouri's stringent procedures.
When the Court later applied Bullington's holding to Arizona capital sentencings, in
which juries play no role, the Court identified three features of the Missouri statute that
determined the outcome in Bullington. First, the sentencer's choice was restricted to two
alternatives. Second, substantive standards guided the sentencer's evaluation of evidence,
which was presented in a separate trial-like proceeding. Finally, no sentence of death was
permitted unless the prosecutor established certain facts beyond a reasonable doubt. See
Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 209-10 (1984). Although Rumsey took a broad view of
Bullington by distilling the holding of that case, the Court did not express any opinion on
Bullington's application to the capital sentencing procedures of additional states.
Nevertheless, the Court later characterized Bullington even more broadly and suggested that it applies to all capital sentencings. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279,
312 n.33 (1987) ("[Bullington] held that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution
prohibits a State from asking for a sentence of death at a second trial when the jury at the
first trial recommended a lesser sentence"); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 458 (1984).
The trial analogy that underlies the Bullington rationale fits most closely with the first
stage of an Illinois capital sentencing hearing, in which the prosecution must follow the
rules of evidence to prove specific facts beyond a reasonable doubt. See Rumsey, 467 U.S.
at 209-10. Accordingly, the Illinois Supreme Court has held that once a defendant has
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Although the rationale of Bullington downplayed the discretionary nature of the jury's decision in order to justify greater procedural protections, the Court in Turner v. Murray423 achieved a
similar result by emphasizing that discretion. Distinguishing the
fact-finding function of ordinary felony trials, the Turner opinion
explained that the discretion accorded capital sentencing juries
provided a "unique" opportunity for racism to affect the ultimate
decision.424 Accordingly, defendants facing capital trials for
crimes involving interracial violence may ask prospective jurors
about racial prejudice.425
been deemed ineligible for death, Bullington prevents the state from trying again. See
People v. Davis, 112 Ill. 2d 78, 82, 491 N.E.2d 1163, 1164-65 (1986).
Questions of how broadly to apply Bullington in Illinois turn on how the Illinois
Supreme Court characterizes the selection stage of the capital sentencing hearing.
Although the jury must choose between only two options, its discretion is otherwise
much broader than in Missouri or Arizona. Because the jury may rely on any evidence it
deems aggravating, its discretion is not confined by preset standards formulated by the
legislature. Furthermore, the prosecutor has no obligation to prove any specific facts, is
not bound by the rules of evidence, and has no burden of proof. See People v. Williams,
97 Ill. 2d 252, 302-03, 454 N.E.2d 220, 225-26 (1983) (no burden of proof), cert. denied,
466 U.S. 981 (1984). In these respects, the second-stage proceeding resembles sentencing
proceedings that, even after Bullington, did not raise concerns under the principles that
bar double jeopardy. See Bullington, 451 U.S. at 439-41 (distinguishing cases that permitted a higher sentence after a second trial); id. at 443-44 & n. 16 (lack of substantive
standards); cf supra notes 386-87 and accompanying text (second-stage proceeding
analogous to the sentencing in Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949)).
If a jury found a defendant eligible for death, but voted for life in the second stage, the
question remained whether Bullington would bar a second capital sentencing hearing if
the conviction were reversed and the case retried. The Illinois Supreme Court has answered affirmatively. Without analyzing the difference between the two stages of the penalty hearing, the court cited Bullington as authority for according finality to the jury's
second-stage verdict against death. See People v. Jimerson, 127 Ill. 2d 12, 53-54, 535
N.E.2d 906, 923-24 (1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3288 (1990). The Illinois court thus
accepted the broad view of Bullington suggested by the Supreme Court's language in
McCleskey and Spaziano. Yet it seems anomalous to regard the second-stage proceeding
as sufficiently trial-like to require Bullington's protections against double jeopardy, but
not sufficiently trial-like to require that prosecutors follow the rules of evidence.
423. 476 U.S. 28 (1986).
424. Id. at 35. In a footnote, the Court said: "Notwithstanding Justice Powell's attempt to minimize the significance of the discretion entrusted to the jury at a capital
sentencing hearing, we are convinced that such discretion gives greater opportunity for
racial prejudice to operate than is present when the jury is restricted to factfinding." Id.
at 36 n.8 (citation omitted).
425. Defendants in noncapital cases cannot insist on such questioning unless special
circumstances present a risk that racism will affect the trial. Id. at 37-38 (reaffirming
Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589 (1976)).
Despite the concerns articulated in Turner, the Court feared that eliminating all opportunity for the jury to act on the admittedly impermissible basis of race would abolish the
discretion that is crucial to the current system of capital punishment. In McCleskey v.
Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), the defendant produced the Baldus study, which marshaled
statistical evidence to demonstrate that race actually has functioned as a sentencing con-
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Conversely, the Court relied on the sentencing jury's discretion
as a reason to reject the defendant's claim of procedural error in
California v. Ramos.426 The Ramos jury considered only two sentencing options: death or life in prison without possibility of parole.427 The trial court told the jury that the governor could
commute the latter sentence.4 28 This instruction, the defendant argued, with its hint that only an execution would guarantee that he
would never return to society, could divert the jury from its main
job of evaluating his crime, background, and character.429 Speaking for the Court, Justice O'Connor responded that a sentencing
jury had no central task from which it could be distracted.430 Because the sentencing jury is free to focus on "countless" factors, the
Court explained, its mission differs fundamentally from the task of
determining guilt or innocence.43 ' Once the jury properly found an
aggravating circumstance that made the defendant eligible for
death, the Constitution posed no bar to an exercise of "unbridled
discretion. ' 432 Free to focus on a "myriad of factors," the jury
could permissibly consider the defendant's prospects of someday
endangering the community if future governors and parole boards
permitted release.433
With such discretion, the jury obviously may assign whatever
weight it wishes to the various parcels of information it considers.
In another context, however, the Court has recognized that such
freedom can increase the risk of erroneous decision making, especially when the ultimate standard of decision is vague.434 In
Santosky v. Kramer, the Court applied an Eldridge analysis and
demanded stiffer procedural protections before states may terminate parental rights.4 35 When parents face charges that they neglect their children, the Court explained, "numerous" factors
sideration in the practice of post-Furman capital sentencing juries in Georgia. The Court
concluded that the study showed, at the most, a disparity in sentencing that appeared to
correlate with race. The Court held that existing procedures met the Constitution's requirements. Id. at 312-13.
426. 463 U.S. 992 (1982).
427. Id. at 995.
428. Id. at 995-96.
429. Id. at 998.
430. Id. at 1008. But see Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 508 (1987) (evidence of
crime's impact on victim's family could "divert [the sentencing jury] from deciding the
case on the relevant evidence concerning the crime and the defendant").
431. Ramos, 463 U.S. at 998 n.21, 1008.
432. Id. at 1008 n.22.
433. Id. at 1008.
434. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 762-63 (1982).
435. Id. at 761.

1990]

Confrontation at Capital Sentencing Hearings

combine to amplify the prospect of unjust outcomes. 36 In a statement that applies with equal force to capital sentencing, the Court
explained that an imprecise standard of decision provided unusual
freedom to underweigh probative facts according to personal subjective values. 437 The Court also noted that cultural and class bias
can easily infect proceedings where the defendants are frequently
poor, uneducated, and nonwhite.4 38 The proceeding challenged in
Kramer already provided for cross-examination. The Court compensated for the risk of error
by requiring that the state shoulder a
439
heavier burden of proof.
Even the broadest view of the jury's sentencing discretion still
suggests that cross-examination would make the results more reliable and just. Although the jury may weigh as it wishes, cross-examination can reduce the risk that the jury will overvalue the
statements of the prosecution's out-of-court declarants. In the
Court's view, the capital sentencing decision should reflect "a reasoned moral response" to the crime and the individual defendant's
background and character. 440 Thus, the jury ultimately decides by
applying a discretionary moral judgment to some view of historical
fact. 4 1 When it forms that view by processing the state's information about the defendant's background and character, the jury can
evaluate more accurately when the sources present their testimony
in court.
When civil juries hear tort suits that seek punitive damages,
they, too, wield absolute discretion to render a decision that combines a finding of historical fact with a subjective, moral evaluation." 2 A plaintiff's bid for punitive damages provides a useful
analogy to a prosecutor's request that a jury sentence a defendant
436. Id. at 762.
437. Id.
438. Id. at 762-63.
439. Id. at 766-68.
440. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2947 (1989) (quoting California v.
Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987)).
441. Cf Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S.
1, 20 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring) ("unless the parole board makes parole-release determinations in some arbitrary or random fashion, these subjective evaluations about future
success on parole also must be based on retrospective factual findings").
442. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 52 (1983) (decision to award punitive damages
is "discretionary moral judgment"); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350
(1974) ("reprehensible" conduct); D. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 3.9, at 204, 218 (1973) (absolute discretion to award; amount sometimes subject to reduction); J. GHIARDI & J.
KIRCHER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES LAW & PRACTICE § 12.04 (1985); W. KEETON, D.
DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at
9 (5th ed. 1984) (deliberate, outrageous conduct).
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to death. First, plaintiffs and prosecutors share some reasons for
requesting their remedies: to punish reprehensible conduct and deter others. 4 3 Second, tortfeasors are not liable for punitive damages unless the jury first determines that the defendant's conduct
was sufficiently aggravated. Third, once defendants are "eligible,"
civil juries enjoy full discretion to award punitive damages or
not. 4 " Finally, courts commonly require juries to determine liability in one proceeding and damages in another, just as capital trials
proceed in two phases. Judges sometimes order an additional severance and conduct a separate hearing dedicated solely to the issue
of punitive damages." 5 A proceeding focusing only on punitive
damages is especially comparable to the second phase of an Illinois
capital sentencing trial. 446 Once a civil jury determines that a defendant acted egregiously enough to risk liability for punitive damages, new evidence becomes relevant. Because punitive damages
are imposed to punish, evidence of the defendant's wealth and income is relevant on the theory that the jury must be able to fix an
award large enough to inflict the appropriate level of financial
pain. 44 7 The jury returns no finding on the defendant's net worth;
the evidence is offered simply to aid the jury's ultimate discretion443. Compare Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 148 (1987) (retribution, deterrence,
and death) with Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) (punishment,
deterrence, and punitive damages).
444. While capital sentencing juries can vote only yes or no, civil juries exercise vast
discretion to fix the amount of punitive damages, often without judicially or legislatively
imposed maximums. Justice O'Connor has suggested that this discretion deserves judicial scrutiny. See Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 86 (1988)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part). When the Court held that the eighth amendment's
bar of excessive fines does not apply to suits between private parties, the opinion cited
Justice O'Connor's criticism of punitive damages and suggested that the due process
clause might impose some limits on juries' discretion. See Browning-Ferris Indus. v.
Kelco Disposal, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 2909, 2921 (1989). The Court is unlikely to actually
abolish punitive damages, however, and any future constitutional limits on civil juries'
discretion will not disturb the analogy this Article proposes. No imminent constitutional
ruling will prompt courts or legislatures to decide that juries may hear ordinarily inadmissible hearsay when pondering whether to impose punitive damages.
445. The rules of procedure in federal courts permit such a severance. FED. R. CIv.
P. 42(b); see also Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 407 n. 16 (5th Cir.
1986) (trial court should consider holding separate trial on issue of punitive damages
after liability and compensatory damages are already determined); Campolongo v. Celotex Corp., 681 F. Supp. 261 (D.N.J. 1988) (citing cases). State courts, too, sometimes
conduct bifurcated hearings when evidence of the defendant's wealth-relevant to punitive damages-may prejudice the jury's decision on compensatory damages. D. LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 610 (1985).
446. In some cases, civil juries are even told they may consider the defendant's character in deciding whether to award punitive damages. See Browning-Ferris, 109 S. Ct. at
2913 (quoting instruction of state trial court).
447. D. LAYCOCK, supra note 445, at 610.
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ary decision. Yet the plaintiff must present the evidence of the defendant's wealth according to the usual rules of evidence."' When
juries consider punitive damages or capital sentences, they hear
some evidence of historical fact that may or may not be crucial to
their final discretionary decisions. Cross-examination, whether
guaranteed by the rules of evidence or the right of confrontation,
reduces the risk that a jury will evaluate some information erroneously and thus taint its ultimate decision.
3.

The Government's Interest

The Eldridge balancing test next weighs the government function involved and the burden of requiring an additional procedure.
The government's interest in foregoing confrontation also has
changed since Williams. The Williams Court referred to the government's interest in relying on sources who might not otherwise
provide information if they knew they would inevitably sacrifice
their time and their anonymity repeating their story in court.449 In
Gardnerv. Florida, however, the Court decided that any legitimate
government interest in relying on secret information must succumb
to the defendant's right to challenge, rebut, or explain. 45 0 Since
Gardner,judges who sentence defendants to death must reveal the
information they rely on, and when juries serve as sentencers, the
information all comes out in open court. The government could
theoretically preserve the anonymity of out-of-court informants by
presenting their information secondhand through the testimony of
police officers or probation investigators. The defense could crossexamine these witnesses when they appear in court, however, and
demand to know their sources. In this manner, the defense could
learn the names of the out-of-court sources, even without a right to
cross-examine them personally. Thus, the Williams-era government interest in encouraging anonymous sources to provide sentencing information does not survive the changes in capital
sentencing procedures that have already occurred.451
448. This would include documentary evidence that fits the exceptions to the rule
against hearsay. State rules of evidence will generally produce the same result as complying with the confrontation clause, except when they allow some hearsay that the Federal
Rules of Evidence would exclude. See 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S
EVIDENCE 800-35 (1988) and discussion supra notes 122, 129.
449. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 250 (1949).
450. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 360 (1977).
451. Once it is clear that the government must disclose the declarants' identities and
the information they furnished, Judge Friendly suggests that courts should then balance
the value of cross-examination against any further harm it might cause:
[T]he question whether cross-examination should be denied must generally be

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 22

In the only capital sentencing case to weigh the Eldridge factors,
the Court said the state shares the defendant's "compelling" interest in avoiding erroneous decisions . 432 The gravity of the life-anddeath decision implicates another government interest first articulated in the years after Williams. The state, which must preserve
the execution's legitimacy in the eyes of the community, has a "vital" interest in the appearance of fairness.453 The government
would certainly foster this appearance of fairness by granting the
defendant one of the fundamental procedural protections contained in the Bill of Rights.454 In other contexts, the Court has
noted that providing a right of confrontation promotes the perception that proceedings are fair.433
Affording a right of confrontation would impose far less fiscal
and administrative costs on the government than the Williams
Court contemplated. Because the Williams Court did not regard
capital sentencing as a special class, a ruling requiring confrontation would have applied to all sentencing proceedings. The formidable administrative burden looming before the Williams Courtdrawn-out evidentiary hearings and clogged court calendarsshould pose no barrier to a right of confrontation in capital
sentencings, which comprise a small proportion of all
sentencing.456
viewed from an incremental standpoint-assuming that the name of the witness
and the content of his testimony will have been disclosed, how much further
harm, if any, will be caused by allowing cross-examination when contrasted
with its value.
Friendly, supra note 345, at 1286. In citing Judge Friendly's article, the Supreme Court
has referred to the author as a "knowledgeable and thoughtful observer." Walters v.
National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 325 (1985).
While requiring cross-examination may undermine authority or increase tension in
prisons and semicustodial institutions like public schools, it is not apparent what sort of
harm confrontation might pose in court proceedings, where cross-examination is normal
and expected. The value of cross-examination in capital sentencing, however, is clear.
Judge Friendly's analysis thus supports a right of cross-examination in capital sentencing
hearings.
452. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83-84 (1985).
453. In Gardner,the Court observed, "It is of vital importance to the defendant and
to the community that any decision to impose the death sentence be, and appear to be,
based on reason rather than caprice or emotion." Gardner, 430 U.S. at 358; see also
Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 508 (1987).
454. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (confrontation is fundamental right).
455. See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1019 (1988) ("[t]he perception that confrontation is essential to fairness has persisted over the centuries"). In Coy, the Court also said
that "the right ... 'contributes to the establishment of a system of criminal justice in
which the perception as well as the reality of fairness prevails.'" Id. at 1018-19 (quoting
Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 540 (1986)).
456. The ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice applied the Eldridge bal-

1990]

Confrontation at Capital Sentencing Hearings

Forcing the government to produce all capital sentencing witnesses for in-court testimony presents another burden to consider
in the due process equation. Witnesses who can provide information on the defendant's entire life history may be scattered across
the country. The Supreme Court considered this problem when it
decided that probationers and parolees may confront adverse witnesses in revocation hearings.4"' In those cases, in which the government threatened to deprive individuals only of conditional
liberty, the Court suggested that traditional substitutes for live testimony sometimes might suffice. But the Court clearly preferred
live testimony, which it regarded as sometimes indispensable.'"
ancing test to analyze noncapital sentencing procedures. The Project advocated a limited
right to an evidentiary hearing in which defendants could contest disputed facts in
presentence reports. In the commentary, the authors report two reasons for stopping
short of recommending a full-fledged trial-type hearing with the right to confront the
sources of all sentencing information. Neither of these reasons applies to capital sentencing.
First, in analyzing the final factor in the due process analysis, the Project authors concluded that the fiscal and administrative burden of a full hearing with a right of confrontation would be too great. If defendants gridlocked court calendars by dragging out
sentencing proceedings, legislatures would respond by adopting determinate sentences
based strictly on the crime committed. The Project authors opposed strict determinate
sentencing. See 3 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUATICE § 18-6.4 commentary at 451
(1979). Because capital sentencing comprises only a small portion of all sentencing, a full
right of confrontation would affect court calendars only insignificantly. Moreover, legislatures cannot require determinate sentences in capital cases. Sumner v. Shuman, 483
U.S. 66 (1987) (statute fixing mandatory sentence of death violates eighth amendment).
Second, the Project authors explained that rules of procedure must balance the dangers
and benefits of underinclusion and overinclusion. In criminal trials, the policy requiring
proof beyond a reasonable doubt represents a decision to underinclude-to let some
guilty people go free. In sentencing, the Project reasoned, the considerations favoring
underinclusion fade: it may not matter if loose procedures erroneously overinclude and
thus regard some convicts as more dangerous than they really are. That choice may be
preferable to establishing strict procedures that may underinclude and thus permit some
truly dangerous criminals to escape the label their record would merit. See 3 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 18-6.4 commentary at 451 (1979).

When evaluating

capital sentencing procedures, however, the risk that the penalty of death may be imposed in error remains the paramount consideration. The procedures for sending defendants to death row should therefore err on the side of underinclusion.
457. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 n.5 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471, 487 (1972).
458. In Gagnon, the Court explained that affidavits and depositions may sometimes
substitute for live testimony in revocation hearings:
An additional comment is warranted with respect to the rights to present witnesses and to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. Petitioner's greatest concern is with the difficulty and expense of procuring witnesses from
perhaps thousands of miles away. While in some cases there is simply no adequate alternative to live testimony, we emphasize that we did not in Morrissey
intend to prohibit use where appropriate of the conventional substitutes for live
testimony, including affidavits, depositions, and documentary evidence.
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Because the state could dispense with confrontation in that setting
only on a showing of necessity,459 the cases suggest that fiscal and
administrative burdens do not justify the Illinois statute's blanket
denial of confrontation.
When considering whether a state must offer additional procedural protections, the Court sometimes looks to the practice of
other states.4 "° A survey of other states reveals that more than half
the states that entrust the capital sentencing decision to the jury
require the prosecution to follow the rules of evidence,"' and the
states that endorse capital punishment most enthusiastically are
the most procedurally strict. Seventy percent of the post-Furman
executions have been carried out in states that exclude hearsay
from the prosecution's case for death, while the states that clearly
deny defendants a right of confrontation are responsible for less
than six percent of the executions." 2 Even when including the
states that leave the final sentencing decision to the trial judge,
more than sixty-three percent of all death sentences outside Illinois
have been handed down in states that require prosecutors to present their aggravating evidence according to the rules that govern
criminal trials. The states that clearly permit hearsay in the prosecution's case account for less than nine percent of all sentences of
death.4 63 The statistics from our nation's most heavily populated
Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 782 n.5 (dealing with probation revocation and explaining Morrissey
v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), which dealt with parole).
459. Morrissey guaranteed parolees the right to confront the sources of adverse information unless the hearing officer determined that an informant's safety required anonymity. Morrisey, 408 U.S. at 487.
460. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 78-79 & n.4 (1985).
461. Of the 30 states that permit the jury to make the final sentencing decision, 18
require prosecutors to present their case for death according to the rules of evidence. A
few additional states permit the prosecutor to use hearsay in rebutting the defendant's
mitigating evidence. For a detailed survey of the practice of other states, see supra note
22.
462. As of May 30, 1990, states had executed 128 prisoners since capital punishment
was restored in 1976. Texas, Louisiana, Georgia, Virginia, North Carolina, Mississippi,
South Carolina, and Missouri, all states that apply the rules of evidence in the sentencing
proceeding, executed 90 prisoners, while Utah and Nevada, which permit hearsay, executed seven. Another 31 executions were carried out in Florida, Alabama, and Indiana,
where the status of the right of confrontation is unclear. NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE &
EDUC. FUND, INC., DEATH Row, U.S.A. 5 (May 20, 1990) (listing executions by state).
463. As of May 30, 1990, 2213 prisoners waited in death rows in states other than
Illinois, and another 128 had already been executed since the moratorium on executions
ended in the 1970s. Id. at 5-33. Of these 2341 capital sentences, 1485 (63.43%) were
handed down in states that require the prosecution to follow the rules of evidence when
presenting its case in aggravation. The evidentially permissive states accounted for 210
capital sentences, or 8.97%. The remaining states, where the status of confrontation is
not clear, were responsible for 659 sentences, or 28.15%. See supra note 22. These
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death rows thus demonstrate that following the rules of evidence
would not unduly interfere with Illinois prosecutors' ability to seek
the ultimate punishment.
4.

The Final Balance

Although the Court has included the right to confront adverse
witnesses in lists of the "minimum" and "rudimentary" elements
of due process,4 " confrontation is not always required whenever
the due process clause applies. The Court has occasionally declined to require confrontation when the private interest at stake is
small, 465 especially when the security concerns of prisons merit defSobered by the prospect of imposing potentially large
erence.'
administrative burdens,467 the Court also prefers to defer to educa468 correctional, 4 9 medical,4 70 and other professional specialtional,
47
1
ists
who are accustomed to operating with minimal judicial
interference. Some cases that decline to require confrontation decide only the requirements of a preliminary predeprivation hearing.
The Court has approved minimal procedures in these cases with
the understanding that a more extensive adversary hearing, often
with a right of confrontation, will follow. 472 Finally, the Court has
occasionally approved some forms of written and documentary evifigures are not precise, as they do not include prisoners who died or committed suicide
while on death row, and some prisoners are under sentences of death in more than one
state.
464. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488-89 (1972) ("minimum requirements"); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-68 (1970) ("rudimentary").
465. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 473 (1983) (prisoner's interest in remaining
in general population not "of great consequence"). Young people, too, are sometimes
light weights in the Court's balancing scales. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 604
(1979) (commitment to mental hospital); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 583 (1975)
(school suspension); see also Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984) ("juveniles, unlike
adults, are always in some form of custody").
466. See, e.g., Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 476; Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 567-68
(1974).
467. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 347-48 (1976); Goss, 419 U.S. at
583 (school suspensions).
468. See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 682 (1977) (corporal punishment).
469. See, e.g., Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 477 (segregation); Greenholtz v. Inmates of the
Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1979) (parole release); Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 568-69 (1974) (good time credits).
470. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 608-09 (1979).
471. See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322-23 (1982) (institution for developmentally disabled).
472. See, e.g, Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc., 481 U.S. 252, 266 (1987). In Ingrahan
v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977), the Court held that state tort remedies provide sufficient
process for students to redress allegedly unreasonable paddlings in public school. The
rules of evidence would prevail at such a proceeding, with opposing witnesses subject to
cross-examination. See supra note 448.
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473
dence as a substitute for live testimony.
None of these cases applies to the second phase of the Illinois
capital sentencing trial. In contrast to the prison cases, the private
interest at stake is far heavier, and providing a right of confrontation poses no greater threat of disruption to the courts than any
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cross-examine the out-of-court sources of adverse information
would increase appreciably the fairness of the proceeding and enhance the reliability of the evidence on which the jury must rely.
Finally, the burden on the government would be minimal. Even if
the Specht decision does not conclusively govern the second stage
of an Illinois penalty trial, the Eldridge formula forcefully suggests
that due process requires a right of confrontation.

VI.

THE RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION IS ESSENTIAL TO THE
SUPREME COURT'S VIEW OF A FAIR TRIAL ON THE
ISSUE OF LIFE OR DEATH

The Supreme Court has long regarded the right of confrontation
in criminal trials as a fundamental right.476 In demanding that
capital sentencing hearings meet heightened standards of procedural fairness, the Court has admonished that states must observe
"fundamental constitutional guarantees. ' 47 7 By comparing the
capital sentencing hearing to a criminal trial and holding that some
sections of the Bill of Rights govern the proceedings, the Court has
forced states to provide procedural protections ordinarily associated only with adversary criminal trials.478 The Court has not pursued the trial analogy fully, however, 479 and its rejection of a sixth
amendment right to jury sentencing demonstrates that not every
provision of the Bill of Rights applies to capital sentencing.48 °
Nevertheless, although the Court has never held that the right of
476. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965).
477. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 463 (1981).
478. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 856-57 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Although the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination ordinarily applies only to statements that could lead to criminal prosecution, the Court now applies it
when the state seeks to use the defendant's involuntary statements as grounds for a sentence of death. Consequently, before interviewing a defendant who is in custody, a statehired psychiatrist must recite Miranda warnings. Psychiatric testimony that is based on
statements made without a valid Miranda waiver are not admissible as part of the prosecution's case in support of a sentence of death. Estelle, 451 U.S. at 466-69. Even when a
state psychiatrist complies with Miranda, he nevertheless violates a represented defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel by interviewing a defendant without first notifying his lawyer. Id. at 469-71; see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984)
(effective assistance of counsel); Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 438 (1981) (double
jeopardy).
479. See, e.g., Clemons v. Mississippi, 110 S.Ct. 1441, 1449 (1990) (when one of
several aggravating factors found by jury is invalid, eighth amendment does not require
new jury sentencing; appellate court may reweigh remaining valid aggravating factors
against mitigating evidence); Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 392 (1986) (eighth amendment does not forbid appellate court to make some factual findings that are necessary
prerequisites to a valid sentence of death); see also Dolinko, Foreword: How to Criticize
the Death Penalty, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 546, 560-64 (1986).
480. See Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 464 (1984).
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confrontation applies in capital sentencing hearings, the opinions
of the justices demonstrate that it is an essential component of their
view of a fair hearing on the punishment to be imposed at a capital
trial.
Strickland v. Washington48 1 reveals that the Court's view of a
fair trial is tied to those provisions of the sixth amendment guaranteeing that significant issues of criminal liability, either in a criminal trial or a capital sentencing hearing, will be decided in
accordance with the rules of adversary procedure. The basic elements of a fair trial, Strickland explained, are laid out in the sixth
amendment, which the Court quoted in full. In a summary that
conspicuously omitted the provision for trial by jury, the Court
concluded that "[lthus, a fair trial is one in which evidence subject
to adversarial testing is presented to an impartial tribunal
for reso4' 82
lution of issues defined in advance of the proceeding.
As Strickland suggests, adversary hearings can proceed without
a jury as long as there is still a neutral decision maker.48 3 The key
to the Court's view of a fair trial, that evidence be presented and
subject to adversarial testing, depends on retaining the remaining
provisions of the sixth amendment.8 4 These include the right to
counsel, the right to compel favorable testimony, and the right to
confront adverse witnesses, which the Court has called "the full
panoply of adversary safeguards. ' 485 Strickland describes the attorney's role in capital sentencing as ensuring the functioning of
481. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
482. Id. at 684-85.
483. See Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975) (bench trial is an adversary
proceeding).
484. In Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818 (1975), the Court held that the right
to counsel also guarantees the right to self-representation. The Court regarded the remaining provisions of the sixth amendment, except for the right to jury trial, as essential
components of the adversary system:
Because these rights are basic to our adversary system of criminal justice, they
are part of the "due process of law" that is guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment to defendants in the criminal courts of the States. The rights to
notice, confrontation, and compulsory process, when taken together, guarantee
that a criminal charge may be answered in a manner now considered fundamental to the fair administration of American justice-through the calling and interrogation of favorable witnesses, the cross-examination of adverse witnesses,
and the orderly introduction of evidence. In short, the Amendment constitutionalizes the right in an adversary criminal trial to make a defense as we know
it.
Id. (footnote omitted).
485. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119 (1975) ("the full panoply of adversary safeguards [includes] counsel, confrontation, cross-examination, and compulsory process for
witnesses").
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the "the adversarial testing process. 48 6 To subject an opponent's
evidence to adversary testing, an effective lawyer must have the
right to insist that his opponent produce his witnesses in court for
cross-examination.4 "7 Strickland's rationale therefore suggests
that in post-Furman capital sentencing proceedings, a right of confrontation is an unseverable part of the
adversary battle over
48 8
whether the defendant shall live or die.
The right of confrontation appears so closely tied to the Court's
view of fair penalty trials that some opinions assume that defendants already have a right to confront the witnesses against them.
For example, in Bullington v. Missouri,8 9 the Court noted that de486. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686-87.
487. Professor Lilly regards the rule against hearsay as an essential part of an adversary proceeding:
[A]ttempts to abandon or nullify the rule against hearsay evidence are unlikely
to be successful so long as the basic tenets of the adversary proceeding are retained. Because the adversarial posture demands the opportunity for cross-examination, the hearsay rule-which protects that right by rejecting "untested"
evidence not within an exception-is not easily forsaken.
G. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE

§

7.28, at 306 (2d ed. 1987).

488. The defendant in Strickland was sentenced to death in Florida, where the jury
does not make the final sentencing decision. Moreover, because the defendant waived his
right to an advisory jury, the judge was the sole sentencing authority. Strickland, 466
U.S. at 672. Strickland thus provides support for the view that the adversary nature of
capital sentencing itself-even without a jury-requires the customary rules of adversary
procedure, like the rights of confrontation and cross-examination, even though they are
not required in less formal noncapital sentencings. See also Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S.
203, 210 (1984) (applying Bullington's holding on double jeopardy and finding "[t]hat the
sentencer in Arizona is the trial judge rather than the jury does not render the sentencing
proceeding any less like a trial").
Relying on Strickland as independent authority for a right of confrontation creates
some tension with earlier Supreme Court opinions that did not object to Florida trial
judges relying on presentence reports, see Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976), discussed supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text, as long as the defendant had the opportunity to challenge the accuracy of the information they contain, see Gardner v. Florida,
430 U.S. 349 (1977), discussed supra notes 60-68 and accompanying text. See also Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 944-46 (1983).
The hallmark of the adversary system is that the parties investigate, control, and present the information on which the decision maker relies. Because presentence reports are
prepared by an agent of the court, any reliance on presentence reports dilutes the adversary nature of the capital sentencing hearing. See supra notes 162-63 & 327-28 and accompanying text. In Strickland, however, there was no presentence report. Indeed, the
defendant's attorney deliberately declined to ask for a presentence investigation, in order
to maintain control of the information on which the decision maker could rely. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 673. Even if Florida judges independently order a presentence investigation in other cases, Strickland and Proffitt can be substantially reconciled if defendants
may confront adverse witnesses at any evidentiary hearing the judge convenes to resolve
disputes about facts in the presentence report. For a discussion of the unsettled procedural issues such hearings present, see Note, A Hidden Issue of Sentencing.- Burdens of
Prooffor Disputed Allegations in Presentence Reports, 66 GEO. L.J. 1515 (1979).
489. 451 U.S. 430 (1981).
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fendants already enjoyed the right of confrontation in capital sentencing hearings that resemble Missouri's, because Specht v.
Patterson 490 requires that defendants be afforded the right of confrontation in sentencing proceedings where a new finding of fact,
not an element of the offense proven at trial, serves as the basis for
an new or increased sentence.491 And in Booth v. Maryland, when
discussing the problems defendants would face in attempting to
challenge or rebut a probation investigator's report on the crime's
defendants
impact on the surviving family, the Court said that
"presumably" could cross-examine the declarants. 492
More specifically, the Court relied on the adversarial testing process and the defendant's right of confrontation in Barefoot v. Estelle, when it held that Texas prosecutors may use expert
psychiatric testimony to predict whether defendants would be dangerous in the future.4 93 The defendant argued that such predictions were extremely unreliable.4 94 Writing in general language
instead of grounding the holding in the specific practice in Texas,
which follows the rules of evidence, the Court appeared to assume
that all defendants would be able to cross-examine psychiatric experts, expose arguably unreliable opinions, and argue the issue of
weight to the jury.4 95 Although the opinion does not hold that
states must afford capital defendants a right of confrontation and
cross-examination, it suggests that the Court would disapprove the
Illinois practice of allowing the state to introduce the uncross-examined opinions of out-of-court psychiatrists. 96
490. 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
491. Bullfington, 451 U.S. at 446. The rule of Specht, as the Bullington court described it, does not clearly grant defendants a right to confront adverse witnesses in the
second stage of an Illinois capital sentencing trial. See supra text accompanying notes
288-99.
492. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 506 (1987). The Court did not explain why it
could only "presume" that the right of cross-examination operated at the penalty hearing. Nor did the Court explain what form this cross-examination would take. According
to the opinion, the Maryland statute provided that the victim impact statement could be
read to the jury, or the family members might be called for live testimony. Id. at 499. If
the statement is simply read to the jury, then the defense can cross-examine the declarants only by calling them as defense witnesses. It is not clear, however, that the Booth
Court actually considered how the defense would be able to cross-examine the prosecution's absent witnesses. For criticism of the view that defendant's right to compulsory
process can substitute for the right to cross-examine the prosecution's out-of-court declarants, see supra note 120.
493. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 902-03 (1983).
494. Id. at 898.
495. Id.
496. See supra notes 254-63 and accompanying text (discussing Illinois cases allowing
hearsay evidence of psychiatric opinions). The Barefoot holding itself does not necessarily render the Illinois practice invalid. Because the rules of evidence govern Texas pen-
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Although the Court has often emphasized the value of crossexamination in furthering the goal of accurate fact-finding,497 truth
seeking is not the only goal that animates rules of criminal procedure. They must also be fair. The Court has reiterated that fairness to the accused remains a prime concern in its review of capital
sentencing proceedings. 49

The Court's sixth amendment cases

also emphasize that the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses is basic to our sense that criminal trials are conducted
fairly,4 99 and the reasoning of these decisions applies with equal
force to the penalty phase of capital trials. Indeed, decisions like
Strickland,Booth, and Barefoot strongly suggest that the Court includes the right of confrontation in its vision of a fair hearing on
the penalty to be imposed after a capital trial. When states permit
juries to sentence defendants to death on the basis of accusations
that they cannot cross-examine, the proceedings are unfair.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The cases of the United States Supreme Court provide no support for denying defendants the right to confront the witnesses who
testify against them in capital sentencing hearings. In drafting the
provision that suspends the rules of evidence in capital sentencing
hearings, the Illinois legislature apparently was influenced by the
Model Penal Code." ° Although some portions of the Code's capital sentencing provisions drew an approving nod from the Supreme
Court in the mid-1970s, it never commented on the Code's proposal to permit hearsay at the sentencing hearing. 50 1
Instead of evaluating testimony according to the rules of evidence, the Illinois Supreme Court has substituted the standard of
relevance and reliability. Although a scrupulous application of
that standard might produce nearly the same results as a right of
alty trials, see Rumbaugh v. State, 589 S.W.2d 414, 417 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979), the
psychiatrist in Barefoot testified in court and the defendant had the opportunity to crossexamine and rebut. Although the Court said the rules of evidence are a constitutionally
sufficient safeguard, it did not decide whether they are inevitably necessary. By writing in
broad language about the right of cross-examination, however, instead of tying its holding to procedures available specifically in Texas, the Court appears to regard confrontation and cross-examination as procedural protections accorded to every capital
defendant.
497. See, e.g., United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 396 (1986).
498. See, e.g., Clemons v. Mississippi, 110 S. Ct. 1441, 1448 (1990) ("twin objectives"
of "measured consistent application and fairness to the accused").
499. See, e.g., Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1019 (1988); Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530,
540 (1986).
500. See Note, supra note 23, at 885 n.136.
501. See supra notes 39-57 and accompanying text.
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confrontation, the Illinois court has generally adopted an extremely deferential approach when trial judges decide to admit ordinarily inadmissible hearsay. It has offered confusing and
contradictory explanations that fail to demonstrate that the prosecution's evidence is truly reliable. With its sometimes terse and
cursory treatment of defendants' evidentiary objections, the court
has appeared unconcerned about the risk of admitting untrustworthy evidence. 50 2 The court's holding that the prosecution may introduce evidence of prior unadjudicated crimes, even through
double hearsay, compounds the problem.
The Illinois Supreme Court first approved submitting uncrossexamined hearsay to a sentencing jury by relying on a mistaken
view of some collected state court authorities and incorrectly extending Williams v. New York. 50 3 Although Williams permitted a
judge to rely on hearsay information, it did not extend similar evidentiary freedom to sentencing juries. Moreover, the precedential
value of Williams has declined as states have responded to later
Supreme Court rulings by transforming capital sentencing hearings
into adversary trials on the issue of life or death."°
The Court's due process cases strongly support a right of confrontation at capital sentencing, 50 5 and the Court has suggested
that a fair penalty trial will feature most of the adversary procedural protections of the sixth amendment. Moreover, by occasionally assuming that the right of confrontation already prevails in
capital sentencing hearings, the Court suggests that it regards confrontation as an essential component of the rigorously fair procedures that must govern the life or death decision. 06
The cases of the Supreme Court thus present a powerful indict502. A recent case is an exception. In People v. Harris, 129 Ill. 2d 123, 162-65, 544
N.E.2d 357, 374-75 (1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1323 (1990), the court reversed a
sentence of death because the trial judge relied on evidence that the Illinois Supreme
Court considered irrelevant and unreliable which implicated Harris in a 1969 homicide.
See supra notes 150-53 & 159 and accompanying text. To show that the trial judge
should not have believed the witnesses who implicated the defendant, the court thoroughly analyzed the testimony from the sentencing hearing. Although the prosecution
did not rely on hearsay and the court had no occasion to discuss the defendant's right of
confrontation, the Harris decision contrasts sharply with many of the court's other rulings that consider what evidence is proper at the capital sentencing hearing: it subjected
the prosecution's evidence of old unadjudicated misconduct to the detailed scrutiny it
rightly deserves.
503. See the discussion of People v. Jones, 94 Ill. 2d 275, 286, 447 N.E.2d 161, 166
(1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 920 (1983), supra notes 97-114 and accompanying text.
504. See supra notes 295-344 and accompanying text.
505. See supra notes 345-475 and accompanying text.
506. See supra notes 476-99 and accompanying text.
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ment. States like Illinois violate the federal Constitution when
they permit juries to sentence defendants to death on the basis of
accusations that they cannot cross-examine.

